Robin J Kempf
Biographic Data
| ID | 4127649 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robin J Kempf |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robin J |
| FAMILY NAME | Kempf |
| SIGNATURE | KEMPF R J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Colorado Springs |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1836-8431 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 82 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Evidence of Reputational Priorities of a Sample of U.S. Federal Offices of Inspector General
An Empirical Assessment of the Contribution of State Offices of Inspectors General to Corruption Control
This exploratory research examines whether the proliferation of state offices of inspector general (OIGs) contributes to corruption control. Using 50-state panel data from 1976 to 2010, preliminary evidence that the number of state-level OIGs is positively associated with the corruption conviction rate is shown. This suggests that state OIGs act as a successful corruption detection mechanism, and therefore, OIGs play a role in corruption control,…
The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General
The question of whether executive agencies can be subject to the control of politically elected legislators has been answered affirmatively, but it remains an open question whether legislators can likewise design an agency to be able to resist such control and influence. This article examines whether the de jure elements established for the system of U.S. federal offices of inspectors general (OIGs) adequately guard their role as independent and …
Collaborating in the Absence of Trust? What Collaborative Governance Theory and Practice Can Learn From the Literatures of Conflict Resolution, Psychology, and Law
Trust is often touted as both an element of success and an outcome of interest in collaboration research, usually without defining the term or acknowledging the possibility of collaborating when trust is diminished or absent. This article broadens our theoretical understanding of the concept of trust, and the ability to collaborate in the absence of trust, by looking at it through the lenses of conflict resolution, psychology, and law. The discip…
The State of Federal Inspectors General Studies
Crafting accountability policy
Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) promise increased accountability from governmental actors. OIGs do so by monitoring governmental programs and operations and providing their findings to legislative or executive decision makers and/or the public. These offices have enjoyed a particular popularity in the United States in the last 40 years; however a close examination of these OIGs demonstrates that, particularly on the state and local levels, t…
Informal Accountability in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations
Multiagency collaboration is widely used in contemporary service delivery systems. This article explores the interpersonal interactions within collaborative systems, among subsystems, and among organizations. Our focus is on illuminating the informal mechanisms that facilitate collaboration, joint production, coordination and integration of service delivery, and sustained effort. Such interactions generate unofficial expectations, discretionary b…
Informal Accountability in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations
Multiagency collaboration is widely used in contemporary service delivery systems. This article explores the interpersonal interactions within collaborative systems, among subsystems, and among organizations. Our focus is on illuminating the informal mechanisms that facilitate collaboration, joint production, coordination and integration of service delivery, and sustained effort. Such interactions generate unofficial expectations, discretionary b…
Collaborating in the Absence of Trust? What Collaborative Governance Theory and Practice Can Learn From the Literatures of Conflict Resolution, Psychology, and Law
Trust is often touted as both an element of success and an outcome of interest in collaboration research, usually without defining the term or acknowledging the possibility of collaborating when trust is diminished or absent. This article broadens our theoretical understanding of the concept of trust, and the ability to collaborate in the absence of trust, by looking at it through the lenses of conflict resolution, psychology, and law. The discip…
The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General
The question of whether executive agencies can be subject to the control of politically elected legislators has been answered affirmatively, but it remains an open question whether legislators can likewise design an agency to be able to resist such control and influence. This article examines whether the de jure elements established for the system of U.S. federal offices of inspectors general (OIGs) adequately guard their role as independent and …
Crafting accountability policy
Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) promise increased accountability from governmental actors. OIGs do so by monitoring governmental programs and operations and providing their findings to legislative or executive decision makers and/or the public. These offices have enjoyed a particular popularity in the United States in the last 40 years; however a close examination of these OIGs demonstrates that, particularly on the state and local levels, t…
Evidence of Reputational Priorities of a Sample of U.S. Federal Offices of Inspector General
Informal Accountability in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations
Multiagency collaboration is widely used in contemporary service delivery systems. This article explores the interpersonal interactions within collaborative systems, among subsystems, and among organizations. Our focus is on illuminating the informal mechanisms that facilitate collaboration, joint production, coordination and integration of service delivery, and sustained effort. Such interactions generate unofficial expectations, discretionary b…
Crafting accountability policy
Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) promise increased accountability from governmental actors. OIGs do so by monitoring governmental programs and operations and providing their findings to legislative or executive decision makers and/or the public. These offices have enjoyed a particular popularity in the United States in the last 40 years; however a close examination of these OIGs demonstrates that, particularly on the state and local levels, t…
The State of Federal Inspectors General Studies
The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General
The question of whether executive agencies can be subject to the control of politically elected legislators has been answered affirmatively, but it remains an open question whether legislators can likewise design an agency to be able to resist such control and influence. This article examines whether the de jure elements established for the system of U.S. federal offices of inspectors general (OIGs) adequately guard their role as independent and …
Collaborating in the Absence of Trust? What Collaborative Governance Theory and Practice Can Learn From the Literatures of Conflict Resolution, Psychology, and Law
Trust is often touted as both an element of success and an outcome of interest in collaboration research, usually without defining the term or acknowledging the possibility of collaborating when trust is diminished or absent. This article broadens our theoretical understanding of the concept of trust, and the ability to collaborate in the absence of trust, by looking at it through the lenses of conflict resolution, psychology, and law. The discip…
An Empirical Assessment of the Contribution of State Offices of Inspectors General to Corruption Control
This exploratory research examines whether the proliferation of state offices of inspector general (OIGs) contributes to corruption control. Using 50-state panel data from 1976 to 2010, preliminary evidence that the number of state-level OIGs is positively associated with the corruption conviction rate is shown. This suggests that state OIGs act as a successful corruption detection mechanism, and therefore, OIGs play a role in corruption control,…
Evidence of Reputational Priorities of a Sample of U.S. Federal Offices of Inspector General
Political science (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Public Policy and Administration Research (5 works) · Regulation and Compliance Studies (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Public relations (4 works) · Accountability (3 works) · Accounting (3 works)