Lina Jansson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3974100 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lina Jansson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lina |
| FAMILY NAME | Jansson |
| SIGNATURE | JANSSON L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Nanyang Technological University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9056-789X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Explanatory Abstractions
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We opp…
Quantitative Parsimony: Probably for the Better
Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory…
Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
Causal Theories of Explanation and the Challenge of Explanatory Disagreement
When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the cent…
Newton’s “satis est”: A new explanatory role for laws
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation
Book Review| October 01 2012 Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation Strevens, Michael, Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. xi + 516 pp. Lina Jansson Lina Jansson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 625–630. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1630885 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions …
Explanatory Abstractions
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We opp…
Quantitative Parsimony: Probably for the Better
Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory…
Causal Theories of Explanation and the Challenge of Explanatory Disagreement
When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the cent…
Newton’s “satis est”: A new explanatory role for laws
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation
Book Review| October 01 2012 Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation Strevens, Michael, Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. xi + 516 pp. Lina Jansson Lina Jansson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 625–630. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1630885 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions …
Newton’s “satis est”: A new explanatory role for laws
Causal Theories of Explanation and the Challenge of Explanatory Disagreement
When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the cent…
Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
Quantitative Parsimony: Probably for the Better
Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory…
Explanatory Abstractions
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We opp…
Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Causal model (2 works) · Causal theory of reference (2 works) · Causality (physics) (2 works) · Causation (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)