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Gemma Mateo

Biographic Data

ID4097906
NAMEGemma Mateo
GIVEN NAMESGemma
FAMILY NAMEMateo
SIGNATUREMATEO G
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Salzburg
ORCID0000-0003-0924-3693
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS19
TOTAL CITATIONS435
AUTHOR COUNT19
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX8
  • Who Drives the Security Narrative in US Trade Policy

    Open Access•Mehmet Yavuz, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2026

    Appeals to national security play a central role in contemporary US trade politics. Who drives this security narrative and why? We argue that executive branch actors, regardless of political party affiliation, are more likely to frame trade policy in national-security terms. In Congress, however, we expect Republicans to rely more heavily than Democrats on a national-security narrative. We tested these expectations through a systematic analysis o…

  • Business versus citizens: Legislators’ responsiveness in trade policy

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Robert A Huber et al.•ARTICLE•European Political Science Review•2026•References: 54

    Legislators may consider the preferences of both business actors and citizens when making trade policy decisions. But when business and citizen preferences diverge, what makes legislators more responsive to one side or the other? We argue that when levels of political engagement are kept constant, legislators are more responsive to citizens than business. This effect should be particularly large for left-leaning legislators and legislators who co…

  • Compensating the losers: The (limited) elite–public gap in trade politics

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Robert A Huber et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2026•References: 41

    Compensatory policies for the losers of trade are a key feature of the liberal economic order established after the Second World War. Legislators have a variety of policy options to choose. But do political elites and the public have the same attitudes toward compensatory policies? We expect an elite–public gap with the public relatively less supportive of spending policies and more supportive of tax cuts and trade restrictions than political eli…

  • Geopolitics meets business interests: The EU and European economic security

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2025•Cited by: 3•References: 26

  • Lobbying in the face of politicisation: Interest Group Strategies in Trade Policy

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2024•Cited by: 14•References: 34

    How does the politicisation of trade policy affect the lobbying strategies chosen by interest groups? Several studies have shown that business associations tend to focus more on inside lobbying and citizen groups more on outside lobbying. We argue that politicisation makes this difference in lobbying strategy even more pronounced. Facing an issue that is contested and publicly salient, we should see business actors move even more toward inside lo…

  • Interest group preferences towards trade agreements: Institutional design matters

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Robert A Huber et al.•ARTICLE•Interest Groups & Advocacy•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 25

    Interest groups play a key role in the political economy of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Their support for or opposition to a planned PTA tends to be crucial in determining the fate of PTAs. But which PTAs receive support from (which) interest groups? Clearly, the design of a PTA, that is, which types of provisions are (not) included in the agreement, is essential in that respect. We argue that trade and trade-related provisions, such as…

  • Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•BOOK•Insiders Versus Outsiders•2016

    What explains differences in the lobbying behaviour of interest groups? And what consequences do these differences have for the access that interest groups can gain to decision-makers and the influence that they can exert on policy outcomes? Building on an unprecedented amount of data on lobbying in Europe, this book puts forward a distinction between lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders. Lobbying insiders, most prominently business interests…

  • The Europeanization of interest groups: Group type, resources and policy area

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•European Union Politics•2014•Cited by: 28•References: 38

    Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material res…

  • Public opinion and interest group influence: How citizen groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2014•Cited by: 120•References: 24

    The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which envisages stricter standards for the transnational enforcement of intellectual property rights, received strong support from business groups. Nevertheless, a campaign against the agreement that was initiated by a small number of citizen groups was successful in stopping its ratification in the European Union (EU). This result is puzzling because the anti-ACTA side controlled few material resou…

  • Negotiation Theory and the EU: The State of the Art

    Andreas Dür, Daniel C Thomas et al.•BOOK•Negotiation Theory and the EU•2013

  • Negotiation theory and the EU: The State of the Art

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•2013•Cited by: 9•References: 15

    The once-distinct literatures on European Union politics and negotiation theory are increasingly interlinked, with each drawing upon and contributing to the other. This collection aims to stimulate even more, and more systematic, research on negotiations in the EU. In particular, it presents a state of the art of the literature at the intersection of these two fields by identifying areas of considerable research progress and by proposing a set of…

  • Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in fiveEuropean countries

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2013•Cited by: 148•References: 31

    Interest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend to ‘go public’ by launching campaigns that aim to mobilise the broader public. In this article it is argued that group type – namely the distinction between business associations, professional associations and citizen groups – is a major determinant of the choice of stra…

  • Who lobbies the European Union? National interest groups in a multilevel polity

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2012•Cited by: 32•References: 29

    What explains variation across national interest groups in their amount of lobbying on legislative proposals in the European Union (EU)? We present an argument that leads to the expectation that resource-rich associations engage in more lobbying on EU legislation than other associations. Moreover, we expect business associations to have privileged access to the European Commission and national governments; and citizens’ groups to parliaments. Usi…

  • To Call or Not to Call? Political Parties and Referendums on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Comparative Political Studies•2011•Cited by: 7•References: 28

    Why did some political parties in the EU member states support and others oppose a facultative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty? The authors argue that electoral competition played a major role in determining how parties positioned themselves with respect to the desirability of a referendum. Parties that expected electoral gains supported and those that expected electoral losses opposed a referendum. The hypotheses that the authors derive …

  • Choosing a bargaining strategy in EU negotiations: Power, Preferences, and Culture

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2010•Cited by: 23•References: 32

    We introduce a series of arguments that explain how country characteristics influence the choice of bargaining strategies. The country characteristics that we consider are a country's power resources, preferences and culture. We derive a series of hypotheses from these variables, and present their implications for intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union (EU). We also discuss the methodological difficulties inherent in studying negoti…

  • Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU's Financial Perspective, 2007–13

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2010•Cited by: 36•References: 20

    We argue that in intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union, large Member States, countries with a good alternative to negotiated agreement and governments facing domestic constraints are more likely to resort to a hard bargaining strategy than less powerful Member States. We test this prediction with data from a survey with high‐level officials from all EU Member States for the case of the negotiations concerning the EU Financial Persp…

  • Irish Associations and Lobbying on EU Legislation: Resources, Access Points, and Strategies

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Irish Political Studies•2010•Cited by: 5•References: 6

    This research note summarises the findings from a survey that asked Irish associations about their lobbying activity with respect to European Union legislation. The authors received 164 responses after having contacted 401 associations. The resulting data show that Irish associations engage in substantial legislative lobbying, also at the EU level. In fact, Irish associations have surprisingly good access to even the highest political levels in I…

  • The Irish EU Presidency and the Constitutional Treaty: Neutrality, Skills and Effective Mediation

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Irish Political Studies•2008•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Most practitioners and scholars concur that the Irish EU presidency of 2004 was an effective mediator in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2003/4. The presidency is generally credited with having facilitated a compromise in these complex negotiations that allowed for agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. Building on this assessment, we argue that Ireland’s neutrality on the most controversial issues under negotiation was a necessary con…

  • Bargaining Efficiency in Intergovernmental Negotiations in the EU: Treaty of Nice vs. Constitutional Treaty

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Integration•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 19

    Two conditions have to be met for bargaining in Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) in the EU to be efficient. On the one hand, an effective preparation of the negotiations is essential to provide governments with the necessary information to engage in issue linkages. On the other hand, mediation provided by the EU’s Presidency is indispensable for the finding of compromises and for the elaboration of a final package deal. Systematic evidence fr…

  • Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in fiveEuropean countries

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2013•Cited by: 148•References: 31

    Interest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend to ‘go public’ by launching campaigns that aim to mobilise the broader public. In this article it is argued that group type – namely the distinction between business associations, professional associations and citizen groups – is a major determinant of the choice of stra…

  • Public opinion and interest group influence: How citizen groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2014•Cited by: 120•References: 24

    The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which envisages stricter standards for the transnational enforcement of intellectual property rights, received strong support from business groups. Nevertheless, a campaign against the agreement that was initiated by a small number of citizen groups was successful in stopping its ratification in the European Union (EU). This result is puzzling because the anti-ACTA side controlled few material resou…

  • Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU's Financial Perspective, 2007–13

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2010•Cited by: 36•References: 20

    We argue that in intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union, large Member States, countries with a good alternative to negotiated agreement and governments facing domestic constraints are more likely to resort to a hard bargaining strategy than less powerful Member States. We test this prediction with data from a survey with high‐level officials from all EU Member States for the case of the negotiations concerning the EU Financial Persp…

  • Who lobbies the European Union? National interest groups in a multilevel polity

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2012•Cited by: 32•References: 29

    What explains variation across national interest groups in their amount of lobbying on legislative proposals in the European Union (EU)? We present an argument that leads to the expectation that resource-rich associations engage in more lobbying on EU legislation than other associations. Moreover, we expect business associations to have privileged access to the European Commission and national governments; and citizens’ groups to parliaments. Usi…

  • The Europeanization of interest groups: Group type, resources and policy area

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•European Union Politics•2014•Cited by: 28•References: 38

    Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material res…

  • Choosing a bargaining strategy in EU negotiations: Power, Preferences, and Culture

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2010•Cited by: 23•References: 32

    We introduce a series of arguments that explain how country characteristics influence the choice of bargaining strategies. The country characteristics that we consider are a country's power resources, preferences and culture. We derive a series of hypotheses from these variables, and present their implications for intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union (EU). We also discuss the methodological difficulties inherent in studying negoti…

  • Lobbying in the face of politicisation: Interest Group Strategies in Trade Policy

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2024•Cited by: 14•References: 34

    How does the politicisation of trade policy affect the lobbying strategies chosen by interest groups? Several studies have shown that business associations tend to focus more on inside lobbying and citizen groups more on outside lobbying. We argue that politicisation makes this difference in lobbying strategy even more pronounced. Facing an issue that is contested and publicly salient, we should see business actors move even more toward inside lo…

  • Negotiation theory and the EU: The State of the Art

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•2013•Cited by: 9•References: 15

    The once-distinct literatures on European Union politics and negotiation theory are increasingly interlinked, with each drawing upon and contributing to the other. This collection aims to stimulate even more, and more systematic, research on negotiations in the EU. In particular, it presents a state of the art of the literature at the intersection of these two fields by identifying areas of considerable research progress and by proposing a set of…

  • To Call or Not to Call? Political Parties and Referendums on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Comparative Political Studies•2011•Cited by: 7•References: 28

    Why did some political parties in the EU member states support and others oppose a facultative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty? The authors argue that electoral competition played a major role in determining how parties positioned themselves with respect to the desirability of a referendum. Parties that expected electoral gains supported and those that expected electoral losses opposed a referendum. The hypotheses that the authors derive …

  • Irish Associations and Lobbying on EU Legislation: Resources, Access Points, and Strategies

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Irish Political Studies•2010•Cited by: 5•References: 6

    This research note summarises the findings from a survey that asked Irish associations about their lobbying activity with respect to European Union legislation. The authors received 164 responses after having contacted 401 associations. The resulting data show that Irish associations engage in substantial legislative lobbying, also at the EU level. In fact, Irish associations have surprisingly good access to even the highest political levels in I…

  • The Irish EU Presidency and the Constitutional Treaty: Neutrality, Skills and Effective Mediation

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Irish Political Studies•2008•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Most practitioners and scholars concur that the Irish EU presidency of 2004 was an effective mediator in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2003/4. The presidency is generally credited with having facilitated a compromise in these complex negotiations that allowed for agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. Building on this assessment, we argue that Ireland’s neutrality on the most controversial issues under negotiation was a necessary con…

  • Bargaining Efficiency in Intergovernmental Negotiations in the EU: Treaty of Nice vs. Constitutional Treaty

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Integration•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 19

    Two conditions have to be met for bargaining in Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) in the EU to be efficient. On the one hand, an effective preparation of the negotiations is essential to provide governments with the necessary information to engage in issue linkages. On the other hand, mediation provided by the EU’s Presidency is indispensable for the finding of compromises and for the elaboration of a final package deal. Systematic evidence fr…

  • Geopolitics meets business interests: The EU and European economic security

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2025•Cited by: 3•References: 26

  • Interest group preferences towards trade agreements: Institutional design matters

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Robert A Huber et al.•ARTICLE•Interest Groups & Advocacy•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 25

    Interest groups play a key role in the political economy of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Their support for or opposition to a planned PTA tends to be crucial in determining the fate of PTAs. But which PTAs receive support from (which) interest groups? Clearly, the design of a PTA, that is, which types of provisions are (not) included in the agreement, is essential in that respect. We argue that trade and trade-related provisions, such as…

  • Bargaining Efficiency in Intergovernmental Negotiations in the EU: Treaty of Nice vs. Constitutional Treaty

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Integration•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 19

    Two conditions have to be met for bargaining in Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) in the EU to be efficient. On the one hand, an effective preparation of the negotiations is essential to provide governments with the necessary information to engage in issue linkages. On the other hand, mediation provided by the EU’s Presidency is indispensable for the finding of compromises and for the elaboration of a final package deal. Systematic evidence fr…

  • The Irish EU Presidency and the Constitutional Treaty: Neutrality, Skills and Effective Mediation

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Irish Political Studies•2008•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Most practitioners and scholars concur that the Irish EU presidency of 2004 was an effective mediator in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2003/4. The presidency is generally credited with having facilitated a compromise in these complex negotiations that allowed for agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. Building on this assessment, we argue that Ireland’s neutrality on the most controversial issues under negotiation was a necessary con…

  • Choosing a bargaining strategy in EU negotiations: Power, Preferences, and Culture

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2010•Cited by: 23•References: 32

    We introduce a series of arguments that explain how country characteristics influence the choice of bargaining strategies. The country characteristics that we consider are a country's power resources, preferences and culture. We derive a series of hypotheses from these variables, and present their implications for intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union (EU). We also discuss the methodological difficulties inherent in studying negoti…

  • Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU's Financial Perspective, 2007–13

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2010•Cited by: 36•References: 20

    We argue that in intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union, large Member States, countries with a good alternative to negotiated agreement and governments facing domestic constraints are more likely to resort to a hard bargaining strategy than less powerful Member States. We test this prediction with data from a survey with high‐level officials from all EU Member States for the case of the negotiations concerning the EU Financial Persp…

  • Irish Associations and Lobbying on EU Legislation: Resources, Access Points, and Strategies

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Irish Political Studies•2010•Cited by: 5•References: 6

    This research note summarises the findings from a survey that asked Irish associations about their lobbying activity with respect to European Union legislation. The authors received 164 responses after having contacted 401 associations. The resulting data show that Irish associations engage in substantial legislative lobbying, also at the EU level. In fact, Irish associations have surprisingly good access to even the highest political levels in I…

  • To Call or Not to Call? Political Parties and Referendums on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Comparative Political Studies•2011•Cited by: 7•References: 28

    Why did some political parties in the EU member states support and others oppose a facultative referendum on the Constitutional Treaty? The authors argue that electoral competition played a major role in determining how parties positioned themselves with respect to the desirability of a referendum. Parties that expected electoral gains supported and those that expected electoral losses opposed a referendum. The hypotheses that the authors derive …

  • Who lobbies the European Union? National interest groups in a multilevel polity

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2012•Cited by: 32•References: 29

    What explains variation across national interest groups in their amount of lobbying on legislative proposals in the European Union (EU)? We present an argument that leads to the expectation that resource-rich associations engage in more lobbying on EU legislation than other associations. Moreover, we expect business associations to have privileged access to the European Commission and national governments; and citizens’ groups to parliaments. Usi…

  • Negotiation Theory and the EU: The State of the Art

    Andreas Dür, Daniel C Thomas et al.•BOOK•Negotiation Theory and the EU•2013

  • Negotiation theory and the EU: The State of the Art

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•2013•Cited by: 9•References: 15

    The once-distinct literatures on European Union politics and negotiation theory are increasingly interlinked, with each drawing upon and contributing to the other. This collection aims to stimulate even more, and more systematic, research on negotiations in the EU. In particular, it presents a state of the art of the literature at the intersection of these two fields by identifying areas of considerable research progress and by proposing a set of…

  • Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in fiveEuropean countries

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2013•Cited by: 148•References: 31

    Interest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend to ‘go public’ by launching campaigns that aim to mobilise the broader public. In this article it is argued that group type – namely the distinction between business associations, professional associations and citizen groups – is a major determinant of the choice of stra…

  • The Europeanization of interest groups: Group type, resources and policy area

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•European Union Politics•2014•Cited by: 28•References: 38

    Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material res…

  • Public opinion and interest group influence: How citizen groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2014•Cited by: 120•References: 24

    The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which envisages stricter standards for the transnational enforcement of intellectual property rights, received strong support from business groups. Nevertheless, a campaign against the agreement that was initiated by a small number of citizen groups was successful in stopping its ratification in the European Union (EU). This result is puzzling because the anti-ACTA side controlled few material resou…

  • Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe

    Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•BOOK•Insiders Versus Outsiders•2016

    What explains differences in the lobbying behaviour of interest groups? And what consequences do these differences have for the access that interest groups can gain to decision-makers and the influence that they can exert on policy outcomes? Building on an unprecedented amount of data on lobbying in Europe, this book puts forward a distinction between lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders. Lobbying insiders, most prominently business interests…

  • Interest group preferences towards trade agreements: Institutional design matters

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Robert A Huber et al.•ARTICLE•Interest Groups & Advocacy•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 25

    Interest groups play a key role in the political economy of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Their support for or opposition to a planned PTA tends to be crucial in determining the fate of PTAs. But which PTAs receive support from (which) interest groups? Clearly, the design of a PTA, that is, which types of provisions are (not) included in the agreement, is essential in that respect. We argue that trade and trade-related provisions, such as…

  • Lobbying in the face of politicisation: Interest Group Strategies in Trade Policy

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2024•Cited by: 14•References: 34

    How does the politicisation of trade policy affect the lobbying strategies chosen by interest groups? Several studies have shown that business associations tend to focus more on inside lobbying and citizen groups more on outside lobbying. We argue that politicisation makes this difference in lobbying strategy even more pronounced. Facing an issue that is contested and publicly salient, we should see business actors move even more toward inside lo…

  • Geopolitics meets business interests: The EU and European economic security

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2025•Cited by: 3•References: 26

  • Who Drives the Security Narrative in US Trade Policy

    Open Access•Mehmet Yavuz, Gemma Mateo et al.•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2026

    Appeals to national security play a central role in contemporary US trade politics. Who drives this security narrative and why? We argue that executive branch actors, regardless of political party affiliation, are more likely to frame trade policy in national-security terms. In Congress, however, we expect Republicans to rely more heavily than Democrats on a national-security narrative. We tested these expectations through a systematic analysis o…

  • Business versus citizens: Legislators’ responsiveness in trade policy

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Robert A Huber et al.•ARTICLE•European Political Science Review•2026•References: 54

    Legislators may consider the preferences of both business actors and citizens when making trade policy decisions. But when business and citizen preferences diverge, what makes legislators more responsive to one side or the other? We argue that when levels of political engagement are kept constant, legislators are more responsive to citizens than business. This effect should be particularly large for left-leaning legislators and legislators who co…

  • Compensating the losers: The (limited) elite–public gap in trade politics

    Open Access•Andreas Dür, Robert A Huber et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2026•References: 41

    Compensatory policies for the losers of trade are a key feature of the liberal economic order established after the Second World War. Legislators have a variety of policy options to choose. But do political elites and the public have the same attitudes toward compensatory policies? We expect an elite–public gap with the public relatively less supportive of spending policies and more supportive of tax cuts and trade restrictions than political eli…

Politics (16 works) · Law (15 works) · Political science (15 works) · Economics (14 works) · Law (12 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (11 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (11 works) · International trade (9 works) · European union (8 works) · Argument (complex analysis (7 works)

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