Stanislav Marku
Biographic Data
| ID | 4016086 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stanislav Marku |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stanislav |
| FAMILY NAME | Marku |
| SIGNATURE | MARKU S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9291-2469 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 87 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Atlas That has Not Shrugged
There is demand among Russia's oligarchs for systemic change, but not for the rule of law proper. Instead, it is the de facto accountability of political elites and improved relations with the West that the Russian oligarchs want from the Kremlin. However, the oligarchs currently lack the capacity to effect change. Their insufficient leverage vis-à-vis Putin is rooted in their competition for rents, which prevents them from confronting the Kremli…
The Flexible Few
Based on an original large- N dataset of individual Ukrainian oligarchs and qualitative evidence, this article tests competing perspectives on the political power of big capital. We find, surprisingly, that neither the assumption of direct power by the oligarchs nor the mobility of oligarchic assets helps tycoons protect their fortunes against shocks. Instead, the indirect strategies of party support and media ownership significantly enhance busi…
Sovereign Commitment and Property Rights
Property, Predation, and Protection
What threatens the property rights of business owners? And what makes these rights secure? This book transcends the conventional diagnosis of the issue in modern developing countries by moving beyond expropriation by the state ruler or by petty bureaucratic corruption. It identifies 'agent predation' as a novel threat type, showing it to be particularly widespread and detrimental. The book also questions the orthodox prescription: institutionaliz…
Institutional complementarity, economic performance and governance in the post-communist world
Secure Property as a Bottom-Up Process
How do property rights become secure? How does rule of law take hold in an economy? The author uses an original survey of 516 firms in Russia and Ukraine, as well as interview-based case studies, to reexamine these fundamental issues of political economy. Most states in the developing world lack the requisite time horizons and institutional capacity to make the credible commitments emphasized in the literature. In this context, the author argues …
Owning Russia
(2007). Owning Russia: The Struggle over Factories, Farms, and Power. Andrew Scott Barnes. Eurasian Geography and Economics: Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 121-124
Capitalists of All Russia, Unite! Business Mobilization Under Debilitated Dirigisme
Political mobilization of business forces in the post-communist world has crucial implications for economic development and civil society. The emergence of strong cross-sectoral business associations during Putin's presidency challenges the prevailing view of Russia's political economy as an informal, particularistic state–business exchange. At the theoretical level, collective action by socio-economic groups is linked to severe principal-agent d…
Secure Property as a Bottom-Up Process
How do property rights become secure? How does rule of law take hold in an economy? The author uses an original survey of 516 firms in Russia and Ukraine, as well as interview-based case studies, to reexamine these fundamental issues of political economy. Most states in the developing world lack the requisite time horizons and institutional capacity to make the credible commitments emphasized in the literature. In this context, the author argues …
The Flexible Few
Based on an original large- N dataset of individual Ukrainian oligarchs and qualitative evidence, this article tests competing perspectives on the political power of big capital. We find, surprisingly, that neither the assumption of direct power by the oligarchs nor the mobility of oligarchic assets helps tycoons protect their fortunes against shocks. Instead, the indirect strategies of party support and media ownership significantly enhance busi…
Capitalists of All Russia, Unite! Business Mobilization Under Debilitated Dirigisme
Political mobilization of business forces in the post-communist world has crucial implications for economic development and civil society. The emergence of strong cross-sectoral business associations during Putin's presidency challenges the prevailing view of Russia's political economy as an informal, particularistic state–business exchange. At the theoretical level, collective action by socio-economic groups is linked to severe principal-agent d…
The Atlas That has Not Shrugged
There is demand among Russia's oligarchs for systemic change, but not for the rule of law proper. Instead, it is the de facto accountability of political elites and improved relations with the West that the Russian oligarchs want from the Kremlin. However, the oligarchs currently lack the capacity to effect change. Their insufficient leverage vis-à-vis Putin is rooted in their competition for rents, which prevents them from confronting the Kremli…
Sovereign Commitment and Property Rights
Institutional complementarity, economic performance and governance in the post-communist world
Owning Russia
(2007). Owning Russia: The Struggle over Factories, Farms, and Power. Andrew Scott Barnes. Eurasian Geography and Economics: Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 121-124
Capitalists of All Russia, Unite! Business Mobilization Under Debilitated Dirigisme
Political mobilization of business forces in the post-communist world has crucial implications for economic development and civil society. The emergence of strong cross-sectoral business associations during Putin's presidency challenges the prevailing view of Russia's political economy as an informal, particularistic state–business exchange. At the theoretical level, collective action by socio-economic groups is linked to severe principal-agent d…
Secure Property as a Bottom-Up Process
How do property rights become secure? How does rule of law take hold in an economy? The author uses an original survey of 516 firms in Russia and Ukraine, as well as interview-based case studies, to reexamine these fundamental issues of political economy. Most states in the developing world lack the requisite time horizons and institutional capacity to make the credible commitments emphasized in the literature. In this context, the author argues …
Institutional complementarity, economic performance and governance in the post-communist world
Property, Predation, and Protection
What threatens the property rights of business owners? And what makes these rights secure? This book transcends the conventional diagnosis of the issue in modern developing countries by moving beyond expropriation by the state ruler or by petty bureaucratic corruption. It identifies 'agent predation' as a novel threat type, showing it to be particularly widespread and detrimental. The book also questions the orthodox prescription: institutionaliz…
Sovereign Commitment and Property Rights
The Atlas That has Not Shrugged
There is demand among Russia's oligarchs for systemic change, but not for the rule of law proper. Instead, it is the de facto accountability of political elites and improved relations with the West that the Russian oligarchs want from the Kremlin. However, the oligarchs currently lack the capacity to effect change. Their insufficient leverage vis-à-vis Putin is rooted in their competition for rents, which prevents them from confronting the Kremli…
The Flexible Few
Based on an original large- N dataset of individual Ukrainian oligarchs and qualitative evidence, this article tests competing perspectives on the political power of big capital. We find, surprisingly, that neither the assumption of direct power by the oligarchs nor the mobility of oligarchic assets helps tycoons protect their fortunes against shocks. Instead, the indirect strategies of party support and media ownership significantly enhance busi…
Economics (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Russia and Soviet political economy (5 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (4 works) · Economic system (4 works) · Bureaucracy (3 works)