Cristina Corduneanu-Huci
Biographic Data
| ID | 4123458 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Cristina Corduneanu-Huci |
| GIVEN NAMES | Cristina |
| FAMILY NAME | Corduneanu-Huci |
| SIGNATURE | CORDUNEANU-HUCI C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Central European University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4051-6098 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 79 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Policy Evaluation in Polarized Polities
This paper provides a political-economic analysis of policy evaluation. We focus on Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) as a subset of policy evaluations and argue that they are used instrumentally by decision-makers in order to improve perceptions of reforms and help secure policy legacy. We theorize that this ’credibility premium’ is more valuable for incumbents in politically polarized societies, which we empirically examine using two methods.…
Selective Control
In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targe…
What, Where, Who, and Why? An Empirical Investigation of Positionality in Political Science Field Experiments
International audience
Autocratic checks and balances? Trust in courts and bureaucratic discretion
An emerging literature in political economy focuses on democratic enclaves or pockets of quasi-democratic decision-making embedded in non-democracies. This article first explores the factors that may lead to the emergence of such institutional checks and balances in autocratic politics. I use the comparative analysis of courts in Morocco and Tunisia, and argue that interest group mobilization and the centrality of legalism in political developmen…
Selective Control
In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targe…
Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity
What explains different levels of clientelism across countries? Why do some politicians deliver clientelistic goods to their electoral constituencies, and why do some voters demand them? This article focuses on the historical origins of trust in states and shows that they have a lasting impact on contemporary patterns of patronage. The shift to programmatic politics reflects a historical transition from personalized trust in politicians to trust …
Running Uphill
This study analyzes twenty-four cases of occurrence/non-occurrence of mobilization in non-democratic states to determine conditions of political opportunity in high-risk authoritarian contexts. Ragin's (1987) Boolean method of qualitative comparison (QCA 3.0) is used to identify specific configurations of conditions that constitute political opportunity in non-democracies. We find that political opportunity is sensitive to conditions created by d…
Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity
What explains different levels of clientelism across countries? Why do some politicians deliver clientelistic goods to their electoral constituencies, and why do some voters demand them? This article focuses on the historical origins of trust in states and shows that they have a lasting impact on contemporary patterns of patronage. The shift to programmatic politics reflects a historical transition from personalized trust in politicians to trust …
Running Uphill
This study analyzes twenty-four cases of occurrence/non-occurrence of mobilization in non-democratic states to determine conditions of political opportunity in high-risk authoritarian contexts. Ragin's (1987) Boolean method of qualitative comparison (QCA 3.0) is used to identify specific configurations of conditions that constitute political opportunity in non-democracies. We find that political opportunity is sensitive to conditions created by d…
Selective Control
In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targe…
What, Where, Who, and Why? An Empirical Investigation of Positionality in Political Science Field Experiments
International audience
Autocratic checks and balances? Trust in courts and bureaucratic discretion
An emerging literature in political economy focuses on democratic enclaves or pockets of quasi-democratic decision-making embedded in non-democracies. This article first explores the factors that may lead to the emergence of such institutional checks and balances in autocratic politics. I use the comparative analysis of courts in Morocco and Tunisia, and argue that interest group mobilization and the centrality of legalism in political developmen…
Running Uphill
This study analyzes twenty-four cases of occurrence/non-occurrence of mobilization in non-democratic states to determine conditions of political opportunity in high-risk authoritarian contexts. Ragin's (1987) Boolean method of qualitative comparison (QCA 3.0) is used to identify specific configurations of conditions that constitute political opportunity in non-democracies. We find that political opportunity is sensitive to conditions created by d…
Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity
What explains different levels of clientelism across countries? Why do some politicians deliver clientelistic goods to their electoral constituencies, and why do some voters demand them? This article focuses on the historical origins of trust in states and shows that they have a lasting impact on contemporary patterns of patronage. The shift to programmatic politics reflects a historical transition from personalized trust in politicians to trust …
Selective Control
In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targe…
Autocratic checks and balances? Trust in courts and bureaucratic discretion
An emerging literature in political economy focuses on democratic enclaves or pockets of quasi-democratic decision-making embedded in non-democracies. This article first explores the factors that may lead to the emergence of such institutional checks and balances in autocratic politics. I use the comparative analysis of courts in Morocco and Tunisia, and argue that interest group mobilization and the centrality of legalism in political developmen…
Selective Control
In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targe…
What, Where, Who, and Why? An Empirical Investigation of Positionality in Political Science Field Experiments
International audience
Policy Evaluation in Polarized Polities
This paper provides a political-economic analysis of policy evaluation. We focus on Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) as a subset of policy evaluations and argue that they are used instrumentally by decision-makers in order to improve perceptions of reforms and help secure policy legacy. We theorize that this ’credibility premium’ is more valuable for incumbents in politically polarized societies, which we empirically examine using two methods.…
Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Democracy (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Bureaucracy (2 works)