Rick Stapenhurst
Biographic Data
| ID | 4122290 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rick Stapenhurst |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rick |
| FAMILY NAME | Stapenhurst |
| SIGNATURE | STAPENHURST R |
| AFFILIATIONS | McGill University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 32 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 3 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Anti-Corruption Evidence
Motivation of Legislators and Political Will
That legislative oversight is an important determinant of corruption is well recognized, as is the fact that parliamentary oversight tools often have limited success both in holding governments to account and reducing corruption. Therefore, legislative oversight tools and mechanisms are a necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight; rather, legislators must also have the political will to apply them effectively. Since legislators…
Developing an index of EX-Post parliamentary oversight of public finance
For the past decade, scholars and practitioners have developed indexes to measure both legislative powers in general, and of the legislative power of the purse, in particular. Initial focus was on the development of a comprehensive index of legislative powers, and on assessing the ex-ante role of the legislature in the budget process.This article substantially deepens extends previous research on ex-post oversight, by developing a more comprehens…
Democracy, Legislatures, and Business Conditions in Post-Authoritarian African Regimes
Bangladeshi citizens enjoyed a competitive, multiparty political system with regularly contested elections. Despite serious weaknesses of other democratic institutions-including the Election Commission; a trust deficit among major political parties particularly among two major parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL); and repeated episodes of political violence-free and fair elections in regular Bangla…
Benchmarking and Self-Assessment for Parliaments
With international focus on good governance and parliamentary effectiveness, a standards-based approach involving benchmarks and assessment frameworks has emerged to evaluate parliament's performance and guide its reforms. The World Bank's has been a leader in the development of these frameworks, stewarding a global multi-stakeholder process aimed at enhancing consensus around parliamentary benchmarks and indicators with international organizatio…
Legislative oversight in Nigeria
This article builds upon and extends the analyses presented by Fashagba (2009) and drills down on the analyses of oversight in Nigeria presented by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014). It presents more nuanced findings. Based on an in-country document search and 45 personal interviews with politicians, parliamentary staff, civil society representatives and journalists, the article demonstrates that the Nigerian National Assembly possesses the tools an…
Oversight Effectiveness and Political Will
The purpose of the present note is to advance two theoretical claims. The first claim proposed is that the impact of the availability of oversight tools and of the most broadly understood legislative capacity (availability of material, technical, financial resources; availability of well-trained staff) on the effectiveness with which legislative oversight is performed is conditional. The second claim put forward, after reviewing a rich body of wo…
World Bank Institute's Approach to Parliamentary Capacity Strengthening
For approximately 15 years, the World Bank Institute (WBI) has aimed to enhance the capacity of parliaments in their oversight, representation and law-making functions, recognising their essential role to good governance: they are representatives, set priorities, hold the executive accountable and engage directly with the media, civil society and individual citizens. This article outlines WBIs model for strengthening parliamentary capacity global…
Improving Democracy and Accountability in Ghana
In this research note, we examine the nature of, and influences on, parliamentary oversight in Ghana. We find that while macro‐institutions are important when examining good governance and legislative effectiveness, meso‐level institutions (such as oversight tools) are more important than previously acknowledged. We also detect a positive relationship between an increase in legislative oversight facilities and the reputation of parliament and its…
Parliaments as Peacebuilders in Conflict-Affected Countries
The role of parliament in conflict-affected countries becomes even more evident when the correlation between poverty and conflict is considered. This book is pioneering in that it considers what parliaments in conflict-affected countries can do, while performing their normal everyday functions, to not only contribute directly to conflict prevention but also aid peace building by combating poverty. By addressing issues of poverty, equitable distri…
Note on ‘The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes’ by Bryane Michael and Aare Kasemets
The Role of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption
In most countries, Parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee government and to hold government to account; often, audit institutions, ombuds and anti-corruption agencies report to parliament, as a means of ensuring both their independence from government and reinforcing parliament's position at the apex of accountability institutions. At the same time, parliaments can also play a key role in promoting accountability, through const…
What Makes Public Accounts Committees Work? A Comparative Analysis
This article investigates whether and under what conditions Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are able to scrutinize government accounts. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. We find that the relationship between the formal powers of the PACs and their successful performance is conditional. Specifically, we argue that the success of PACs depend on the behavior of committ…
Features and Functions of Supreme Audit Institutions
Supreme audit institutions are national \n agencies responsible for auditing government revenue and \n spending. Their legal mandates, reporting relationships, and \n effectiveness vary, reflecting different governance systems \n and government policies. But their primary purpose is to \n oversee the management of public funds and the quality and \n credibility of governments' reported financial data. In \n the past the World Bank and other donor…
Curbing corruption
No AccessWorld Bank Institute Development Studies1 Feb 2013Curbing corruptionToward a model for building national integrityAuthors/Editors: Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. KpundehRick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundehhttps://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-4257-6SectionsAboutPDF (0.8 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:This volume contains selections by theorists and practitioners of governance work…
Improving Democracy and Accountability in Ghana
In this research note, we examine the nature of, and influences on, parliamentary oversight in Ghana. We find that while macro‐institutions are important when examining good governance and legislative effectiveness, meso‐level institutions (such as oversight tools) are more important than previously acknowledged. We also detect a positive relationship between an increase in legislative oversight facilities and the reputation of parliament and its…
Oversight Effectiveness and Political Will
The purpose of the present note is to advance two theoretical claims. The first claim proposed is that the impact of the availability of oversight tools and of the most broadly understood legislative capacity (availability of material, technical, financial resources; availability of well-trained staff) on the effectiveness with which legislative oversight is performed is conditional. The second claim put forward, after reviewing a rich body of wo…
What Makes Public Accounts Committees Work? A Comparative Analysis
This article investigates whether and under what conditions Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are able to scrutinize government accounts. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. We find that the relationship between the formal powers of the PACs and their successful performance is conditional. Specifically, we argue that the success of PACs depend on the behavior of committ…
Developing an index of EX-Post parliamentary oversight of public finance
For the past decade, scholars and practitioners have developed indexes to measure both legislative powers in general, and of the legislative power of the purse, in particular. Initial focus was on the development of a comprehensive index of legislative powers, and on assessing the ex-ante role of the legislature in the budget process.This article substantially deepens extends previous research on ex-post oversight, by developing a more comprehens…
Legislative oversight in Nigeria
This article builds upon and extends the analyses presented by Fashagba (2009) and drills down on the analyses of oversight in Nigeria presented by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014). It presents more nuanced findings. Based on an in-country document search and 45 personal interviews with politicians, parliamentary staff, civil society representatives and journalists, the article demonstrates that the Nigerian National Assembly possesses the tools an…
Motivation of Legislators and Political Will
That legislative oversight is an important determinant of corruption is well recognized, as is the fact that parliamentary oversight tools often have limited success both in holding governments to account and reducing corruption. Therefore, legislative oversight tools and mechanisms are a necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight; rather, legislators must also have the political will to apply them effectively. Since legislators…
World Bank Institute's Approach to Parliamentary Capacity Strengthening
For approximately 15 years, the World Bank Institute (WBI) has aimed to enhance the capacity of parliaments in their oversight, representation and law-making functions, recognising their essential role to good governance: they are representatives, set priorities, hold the executive accountable and engage directly with the media, civil society and individual citizens. This article outlines WBIs model for strengthening parliamentary capacity global…
Curbing corruption
No AccessWorld Bank Institute Development Studies1 Feb 2013Curbing corruptionToward a model for building national integrityAuthors/Editors: Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. KpundehRick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundehhttps://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-4257-6SectionsAboutPDF (0.8 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:This volume contains selections by theorists and practitioners of governance work…
Features and Functions of Supreme Audit Institutions
Supreme audit institutions are national \n agencies responsible for auditing government revenue and \n spending. Their legal mandates, reporting relationships, and \n effectiveness vary, reflecting different governance systems \n and government policies. But their primary purpose is to \n oversee the management of public funds and the quality and \n credibility of governments' reported financial data. In \n the past the World Bank and other donor…
The Role of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption
In most countries, Parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee government and to hold government to account; often, audit institutions, ombuds and anti-corruption agencies report to parliament, as a means of ensuring both their independence from government and reinforcing parliament's position at the apex of accountability institutions. At the same time, parliaments can also play a key role in promoting accountability, through const…
What Makes Public Accounts Committees Work? A Comparative Analysis
This article investigates whether and under what conditions Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are able to scrutinize government accounts. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. We find that the relationship between the formal powers of the PACs and their successful performance is conditional. Specifically, we argue that the success of PACs depend on the behavior of committ…
Parliaments as Peacebuilders in Conflict-Affected Countries
The role of parliament in conflict-affected countries becomes even more evident when the correlation between poverty and conflict is considered. This book is pioneering in that it considers what parliaments in conflict-affected countries can do, while performing their normal everyday functions, to not only contribute directly to conflict prevention but also aid peace building by combating poverty. By addressing issues of poverty, equitable distri…
Note on ‘The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes’ by Bryane Michael and Aare Kasemets
World Bank Institute's Approach to Parliamentary Capacity Strengthening
For approximately 15 years, the World Bank Institute (WBI) has aimed to enhance the capacity of parliaments in their oversight, representation and law-making functions, recognising their essential role to good governance: they are representatives, set priorities, hold the executive accountable and engage directly with the media, civil society and individual citizens. This article outlines WBIs model for strengthening parliamentary capacity global…
Improving Democracy and Accountability in Ghana
In this research note, we examine the nature of, and influences on, parliamentary oversight in Ghana. We find that while macro‐institutions are important when examining good governance and legislative effectiveness, meso‐level institutions (such as oversight tools) are more important than previously acknowledged. We also detect a positive relationship between an increase in legislative oversight facilities and the reputation of parliament and its…
Oversight Effectiveness and Political Will
The purpose of the present note is to advance two theoretical claims. The first claim proposed is that the impact of the availability of oversight tools and of the most broadly understood legislative capacity (availability of material, technical, financial resources; availability of well-trained staff) on the effectiveness with which legislative oversight is performed is conditional. The second claim put forward, after reviewing a rich body of wo…
Benchmarking and Self-Assessment for Parliaments
With international focus on good governance and parliamentary effectiveness, a standards-based approach involving benchmarks and assessment frameworks has emerged to evaluate parliament's performance and guide its reforms. The World Bank's has been a leader in the development of these frameworks, stewarding a global multi-stakeholder process aimed at enhancing consensus around parliamentary benchmarks and indicators with international organizatio…
Legislative oversight in Nigeria
This article builds upon and extends the analyses presented by Fashagba (2009) and drills down on the analyses of oversight in Nigeria presented by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014). It presents more nuanced findings. Based on an in-country document search and 45 personal interviews with politicians, parliamentary staff, civil society representatives and journalists, the article demonstrates that the Nigerian National Assembly possesses the tools an…
Democracy, Legislatures, and Business Conditions in Post-Authoritarian African Regimes
Bangladeshi citizens enjoyed a competitive, multiparty political system with regularly contested elections. Despite serious weaknesses of other democratic institutions-including the Election Commission; a trust deficit among major political parties particularly among two major parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL); and repeated episodes of political violence-free and fair elections in regular Bangla…
Developing an index of EX-Post parliamentary oversight of public finance
For the past decade, scholars and practitioners have developed indexes to measure both legislative powers in general, and of the legislative power of the purse, in particular. Initial focus was on the development of a comprehensive index of legislative powers, and on assessing the ex-ante role of the legislature in the budget process.This article substantially deepens extends previous research on ex-post oversight, by developing a more comprehens…
Anti-Corruption Evidence
Motivation of Legislators and Political Will
That legislative oversight is an important determinant of corruption is well recognized, as is the fact that parliamentary oversight tools often have limited success both in holding governments to account and reducing corruption. Therefore, legislative oversight tools and mechanisms are a necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight; rather, legislators must also have the political will to apply them effectively. Since legislators…
Political science (15 works) · Law (9 works) · Public Administration (8 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Public Administration (6 works) · Language change (5 works) · Accounting (3 works)