Rachel Augustine Potter
Biographic Data
| ID | 4123958 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rachel Augustine Potter |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rachel Augustine |
| FAMILY NAME | Potter |
| SIGNATURE | POTTER R A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Virginia |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3572-3228 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 167 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Buying Evidence? Policy Research as a Presidential Commodity
Bureaucratic Politics
Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens, between policy and implementation. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy is studied varies widely, permitting theoretical and empirical blind spots as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policy making at the national leve…
Not by the Numbers
We examine President Trump's use of administrative tools related to policy making—including executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, signing statements, and rulemaking—and compare him to presidents since Eisenhower. Overall, we find that Trump was not that different from his predecessors and from what theories of unilateral output predict—at least, not by the numbers. However, the content of his actions were noteworthy in two ways. First, the …
Macro Outsourcing
Government outsourcing of services to private sector entities is increasingly common. The conventional wisdom ties governments' outsourcing decisions to either an ideological preference for market-based solutions or fiscal pressures. However, these conjectures have not been systematically subjected to empirical scrutiny. I develop an aggregate annual measure of US state-level outsourcing decisions—macro outsourcing—and explore whether the evidenc…
Congressional Oversight Revisited
Scholars have long acknowledged that legislators strategically employ procedure to advance policy preferences. But evidence for this view is confined to the lawmaking process, omitting an essential function of elected representatives: oversight of executive policy making. We argue that ex post procedural oversight is also driven by policy disagreement. We demonstrate this by analyzing congressional participation in US Environmental Protection Age…
A Female Policy Premium? Agency Context and Women’s Leadership in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy
Although there are descriptive and substantive benefits associated with women serving in leadership posts in the bureaucracy, we ask whether there is a policy benefit associated with women’s leadership. Simply put, is there a policy premium to having women as bureaucratic leaders? We focus on agency rulemaking, a policymaking activity conducted by nearly all federal agencies. Across three presidential administrations, we find no evidence of an ac…
Bending the Rules
Light, Paul C. The Government-Industrial Complex
Light, Paul C. The Government-Industrial Complex: The True Size of the Federal Government, 1984–2018." Congress & the Presidency, 47(1), pp. 144–145
Bending the Rules
Agency rulemaking in a separation of powers system
Rulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test o…
Continuity Trumps Change
From campaign rhetoric to tweets, President Trump has positioned himself as “disrupter in chief,” often pointing to administrative action as the avenue by which he is leaving a lasting mark. However, research on the administrative presidency begins with the premise that all presidents face incentives to use administrative tools to gain substantive or political traction. If, as this article suggests, Trump’s institutional standing differs little f…
Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
The slow pace of administrative action is arguably a defining characteristic of modern bureaucracy. The reasons proffered for delay are numerous, often centering on procedural hurdles or bureaucrats' ineptitude. I offer a different perspective on delay in one important bureaucratic venue: the federal rulemaking process. I argue that agencies can speed up (fast-track) or slow down (slow-roll) the rulemaking process in order to undermine political …
The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy
How does the institutional design of a state's bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that institutions can moderate bureaucrats' incentives to act in accordance with an Executive's diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to …
Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
The slow pace of administrative action is arguably a defining characteristic of modern bureaucracy. The reasons proffered for delay are numerous, often centering on procedural hurdles or bureaucrats' ineptitude. I offer a different perspective on delay in one important bureaucratic venue: the federal rulemaking process. I argue that agencies can speed up (fast-track) or slow down (slow-roll) the rulemaking process in order to undermine political …
The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy
How does the institutional design of a state's bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that institutions can moderate bureaucrats' incentives to act in accordance with an Executive's diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to …
Congressional Oversight Revisited
Scholars have long acknowledged that legislators strategically employ procedure to advance policy preferences. But evidence for this view is confined to the lawmaking process, omitting an essential function of elected representatives: oversight of executive policy making. We argue that ex post procedural oversight is also driven by policy disagreement. We demonstrate this by analyzing congressional participation in US Environmental Protection Age…
Agency rulemaking in a separation of powers system
Rulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test o…
Bureaucratic Politics
Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens, between policy and implementation. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy is studied varies widely, permitting theoretical and empirical blind spots as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policy making at the national leve…
A Female Policy Premium? Agency Context and Women’s Leadership in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy
Although there are descriptive and substantive benefits associated with women serving in leadership posts in the bureaucracy, we ask whether there is a policy benefit associated with women’s leadership. Simply put, is there a policy premium to having women as bureaucratic leaders? We focus on agency rulemaking, a policymaking activity conducted by nearly all federal agencies. Across three presidential administrations, we find no evidence of an ac…
Not by the Numbers
We examine President Trump's use of administrative tools related to policy making—including executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, signing statements, and rulemaking—and compare him to presidents since Eisenhower. Overall, we find that Trump was not that different from his predecessors and from what theories of unilateral output predict—at least, not by the numbers. However, the content of his actions were noteworthy in two ways. First, the …
Macro Outsourcing
Government outsourcing of services to private sector entities is increasingly common. The conventional wisdom ties governments' outsourcing decisions to either an ideological preference for market-based solutions or fiscal pressures. However, these conjectures have not been systematically subjected to empirical scrutiny. I develop an aggregate annual measure of US state-level outsourcing decisions—macro outsourcing—and explore whether the evidenc…
Continuity Trumps Change
From campaign rhetoric to tweets, President Trump has positioned himself as “disrupter in chief,” often pointing to administrative action as the avenue by which he is leaving a lasting mark. However, research on the administrative presidency begins with the premise that all presidents face incentives to use administrative tools to gain substantive or political traction. If, as this article suggests, Trump’s institutional standing differs little f…
The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy
How does the institutional design of a state's bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that institutions can moderate bureaucrats' incentives to act in accordance with an Executive's diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to …
Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
The slow pace of administrative action is arguably a defining characteristic of modern bureaucracy. The reasons proffered for delay are numerous, often centering on procedural hurdles or bureaucrats' ineptitude. I offer a different perspective on delay in one important bureaucratic venue: the federal rulemaking process. I argue that agencies can speed up (fast-track) or slow down (slow-roll) the rulemaking process in order to undermine political …
Bending the Rules
Light, Paul C. The Government-Industrial Complex
Light, Paul C. The Government-Industrial Complex: The True Size of the Federal Government, 1984–2018." Congress & the Presidency, 47(1), pp. 144–145
Bending the Rules
Agency rulemaking in a separation of powers system
Rulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test o…
Continuity Trumps Change
From campaign rhetoric to tweets, President Trump has positioned himself as “disrupter in chief,” often pointing to administrative action as the avenue by which he is leaving a lasting mark. However, research on the administrative presidency begins with the premise that all presidents face incentives to use administrative tools to gain substantive or political traction. If, as this article suggests, Trump’s institutional standing differs little f…
A Female Policy Premium? Agency Context and Women’s Leadership in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy
Although there are descriptive and substantive benefits associated with women serving in leadership posts in the bureaucracy, we ask whether there is a policy benefit associated with women’s leadership. Simply put, is there a policy premium to having women as bureaucratic leaders? We focus on agency rulemaking, a policymaking activity conducted by nearly all federal agencies. Across three presidential administrations, we find no evidence of an ac…
Congressional Oversight Revisited
Scholars have long acknowledged that legislators strategically employ procedure to advance policy preferences. But evidence for this view is confined to the lawmaking process, omitting an essential function of elected representatives: oversight of executive policy making. We argue that ex post procedural oversight is also driven by policy disagreement. We demonstrate this by analyzing congressional participation in US Environmental Protection Age…
Not by the Numbers
We examine President Trump's use of administrative tools related to policy making—including executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, signing statements, and rulemaking—and compare him to presidents since Eisenhower. Overall, we find that Trump was not that different from his predecessors and from what theories of unilateral output predict—at least, not by the numbers. However, the content of his actions were noteworthy in two ways. First, the …
Macro Outsourcing
Government outsourcing of services to private sector entities is increasingly common. The conventional wisdom ties governments' outsourcing decisions to either an ideological preference for market-based solutions or fiscal pressures. However, these conjectures have not been systematically subjected to empirical scrutiny. I develop an aggregate annual measure of US state-level outsourcing decisions—macro outsourcing—and explore whether the evidenc…
Bureaucratic Politics
Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens, between policy and implementation. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy is studied varies widely, permitting theoretical and empirical blind spots as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policy making at the national leve…
Buying Evidence? Policy Research as a Presidential Commodity
Political science (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (9 works) · Public Administration (7 works) · Public Administration (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Bureaucracy (5 works) · Economics (5 works)