Robert M Yarbrough
Biographic Data
| ID | 4085682 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert M Yarbrough |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert M |
| FAMILY NAME | Yarbrough |
| SIGNATURE | YARBROUGH R M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Amherst College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 55 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1985 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Contractual Role of Boundaries
Without universally efficacious contract enforcement, contracting boundaries divide the world into ‘insiders’, with whom we contract freely, and ‘outsiders’, with whom contracting is circumscribed. Boundary types vary and vacillate between territorially defined ones and ones defined on nonterritorial margins (religion, ethnicity or functional specialization). Sovereignty, or sole legal constitutional authority, has always existed alongside other,…
Cooperation and Governance in International Trade
International trade liberalization historically has taken many organizational forms--unilateral, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral. Given the proliferation of normative views about which of these should be pursued, economists and political scientists have devoted surprisingly little attention to the reasons for the observed variation in the chosen forms. This book is the first to develop a single theoretical framework to account for past l…
International institutions and the new economics of organization
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade
Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests. ... Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals …
Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic 'Hostages
Journal Article Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic ‘Hostages’: Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade Get access Beth V. Yarbrough, Beth V. Yarbrough Amherst College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert M. Yarbrough Robert M. Yarbrough American International College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 30, Issue 1,…
Neoclassical political economy
International institutions and the new economics of organization
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic 'Hostages
Journal Article Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic ‘Hostages’: Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade Get access Beth V. Yarbrough, Beth V. Yarbrough Amherst College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert M. Yarbrough Robert M. Yarbrough American International College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 30, Issue 1,…
Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade
Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests. ... Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals …
The Contractual Role of Boundaries
Without universally efficacious contract enforcement, contracting boundaries divide the world into ‘insiders’, with whom we contract freely, and ‘outsiders’, with whom contracting is circumscribed. Boundary types vary and vacillate between territorially defined ones and ones defined on nonterritorial margins (religion, ethnicity or functional specialization). Sovereignty, or sole legal constitutional authority, has always existed alongside other,…
Neoclassical political economy
Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic 'Hostages
Journal Article Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic ‘Hostages’: Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade Get access Beth V. Yarbrough, Beth V. Yarbrough Amherst College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert M. Yarbrough Robert M. Yarbrough American International College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Quarterly, Volume 30, Issue 1,…
Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade
Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests. ... Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals …
International institutions and the new economics of organization
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Cooperation and Governance in International Trade
International trade liberalization historically has taken many organizational forms--unilateral, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral. Given the proliferation of normative views about which of these should be pursued, economists and political scientists have devoted surprisingly little attention to the reasons for the observed variation in the chosen forms. This book is the first to develop a single theoretical framework to account for past l…
The Contractual Role of Boundaries
Without universally efficacious contract enforcement, contracting boundaries divide the world into ‘insiders’, with whom we contract freely, and ‘outsiders’, with whom contracting is circumscribed. Boundary types vary and vacillate between territorially defined ones and ones defined on nonterritorial margins (religion, ethnicity or functional specialization). Sovereignty, or sole legal constitutional authority, has always existed alongside other,…
Political science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Global trade and economics (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · International trade (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · International Development and Aid (2 works) · Law (2 works)