Benjamin A T Graham
Biographic Data
| ID | 4122650 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benjamin A T Graham |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benjamin A T |
| FAMILY NAME | Graham |
| SIGNATURE | GRAHAM B A T |
| AFFILIATIONS | School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 174 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Police as Policymakers: How Experiences With Policy Implementation Shape Policy Representation
Scholars of political representation have focused primarily on congruence between public preferences and enacted legislation, paying less attention to how policies are actually delivered by street-level bureaucrats in face-to-face encounters with citizens. This approach obscures the possibility that individuals may nonetheless have divergent perceptions of implemented policy that, in turn, inform their political attitudes. We examine this argumen…
Investing in the Homeland: Migration, Social Ties, and Foreign Firms
Once viewed as a "brain drain," migrants are increasingly viewed as a resource for promoting economic development back in their home countries. In Investing in the Homeland, Benjamin Graham finds that diasporans—migrants and their descendants—play a critical role in linking foreign firms to social networks in developing countries, allowing firms to flourish even in challenging political environments most foreign investors shun. Graham's analysis …
Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we …
Even Constrained Governments Take: The Domestic Politics of Transfer and Expropriation Risks
This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal …
The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory
Studies of regime type and war show that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but questions remain about why this is the case. A simple, if underappreciated, explanation for democratic success is that democracies fight alongside larger and more powerful coalitions. Coalition partners bring additional material capabilities and may also provide intangible benefits to the war effort, such as increased legitimacy or confidence. Democracies ma…
Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World’s States, 1975–2010
Arrangements for sharing political power serve three purposes: to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the policy process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority. A new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975–2010, is introduced here, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, …
Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival
Democracy is often fragile, especially in states recovering from civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions, which aim to safeguard minority group interests. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it limits electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dis…
Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
Power sharing is often purported to lead to civil peace, though its effects are disputed. We identify three types of power sharing—inclusive, dispersive, and constraining—and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation. We argue that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups. Constraining power-sharing institutions, such as guarantees of civil liberties and independe…
Who's Ready for Asean 2015? Firm Expectations and Preparations in the Philippines
New-new trade theory makes predictions regarding the types of firms most likely to benefit from increases in economic openness. This paper exploits the launch of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 to test predictions regarding the types of firms that are optimistic about, and prepared for, increased regional integration. We introduce data from an original survey conducted just prior to the launch of the AEC of over 300 mostly multinational firm…
Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival
Democracy is often fragile, especially in states recovering from civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions, which aim to safeguard minority group interests. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it limits electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dis…
Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
Power sharing is often purported to lead to civil peace, though its effects are disputed. We identify three types of power sharing—inclusive, dispersive, and constraining—and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation. We argue that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups. Constraining power-sharing institutions, such as guarantees of civil liberties and independe…
Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World’s States, 1975–2010
Arrangements for sharing political power serve three purposes: to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the policy process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority. A new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975–2010, is introduced here, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, …
Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we …
Even Constrained Governments Take: The Domestic Politics of Transfer and Expropriation Risks
This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal …
The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory
Studies of regime type and war show that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but questions remain about why this is the case. A simple, if underappreciated, explanation for democratic success is that democracies fight alongside larger and more powerful coalitions. Coalition partners bring additional material capabilities and may also provide intangible benefits to the war effort, such as increased legitimacy or confidence. Democracies ma…
Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
Power sharing is often purported to lead to civil peace, though its effects are disputed. We identify three types of power sharing—inclusive, dispersive, and constraining—and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation. We argue that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups. Constraining power-sharing institutions, such as guarantees of civil liberties and independe…
Who's Ready for Asean 2015? Firm Expectations and Preparations in the Philippines
New-new trade theory makes predictions regarding the types of firms most likely to benefit from increases in economic openness. This paper exploits the launch of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 to test predictions regarding the types of firms that are optimistic about, and prepared for, increased regional integration. We introduce data from an original survey conducted just prior to the launch of the AEC of over 300 mostly multinational firm…
The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory
Studies of regime type and war show that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but questions remain about why this is the case. A simple, if underappreciated, explanation for democratic success is that democracies fight alongside larger and more powerful coalitions. Coalition partners bring additional material capabilities and may also provide intangible benefits to the war effort, such as increased legitimacy or confidence. Democracies ma…
Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World’s States, 1975–2010
Arrangements for sharing political power serve three purposes: to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the policy process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority. A new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975–2010, is introduced here, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, …
Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival
Democracy is often fragile, especially in states recovering from civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions, which aim to safeguard minority group interests. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it limits electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dis…
Even Constrained Governments Take: The Domestic Politics of Transfer and Expropriation Risks
This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal …
Investing in the Homeland: Migration, Social Ties, and Foreign Firms
Once viewed as a "brain drain," migrants are increasingly viewed as a resource for promoting economic development back in their home countries. In Investing in the Homeland, Benjamin Graham finds that diasporans—migrants and their descendants—play a critical role in linking foreign firms to social networks in developing countries, allowing firms to flourish even in challenging political environments most foreign investors shun. Graham's analysis …
Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we …
Police as Policymakers: How Experiences With Policy Implementation Shape Policy Representation
Scholars of political representation have focused primarily on congruence between public preferences and enacted legislation, paying less attention to how policies are actually delivered by street-level bureaucrats in face-to-face encounters with citizens. This approach obscures the possibility that individuals may nonetheless have divergent perceptions of implemented policy that, in turn, inform their political attitudes. We examine this argumen…
Political science (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (5 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Democracy (3 works) · International Development and Aid (3 works)