Sasha Mudd
Biographic Data
| ID | 3974800 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sasha Mudd |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sasha |
| FAMILY NAME | Mudd |
| SIGNATURE | MUDD S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8767-087X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Towards a Capabilities-Based Conception of Distributive Epistemic Justice
Despite a growing effort in recent years to theorize epistemic justice as a species of distributive justice from within a Rawlsian framework, there is as yet no well-worked out capabilities-based account. In this paper, we set out to provide one. According to our sufficientarian conception, epistemic justice requires a distribution of capabilities that ensures to all individuals opportunities for minimal epistemic agency, publicly conceived. We a…
They Don't Understand Us, but We Have to Understand Them”
Kant on Reflection and Virtue
In Kant on Reflection and Virtue, Melissa Merritt offers a detailed interpretation of what she calls “the Kantian reflective ideal,” bringing together Kant's most important claims concerning the value of reflection and our putative obligation to reflect. At its most minimal, Merritt takes the ideal to be implicit in Kant's claims that every judgment requires reflection (Überlegung) (A/B: 260–61/316–17), and that such reflection is a duty (A/B: 26…
The Demand for Systematicity and the Authority of Theoretical Reason in Kant
Kant’s notoriously unclear attempt to defend the regulative principle of systematic unity as the supreme principle of theoretical reason in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic has left its status a source of controversy. According to the dominant interpretation, the principle ought to be understood as a methodologically necessary device for extending our understanding of nature. I argue that this reading is flawed. While it may correctly…
Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in K ant
Throughout the critical period K ant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How K ant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our th…
Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in K ant
Throughout the critical period K ant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How K ant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our th…
They Don't Understand Us, but We Have to Understand Them”
Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in K ant
Throughout the critical period K ant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How K ant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our th…
The Demand for Systematicity and the Authority of Theoretical Reason in Kant
Kant’s notoriously unclear attempt to defend the regulative principle of systematic unity as the supreme principle of theoretical reason in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic has left its status a source of controversy. According to the dominant interpretation, the principle ought to be understood as a methodologically necessary device for extending our understanding of nature. I argue that this reading is flawed. While it may correctly…
Kant on Reflection and Virtue
In Kant on Reflection and Virtue, Melissa Merritt offers a detailed interpretation of what she calls “the Kantian reflective ideal,” bringing together Kant's most important claims concerning the value of reflection and our putative obligation to reflect. At its most minimal, Merritt takes the ideal to be implicit in Kant's claims that every judgment requires reflection (Überlegung) (A/B: 260–61/316–17), and that such reflection is a duty (A/B: 26…
They Don't Understand Us, but We Have to Understand Them”
Towards a Capabilities-Based Conception of Distributive Epistemic Justice
Despite a growing effort in recent years to theorize epistemic justice as a species of distributive justice from within a Rawlsian framework, there is as yet no well-worked out capabilities-based account. In this paper, we set out to provide one. According to our sufficientarian conception, epistemic justice requires a distribution of capabilities that ensures to all individuals opportunities for minimal epistemic agency, publicly conceived. We a…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Analytic philosophy (1 work)