Eric Reinhardt
Biographic Data
| ID | 4085634 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eric Reinhardt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eric |
| FAMILY NAME | Reinhardt |
| SIGNATURE | REINHARDT E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Emory University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 409 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 10 |
The politics of human rights trade sanctions
Scholars contend that embedding human rights conditionality in trade agreements can improve human rights. We argue that human rights interests may collide with trade, investment, and security interests. We examine these claims in the context of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a unilateral trade preference program with robust human rights conditions, created in 2000 by the United States for up to 49 potentially eligible sub-Saharan …
Global Credit Markets, Political Violence, and Politically Sustainable Risk Premia
How do international financial conditions affect civil unrest? Existing studies examine the domestic economic roots of political violence but say little about the role of external financial conditions. We explore the interactions between international lending, government policy, and domestic unrest. In particular, we note that because of sovereign risk and defensive lending dynamics, credit ratings and interest rate premia are endogenous to expec…
International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade
During the past half-century, states have established a large number of international trade institutions, both multilateral and regional in scope. The existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce. Yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers, namely, reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows. Ex…
Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime
Do flexibility provisions in international agreements—clauses allowing for legal suspension of concessions without abrogating the treaty—promote cooperation? Recent work emphasizes that provisions for relaxing treaty commitments can ironically make states more likely to form agreements and make deeper concessions when doing so. This argument has particularly been applied to the global trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT…
Three's a Crowd
Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Cons…
The perversity of preferences
Industrial Location and Voter Participation in Europe
Does the geographic concentration of industry ‘matter’ outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debat…
Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism
Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have spread widely over the past fifty years. During the same era, multilateral openness has grown to unprecedented heights, spurred by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the cornerstone of the manifestly successful multilateral regime is nondiscrimination, why have its members increasingly resorted to preferential liberalization? We …
Adjudication without Enforcement in Gatt Disputes
Disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exhibit a puzzling selection effect. Defendants concede more prior to GATT judgments than afterward, despite GATT's lack of enforcement power. Yet, why would states plea-bargain if they know they can spurn contrary rulings? To find out, the article develops an incomplete information model of trade bargaining with the option of adjudication. The plaintiff has greater resolve prior to…
Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries
posed industries, geographic concentration strongly increases (a) the formation of common trade policy preferences among workers; (b) employees' contributions to political campaigns; and (c) voter turnout. This activism traces not to the behavior of political elites, but rather to the increased possibility for collective action that spatial proximity affords individuals in trade-exposed industries. ,eS ~ eography is everywhere in vogue. From stud…
Industrial Location and Protection
The debate over the relationship between the location of industry and the incidence of import barriers has been miscast. Three problems call into question the findings reported in the endogenous protection literature. First, geographic concentration is widely used as a proxy for political concentration (i.e., the spread of industry across political districts), although these two variables are conceptually and empirically distinct. Second, extant …
Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad
Classical diversionary theory suggests that domestic strife leads to foreign aggression. This theory has been unsupported empirically because it ignores the critical role played by the military in decisions to use force abroad. Strife leads to external aggression when it threatens the organizational interests of the military; otherwise, the military is reluctant to do politicians' dirty work. Only a particular type of domestic strife-contested po…
Activities and Appointments
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains
The debate between neoliberals and realists in the field of international relations draws heavily on the findings offered in Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrod's well-known argument is that cooperation can emerge among egoists despite the absence of a central authority. This article assesses the robustness of Axelrod's findings in light of the realist critique that relative gains concerns make cooperation less likely than neoliber…
Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism
Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have spread widely over the past fifty years. During the same era, multilateral openness has grown to unprecedented heights, spurred by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the cornerstone of the manifestly successful multilateral regime is nondiscrimination, why have its members increasingly resorted to preferential liberalization? We …
Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime
Do flexibility provisions in international agreements—clauses allowing for legal suspension of concessions without abrogating the treaty—promote cooperation? Recent work emphasizes that provisions for relaxing treaty commitments can ironically make states more likely to form agreements and make deeper concessions when doing so. This argument has particularly been applied to the global trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT…
Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad
Classical diversionary theory suggests that domestic strife leads to foreign aggression. This theory has been unsupported empirically because it ignores the critical role played by the military in decisions to use force abroad. Strife leads to external aggression when it threatens the organizational interests of the military; otherwise, the military is reluctant to do politicians' dirty work. Only a particular type of domestic strife-contested po…
International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade
During the past half-century, states have established a large number of international trade institutions, both multilateral and regional in scope. The existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce. Yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers, namely, reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows. Ex…
Adjudication without Enforcement in Gatt Disputes
Disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exhibit a puzzling selection effect. Defendants concede more prior to GATT judgments than afterward, despite GATT's lack of enforcement power. Yet, why would states plea-bargain if they know they can spurn contrary rulings? To find out, the article develops an incomplete information model of trade bargaining with the option of adjudication. The plaintiff has greater resolve prior to…
Industrial Location and Protection
The debate over the relationship between the location of industry and the incidence of import barriers has been miscast. Three problems call into question the findings reported in the endogenous protection literature. First, geographic concentration is widely used as a proxy for political concentration (i.e., the spread of industry across political districts), although these two variables are conceptually and empirically distinct. Second, extant …
Three's a Crowd
Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Cons…
Industrial Location and Voter Participation in Europe
Does the geographic concentration of industry ‘matter’ outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debat…
The perversity of preferences
Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains
The debate between neoliberals and realists in the field of international relations draws heavily on the findings offered in Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrod's well-known argument is that cooperation can emerge among egoists despite the absence of a central authority. This article assesses the robustness of Axelrod's findings in light of the realist critique that relative gains concerns make cooperation less likely than neoliber…
Global Credit Markets, Political Violence, and Politically Sustainable Risk Premia
How do international financial conditions affect civil unrest? Existing studies examine the domestic economic roots of political violence but say little about the role of external financial conditions. We explore the interactions between international lending, government policy, and domestic unrest. In particular, we note that because of sovereign risk and defensive lending dynamics, credit ratings and interest rate premia are endogenous to expec…
The politics of human rights trade sanctions
Scholars contend that embedding human rights conditionality in trade agreements can improve human rights. We argue that human rights interests may collide with trade, investment, and security interests. We examine these claims in the context of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a unilateral trade preference program with robust human rights conditions, created in 2000 by the United States for up to 49 potentially eligible sub-Saharan …
Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains
The debate between neoliberals and realists in the field of international relations draws heavily on the findings offered in Robert Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation. Axelrod's well-known argument is that cooperation can emerge among egoists despite the absence of a central authority. This article assesses the robustness of Axelrod's findings in light of the realist critique that relative gains concerns make cooperation less likely than neoliber…
Activities and Appointments
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Industrial Location and Protection
The debate over the relationship between the location of industry and the incidence of import barriers has been miscast. Three problems call into question the findings reported in the endogenous protection literature. First, geographic concentration is widely used as a proxy for political concentration (i.e., the spread of industry across political districts), although these two variables are conceptually and empirically distinct. Second, extant …
Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad
Classical diversionary theory suggests that domestic strife leads to foreign aggression. This theory has been unsupported empirically because it ignores the critical role played by the military in decisions to use force abroad. Strife leads to external aggression when it threatens the organizational interests of the military; otherwise, the military is reluctant to do politicians' dirty work. Only a particular type of domestic strife-contested po…
Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries
posed industries, geographic concentration strongly increases (a) the formation of common trade policy preferences among workers; (b) employees' contributions to political campaigns; and (c) voter turnout. This activism traces not to the behavior of political elites, but rather to the increased possibility for collective action that spatial proximity affords individuals in trade-exposed industries. ,eS ~ eography is everywhere in vogue. From stud…
Adjudication without Enforcement in Gatt Disputes
Disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exhibit a puzzling selection effect. Defendants concede more prior to GATT judgments than afterward, despite GATT's lack of enforcement power. Yet, why would states plea-bargain if they know they can spurn contrary rulings? To find out, the article develops an incomplete information model of trade bargaining with the option of adjudication. The plaintiff has greater resolve prior to…
Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism
Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have spread widely over the past fifty years. During the same era, multilateral openness has grown to unprecedented heights, spurred by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the cornerstone of the manifestly successful multilateral regime is nondiscrimination, why have its members increasingly resorted to preferential liberalization? We …
The perversity of preferences
Industrial Location and Voter Participation in Europe
Does the geographic concentration of industry ‘matter’ outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debat…
Three's a Crowd
Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Cons…
International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade
During the past half-century, states have established a large number of international trade institutions, both multilateral and regional in scope. The existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce. Yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers, namely, reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows. Ex…
Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime
Do flexibility provisions in international agreements—clauses allowing for legal suspension of concessions without abrogating the treaty—promote cooperation? Recent work emphasizes that provisions for relaxing treaty commitments can ironically make states more likely to form agreements and make deeper concessions when doing so. This argument has particularly been applied to the global trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT…
Global Credit Markets, Political Violence, and Politically Sustainable Risk Premia
How do international financial conditions affect civil unrest? Existing studies examine the domestic economic roots of political violence but say little about the role of external financial conditions. We explore the interactions between international lending, government policy, and domestic unrest. In particular, we note that because of sovereign risk and defensive lending dynamics, credit ratings and interest rate premia are endogenous to expec…
The politics of human rights trade sanctions
Scholars contend that embedding human rights conditionality in trade agreements can improve human rights. We argue that human rights interests may collide with trade, investment, and security interests. We examine these claims in the context of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a unilateral trade preference program with robust human rights conditions, created in 2000 by the United States for up to 49 potentially eligible sub-Saharan …
Economics (13 works) · Political science (11 works) · Law (9 works) · International trade (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Global trade and economics (7 works) · International Development and Aid (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis (4 works)