Talbot Brewer
Biographic Data
| ID | 3974464 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Talbot Brewer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Talbot |
| FAMILY NAME | Brewer |
| SIGNATURE | BREWER T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Virginia |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Self‐Love and Its Forms
Sarah Buss argues that if we are to rise to the challenge of standing up to justice when doing so is costly, we will have to internalise a sense of our own unimportance. That is, we will have to cultivate an attitude that is ‘the opposite of self‐love’. I try to show that what we need is not to eliminate our love of self but to give it a proper and discerning shape, so that it conduces to our goodness rather than to our self‐interest narrowly con…
The Retrieval of Ethics
Talbot Brewer offers a new approach to ethical theory, founded on a far-reaching reconsideration of the nature and sources of human agency. He argues that ethical reflection is itself an important life activity, and philosophical ethics is an extension of this practical activity rather than just a theoretical reflection upon it
Morality and the Second Person
The guiding ambition of Stephen Darwall's The Second‐Person Standpoint is to account for the normativity of moral obligations by tying them to a reciprocal ‘second‐person’ authority, possessed by each person, to make reasonable demands of others. Darwall maintains that this theoretical approach is uniquely suited to illuminate the basic distinguishing marks of moral obligations. A moral obligation is not merely an act that it would be a very good…
Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason
Two Kinds of Commitments (And Two Kinds of Social Groups)
In this paper, I draw a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of commitments by highlighting some previously unnoticed subtleties in the pragmatics of “commissive” utterances. I argue that theories which seek to model all commitments on promises, or to ground them all on voluntary consent, can account only for one sort of obligation and not for the other. Since social groups are most perspicuously categorized in terms of the sorts…
Maxims and Virtues
Research Article| October 01 2002 Maxims and Virtues Talbot Brewer Talbot Brewer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 539–572. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-539 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Talbot Brewer; Maxims and Virtues. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2002; 111 (4): 539–572. doi: https://doi.org/10.12…
Maxims and Virtues
The Real Problem With Internalism About Reasons
Over the past two decades, moral philosophers have been engaged in a seemingly interminable debate about the role of internal and external reasons in practical reasoning. The rough distinction between these two sorts of reasons is this: internal reasons apply to particular agents in virtue of their relation to that agent's desires, preferences, or other motivational states, while external reasons are normative for particular agents quite independ…
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character
This book presents an ethical theory that uniquely integrates naturalistic and rationalistic elements. Robert Audi develops his theory in four areas: moral epistemology, the metaphysics of ethics, moral psychology, and the foundations of ethics. Comprising both new and published work, the book sets forth a moderate intuitionism, clarifies the relation between reason and motivation, constructs a theory of intrinsic value and its place in moral obl…
Two Kinds of Commitments (And Two Kinds of Social Groups)
In this paper, I draw a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of commitments by highlighting some previously unnoticed subtleties in the pragmatics of “commissive” utterances. I argue that theories which seek to model all commitments on promises, or to ground them all on voluntary consent, can account only for one sort of obligation and not for the other. Since social groups are most perspicuously categorized in terms of the sorts…
Maxims and Virtues
Research Article| October 01 2002 Maxims and Virtues Talbot Brewer Talbot Brewer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 539–572. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-539 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Talbot Brewer; Maxims and Virtues. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2002; 111 (4): 539–572. doi: https://doi.org/10.12…
The Real Problem With Internalism About Reasons
Over the past two decades, moral philosophers have been engaged in a seemingly interminable debate about the role of internal and external reasons in practical reasoning. The rough distinction between these two sorts of reasons is this: internal reasons apply to particular agents in virtue of their relation to that agent's desires, preferences, or other motivational states, while external reasons are normative for particular agents quite independ…
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character
This book presents an ethical theory that uniquely integrates naturalistic and rationalistic elements. Robert Audi develops his theory in four areas: moral epistemology, the metaphysics of ethics, moral psychology, and the foundations of ethics. Comprising both new and published work, the book sets forth a moderate intuitionism, clarifies the relation between reason and motivation, constructs a theory of intrinsic value and its place in moral obl…
Maxims and Virtues
Research Article| October 01 2002 Maxims and Virtues Talbot Brewer Talbot Brewer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 539–572. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-539 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Talbot Brewer; Maxims and Virtues. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2002; 111 (4): 539–572. doi: https://doi.org/10.12…
Maxims and Virtues
The Real Problem With Internalism About Reasons
Over the past two decades, moral philosophers have been engaged in a seemingly interminable debate about the role of internal and external reasons in practical reasoning. The rough distinction between these two sorts of reasons is this: internal reasons apply to particular agents in virtue of their relation to that agent's desires, preferences, or other motivational states, while external reasons are normative for particular agents quite independ…
Two Kinds of Commitments (And Two Kinds of Social Groups)
In this paper, I draw a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of commitments by highlighting some previously unnoticed subtleties in the pragmatics of “commissive” utterances. I argue that theories which seek to model all commitments on promises, or to ground them all on voluntary consent, can account only for one sort of obligation and not for the other. Since social groups are most perspicuously categorized in terms of the sorts…
Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason
The Retrieval of Ethics
Talbot Brewer offers a new approach to ethical theory, founded on a far-reaching reconsideration of the nature and sources of human agency. He argues that ethical reflection is itself an important life activity, and philosophical ethics is an extension of this practical activity rather than just a theoretical reflection upon it
Morality and the Second Person
The guiding ambition of Stephen Darwall's The Second‐Person Standpoint is to account for the normativity of moral obligations by tying them to a reciprocal ‘second‐person’ authority, possessed by each person, to make reasonable demands of others. Darwall maintains that this theoretical approach is uniquely suited to illuminate the basic distinguishing marks of moral obligations. A moral obligation is not merely an act that it would be a very good…
Self‐Love and Its Forms
Sarah Buss argues that if we are to rise to the challenge of standing up to justice when doing so is costly, we will have to internalise a sense of our own unimportance. That is, we will have to cultivate an attitude that is ‘the opposite of self‐love’. I try to show that what we need is not to eliminate our love of self but to give it a proper and discerning shape, so that it conduces to our goodness rather than to our self‐interest narrowly con…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Analytic philosophy (3 works) · Contemporary philosophy (3 works)