Elena Barham
Biographic Data
| ID | 4123480 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elena Barham |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elena |
| FAMILY NAME | Barham |
| SIGNATURE | BARHAM E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Columbia University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5179-3667 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
A Bargaining Theory of Criminal War
Criminal war is a leading cause of death around the world. We argue for the inclusion of this topic in security studies and adapt a bargaining framework to shed light on why criminal groups fight or agree to peace. We propose that shocks to relative coercive capacity cause criminal war. This escalation in violent conflict proves more likely when criminal groups face greater difficulty negotiating: when they are more factionalized, less rooted in …
Vaccine Diplomacy: How Covid-19 Vaccine Distribution in Latin America Increases Trust in Foreign Governments
Vaccine distribution in the Global South has created opportunities for vaccine-developing countries to improve their international reputations. Leveraging a panel survey conducted in early 2021, this article evaluates whether vaccine diplomacy affects trust in foreign governments in six Latin American countries. Among vaccinated respondents, trust in the government of the country that they believed developed their vaccine increased relative to tr…
Teaching the Hidden Curriculum in Political Science
The “hidden curriculum” in academia represents a set of informal norms and rules, expectations, and skills that inform our “ways of doing” academic practice (Calarco 2020). This article suggests that relying on informal networks to provide access to instruction in these skills can reinforce preexisting inequalities in the discipline. Drawing on a pilot program that we developed and implemented in our own department, we provide a model for formali…
Complicit States and the Governing Strategy of Privilege Violence: When Weakness Is Not the Problem
This article seeks to explain why some high-capacity democracies have high levels of internal violence. These regimes present a puzzle: Why are bureaucratically capable states that ostensibly answer to voters failing to provide security? Challenging the “weak states” paradigm, we argue that states with high capacity and significant violence within marginalized populations exhibit a governance pattern in which governing factions deliberately weake…
Complicit States and the Governing Strategy of Privilege Violence: When Weakness Is Not the Problem
This article seeks to explain why some high-capacity democracies have high levels of internal violence. These regimes present a puzzle: Why are bureaucratically capable states that ostensibly answer to voters failing to provide security? Challenging the “weak states” paradigm, we argue that states with high capacity and significant violence within marginalized populations exhibit a governance pattern in which governing factions deliberately weake…
Vaccine Diplomacy: How Covid-19 Vaccine Distribution in Latin America Increases Trust in Foreign Governments
Vaccine distribution in the Global South has created opportunities for vaccine-developing countries to improve their international reputations. Leveraging a panel survey conducted in early 2021, this article evaluates whether vaccine diplomacy affects trust in foreign governments in six Latin American countries. Among vaccinated respondents, trust in the government of the country that they believed developed their vaccine increased relative to tr…
Teaching the Hidden Curriculum in Political Science
The “hidden curriculum” in academia represents a set of informal norms and rules, expectations, and skills that inform our “ways of doing” academic practice (Calarco 2020). This article suggests that relying on informal networks to provide access to instruction in these skills can reinforce preexisting inequalities in the discipline. Drawing on a pilot program that we developed and implemented in our own department, we provide a model for formali…
A Bargaining Theory of Criminal War
Criminal war is a leading cause of death around the world. We argue for the inclusion of this topic in security studies and adapt a bargaining framework to shed light on why criminal groups fight or agree to peace. We propose that shocks to relative coercive capacity cause criminal war. This escalation in violent conflict proves more likely when criminal groups face greater difficulty negotiating: when they are more factionalized, less rooted in …
Complicit States and the Governing Strategy of Privilege Violence: When Weakness Is Not the Problem
This article seeks to explain why some high-capacity democracies have high levels of internal violence. These regimes present a puzzle: Why are bureaucratically capable states that ostensibly answer to voters failing to provide security? Challenging the “weak states” paradigm, we argue that states with high capacity and significant violence within marginalized populations exhibit a governance pattern in which governing factions deliberately weake…
Teaching the Hidden Curriculum in Political Science
The “hidden curriculum” in academia represents a set of informal norms and rules, expectations, and skills that inform our “ways of doing” academic practice (Calarco 2020). This article suggests that relying on informal networks to provide access to instruction in these skills can reinforce preexisting inequalities in the discipline. Drawing on a pilot program that we developed and implemented in our own department, we provide a model for formali…
Vaccine Diplomacy: How Covid-19 Vaccine Distribution in Latin America Increases Trust in Foreign Governments
Vaccine distribution in the Global South has created opportunities for vaccine-developing countries to improve their international reputations. Leveraging a panel survey conducted in early 2021, this article evaluates whether vaccine diplomacy affects trust in foreign governments in six Latin American countries. Among vaccinated respondents, trust in the government of the country that they believed developed their vaccine increased relative to tr…
A Bargaining Theory of Criminal War
Criminal war is a leading cause of death around the world. We argue for the inclusion of this topic in security studies and adapt a bargaining framework to shed light on why criminal groups fight or agree to peace. We propose that shocks to relative coercive capacity cause criminal war. This escalation in violent conflict proves more likely when criminal groups face greater difficulty negotiating: when they are more factionalized, less rooted in …
Political science (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Criminology (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political economy (2 works) · Bargaining power (1 works) · Business (1 works)