Joseph Melia
Biographic Data
| ID | 3973945 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joseph Melia |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joseph |
| FAMILY NAME | Melia |
| SIGNATURE | MELIÁ J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leeds |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Modality
Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument…
Modality
More and more philosophers are using modal notions to solve problems and to analyse concepts. In this introduction to the topic of modality Joseph Melia places his emphasis on a commitment to possible worlds as the best way to understand the nature of necessity. Melia demonstrates how different theories about possible worlds not only influence our more general modal beliefs but illustrate and illuminate various methodological considerations, such…
Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics.
Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism
In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this…
Languages of Possibility
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Languages of Possibility. By Graeme Forbes. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Pp. xi + 181. Price £39.50.) Joseph Melia Joseph Melia Jesus College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 271–273, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219821 Published: 01 April 1990
Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument…
Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism
In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this…
Languages of Possibility
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Languages of Possibility. By Graeme Forbes. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Pp. xi + 181. Price £39.50.) Joseph Melia Joseph Melia Jesus College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 271–273, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219821 Published: 01 April 1990
Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism
In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this…
Modality
More and more philosophers are using modal notions to solve problems and to analyse concepts. In this introduction to the topic of modality Joseph Melia places his emphasis on a commitment to possible worlds as the best way to understand the nature of necessity. Melia demonstrates how different theories about possible worlds not only influence our more general modal beliefs but illustrate and illuminate various methodological considerations, such…
Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics.
Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content
Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument…
Modality
Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · History and Theory of Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Modalite? (Logique) (2 works) · Modalite? (Theorie de la connaissance) (2 works) · Modality (Logic) (2 works) · Modality (Theory of knowledge) (2 works)