Erin R Graham
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4085457 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Erin R Graham |
| NOMBRES | Erin R |
| APELLIDO | Graham |
| FIRMA | GRAHAM E R |
| AFILIACIONES | Drexel University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 323 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2013 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
International Courts and the Construction of Legal Facts
How do international courts (ICs) affect the development of international law? Building on constructivist arguments that emphasize the law’s productive power, I argue that a full conception of the agency of ICs—of how ICs affect the development of international law—requires that we problematize legal facts. When interpreting international law, interpretive rules direct judges to consider legal facts: relevant rules, subsequent agreements, and the…
Multilateral Climate Finance in Pursuit of Private Capital
In the last decade, international financial institutions have advocated that multilateral funding be leveraged to reduce the risk of institutional investors, such as pensions and mutual funds, mobilizing private capital for development and decarbonization. Have international organizations (IOs) that deliver climate finance adopted the de-risking agenda? How is it affecting their work? Through a text analysis of the replenishment documents of five…
Shadow negotiators
Knowing How to Give
What shapes public support for aid delivery through international organizations (IOs)? Drawing on delegation theory, we propose that concerns about donor governments losing control over aid dampens public support for IO delivery. We theorize and provide examples of how two sets of control concerns animate public preferences: those incurred through shared decision-making in multilateral bodies and those incurred during disbursement and implementat…
Emergent Flexibility in Institutional Development
How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional wisdom in international relations, outlined by rational design, is that the answer lies in designed flexibility, which allows states to adjust agreements. Drawing on rich but disparate literatures across subfields of political science—especially constructivism and historical institutionalism—we propose an alternative, which we call “emergent flexibil…
Power, Control, and the Logic of Substitution in Institutional Design
How do powerful states control international organizations (IOs)? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design, we propose that funding rules are equally important. Our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules—that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an IO are used…
The institutional design of funding rules at international organizations
What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have f…
International Organizations as Orchestrators
International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries – including NGOs – IOs can shape and steer global governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholar…
Money and multilateralism
International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the liberal international order and is instantiated in formal, intergovernmental organizations. This paper revisits the conventional wisdom regarding the multilateral character of international organization (IO) governance by drawing attention to the funding methods used to finance contemporary IOs. I argue that different funding rules constitute differe…
The Communication of Ideas across Subfields in Political Science
What factors inhibit or facilitate cross-subfield conversations in political science? This article draws on diffusion scholarship to gain insight into cross-subfield communication. Diffusion scholarship represents a case where such communication might be expected, given that similar diffusion processes are analyzed in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. We identify nearly 800 journal articles published on diffusi…
International organizations as collective agents
What factors influence the faithfulness of international organizations (IOs) to mandates assigned to them by member states? Although recent literature treats international organization agents as autonomous actors in global politics, most work continues to treat the bureaucracy of an international organization as a unitary actor. I argue that the unitary actor assumption limits our ability to assess how internal factors such as fragmentation influ…
The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science
Over the past fifty years, top political science journals have published hundreds of articles about policy diffusion. This article reports on network analyses of how the ideas and approaches in these articles have spread both within and across the subfields of American politics, comparative politics and international relations. Then, based on a survey of the literature, the who, what, when, where, how and why of policy diffusion are addressed in …
The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science
Over the past fifty years, top political science journals have published hundreds of articles about policy diffusion. This article reports on network analyses of how the ideas and approaches in these articles have spread both within and across the subfields of American politics, comparative politics and international relations. Then, based on a survey of the literature, the who, what, when, where, how and why of policy diffusion are addressed in …
Power, Control, and the Logic of Substitution in Institutional Design
How do powerful states control international organizations (IOs)? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design, we propose that funding rules are equally important. Our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules—that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an IO are used…
Money and multilateralism
International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the liberal international order and is instantiated in formal, intergovernmental organizations. This paper revisits the conventional wisdom regarding the multilateral character of international organization (IO) governance by drawing attention to the funding methods used to finance contemporary IOs. I argue that different funding rules constitute differe…
The institutional design of funding rules at international organizations
What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have f…
International organizations as collective agents
What factors influence the faithfulness of international organizations (IOs) to mandates assigned to them by member states? Although recent literature treats international organization agents as autonomous actors in global politics, most work continues to treat the bureaucracy of an international organization as a unitary actor. I argue that the unitary actor assumption limits our ability to assess how internal factors such as fragmentation influ…
Knowing How to Give
What shapes public support for aid delivery through international organizations (IOs)? Drawing on delegation theory, we propose that concerns about donor governments losing control over aid dampens public support for IO delivery. We theorize and provide examples of how two sets of control concerns animate public preferences: those incurred through shared decision-making in multilateral bodies and those incurred during disbursement and implementat…
Emergent Flexibility in Institutional Development
How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional wisdom in international relations, outlined by rational design, is that the answer lies in designed flexibility, which allows states to adjust agreements. Drawing on rich but disparate literatures across subfields of political science—especially constructivism and historical institutionalism—we propose an alternative, which we call “emergent flexibil…
The Communication of Ideas across Subfields in Political Science
What factors inhibit or facilitate cross-subfield conversations in political science? This article draws on diffusion scholarship to gain insight into cross-subfield communication. Diffusion scholarship represents a case where such communication might be expected, given that similar diffusion processes are analyzed in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. We identify nearly 800 journal articles published on diffusi…
Shadow negotiators
The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science
Over the past fifty years, top political science journals have published hundreds of articles about policy diffusion. This article reports on network analyses of how the ideas and approaches in these articles have spread both within and across the subfields of American politics, comparative politics and international relations. Then, based on a survey of the literature, the who, what, when, where, how and why of policy diffusion are addressed in …
The Communication of Ideas across Subfields in Political Science
What factors inhibit or facilitate cross-subfield conversations in political science? This article draws on diffusion scholarship to gain insight into cross-subfield communication. Diffusion scholarship represents a case where such communication might be expected, given that similar diffusion processes are analyzed in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. We identify nearly 800 journal articles published on diffusi…
International organizations as collective agents
What factors influence the faithfulness of international organizations (IOs) to mandates assigned to them by member states? Although recent literature treats international organization agents as autonomous actors in global politics, most work continues to treat the bureaucracy of an international organization as a unitary actor. I argue that the unitary actor assumption limits our ability to assess how internal factors such as fragmentation influ…
International Organizations as Orchestrators
International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries – including NGOs – IOs can shape and steer global governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholar…
Money and multilateralism
International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the liberal international order and is instantiated in formal, intergovernmental organizations. This paper revisits the conventional wisdom regarding the multilateral character of international organization (IO) governance by drawing attention to the funding methods used to finance contemporary IOs. I argue that different funding rules constitute differe…
The institutional design of funding rules at international organizations
What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have f…
Emergent Flexibility in Institutional Development
How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional wisdom in international relations, outlined by rational design, is that the answer lies in designed flexibility, which allows states to adjust agreements. Drawing on rich but disparate literatures across subfields of political science—especially constructivism and historical institutionalism—we propose an alternative, which we call “emergent flexibil…
Power, Control, and the Logic of Substitution in Institutional Design
How do powerful states control international organizations (IOs)? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design, we propose that funding rules are equally important. Our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules—that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an IO are used…
Knowing How to Give
What shapes public support for aid delivery through international organizations (IOs)? Drawing on delegation theory, we propose that concerns about donor governments losing control over aid dampens public support for IO delivery. We theorize and provide examples of how two sets of control concerns animate public preferences: those incurred through shared decision-making in multilateral bodies and those incurred during disbursement and implementat…
Shadow negotiators
Multilateral Climate Finance in Pursuit of Private Capital
In the last decade, international financial institutions have advocated that multilateral funding be leveraged to reduce the risk of institutional investors, such as pensions and mutual funds, mobilizing private capital for development and decarbonization. Have international organizations (IOs) that deliver climate finance adopted the de-risking agenda? How is it affecting their work? Through a text analysis of the replenishment documents of five…
International Courts and the Construction of Legal Facts
How do international courts (ICs) affect the development of international law? Building on constructivist arguments that emphasize the law’s productive power, I argue that a full conception of the agency of ICs—of how ICs affect the development of international law—requires that we problematize legal facts. When interpreting international law, interpretive rules direct judges to consider legal facts: relevant rules, subsequent agreements, and the…
Political science (9 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Economics (7 obras) · International Development and Aid (7 obras) · Politics (6 obras) · Corporate governance (5 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (5 obras) · Business (4 obras) · Finance (4 obras)