Erica A Holberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 4125110 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erica A Holberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erica A |
| FAMILY NAME | Holberg |
| SIGNATURE | HOLBERG E A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Languages, Philosophy, and Communication Studies, Utah State University Logan, UT USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Can we Modify our Pleasures? A New Look at Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable
Many of us are all too familiar with the experience of taking pleasure in things we feel we ought not, and of finding it frustratingly hard to bring our pleasures into line with our moral judgements. As a value dualist, Kant draws a sharp contrast between the two sources of practical motivation: pleasure in the agreeable and respect for the moral law. His ethics might thus seem to be an unpromising source for help in thinking about how we can bri…
Aristotle on the Pleasure of Courage
Aristotle repeatedly qualifies the pleasure of courageous actions relative to other kinds of virtuous actions. This article argues that the pleasure of courageous actions is qualified because virtuous activity and its pleasure is dependent upon external conditions, and the external conditions of courageous actions are particularly constraining. The article shows that Curzer’s explanation of the qualified pleasure of courageous actions by the pres…
No prominent works on this page.
Aristotle on the Pleasure of Courage
Aristotle repeatedly qualifies the pleasure of courageous actions relative to other kinds of virtuous actions. This article argues that the pleasure of courageous actions is qualified because virtuous activity and its pleasure is dependent upon external conditions, and the external conditions of courageous actions are particularly constraining. The article shows that Curzer’s explanation of the qualified pleasure of courageous actions by the pres…
Can we Modify our Pleasures? A New Look at Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable
Many of us are all too familiar with the experience of taking pleasure in things we feel we ought not, and of finding it frustratingly hard to bring our pleasures into line with our moral judgements. As a value dualist, Kant draws a sharp contrast between the two sources of practical motivation: pleasure in the agreeable and respect for the moral law. His ethics might thus seem to be an unpromising source for help in thinking about how we can bri…
Aesthetics (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Pleasure (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Courage (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 works) · Free Will and Agency (1 works)