Alexander Paseau
Biographic Data
| ID | 3974083 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alexander Paseau |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alexander |
| FAMILY NAME | Paseau |
| SIGNATURE | PASEAU A |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof
Mathematicians do not claim to know a proposition unless they think they possess a proof of it. For all their confidence in the truth of a proposition with weighty non-deductive support (for example, the Riemann hypothesis), they maintain that, strictly speaking, the proposition remains unknown until such time as someone has proved it. This article challenges this conception of knowledge, which is quasi-universal within mathematics. We present fo…
Mathematical instrumentalism, Gödel’s theorem, and inductive evidence
Defining Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer
I explain why Ross Cameron's definition of ultimate ontological basis is incorrect, and propose a different definition in terms of ontological dependence, as well as a definition of reality's fundamental layer. These new definitions cover the conceptual possibility that self-dependent entities exist. They also apply to different conceptions of the relation of ontological dependence. © 2009 The Author
Mathematical Knowledge
What the foundationalist filter kept out
Naturalism in Mathematics and the Authority of Philosophy
Naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that philosophy cannot legitimately gainsay mathematics. I distinguish between reinterpretation and reconstruction naturalism: the former states that philosophy cannot legitimately sanction a reinterpretation of mathematics (i.e. an interpretation different from the standard one); the latter that philosophy cannot legitimately change standard mathematics (as opposed to its interpretation). I…
Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof
Mathematicians do not claim to know a proposition unless they think they possess a proof of it. For all their confidence in the truth of a proposition with weighty non-deductive support (for example, the Riemann hypothesis), they maintain that, strictly speaking, the proposition remains unknown until such time as someone has proved it. This article challenges this conception of knowledge, which is quasi-universal within mathematics. We present fo…
Mathematical instrumentalism, Gödel’s theorem, and inductive evidence
Naturalism in Mathematics and the Authority of Philosophy
Naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that philosophy cannot legitimately gainsay mathematics. I distinguish between reinterpretation and reconstruction naturalism: the former states that philosophy cannot legitimately sanction a reinterpretation of mathematics (i.e. an interpretation different from the standard one); the latter that philosophy cannot legitimately change standard mathematics (as opposed to its interpretation). I…
Defining Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer
I explain why Ross Cameron's definition of ultimate ontological basis is incorrect, and propose a different definition in terms of ontological dependence, as well as a definition of reality's fundamental layer. These new definitions cover the conceptual possibility that self-dependent entities exist. They also apply to different conceptions of the relation of ontological dependence. © 2009 The Author
What the foundationalist filter kept out
What the foundationalist filter kept out
Naturalism in Mathematics and the Authority of Philosophy
Naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that philosophy cannot legitimately gainsay mathematics. I distinguish between reinterpretation and reconstruction naturalism: the former states that philosophy cannot legitimately sanction a reinterpretation of mathematics (i.e. an interpretation different from the standard one); the latter that philosophy cannot legitimately change standard mathematics (as opposed to its interpretation). I…
Mathematical Knowledge
Defining Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer
I explain why Ross Cameron's definition of ultimate ontological basis is incorrect, and propose a different definition in terms of ontological dependence, as well as a definition of reality's fundamental layer. These new definitions cover the conceptual possibility that self-dependent entities exist. They also apply to different conceptions of the relation of ontological dependence. © 2009 The Author
Mathematical instrumentalism, Gödel’s theorem, and inductive evidence
Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof
Mathematicians do not claim to know a proposition unless they think they possess a proof of it. For all their confidence in the truth of a proposition with weighty non-deductive support (for example, the Riemann hypothesis), they maintain that, strictly speaking, the proposition remains unknown until such time as someone has proved it. This article challenges this conception of knowledge, which is quasi-universal within mathematics. We present fo…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Algorithm (1 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works)