Dan Altman
Biographic Data
| ID | 4134611 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dan Altman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dan |
| FAMILY NAME | Altman |
| SIGNATURE | ALTMAN D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgia State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 102 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve
Sinking costs to signal resolve has become a vital part of how the field of international relations (IR) understands crisis bargaining. The logic of a resolved state “burning money” to distinguish itself from an unresolved state is well established in theory. But do states choose to sink costs and burn money in practice? We address the question on two fronts. First, we collect and analyze the examples of sinking costs in the mainstream IR literat…
Red lines
Using declassified materials to examine the eleven red lines of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this study qualifies and amends two popular beliefs about them: failing to punish violations damages credibility and deterrence requires declaring unambiguous red lines. I argue, first, that violations of red lines create fleeting ‘windows of credibility’ wherein violators fear retaliation. If declarers move quickly, they can convert non-enforcement into a b…
The Psychology of Coercion Failure
When confronted with coercive threats, targets often stand firm rather than back down. We identify one important yet unrecognized factor that causes actors to resist threats: psychological reactance. Reactance theory explains that when someone perceives a threat to their freedom to make choices, they attempt to restore their autonomy by refusing to capitulate. The result is unwillingness to concede to coercion that extends beyond rational incenti…
Why Territorial Disputes Escalate
Although attempts to conquer entire states became rare after 1945, attempts to conquer small pieces of territory persisted. Why do states so often seize—and even fight wars over—remarkably small areas? We argue that traditional explanations predicated on the material or ethnic value of disputed territories largely cannot explain the escalation of territorial disputes since 1945. Instead, actors more often seize territory to be seen seizing it. We…
The Evolution of Territorial Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm
Past studies conclude that a territorial integrity norm caused territorial conquest to decline sharply after 1945, virtually subsiding after 1975. However, using new and more comprehensive data on territorial conquest attempts, this study presents a revised history of conquest after 1945. Unlike attempts to conquer entire states, attempts to conquer parts of states remained far more common than previously recognized. More than conquest declined i…
Advancing without Attacking
What is the nature of the strategic game that states play during crises? Extensive research examines the leading answer: coercive bargaining. States prevail by signaling resolve, establishing the credibility of their threats, and coercing their adversaries into backing down. However, instead of (or in addition to) traditional coercive bargaining, this article shows that states frequently play out a different game with its own set of rules and tac…
By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion
The Evolution of Territorial Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm
Past studies conclude that a territorial integrity norm caused territorial conquest to decline sharply after 1945, virtually subsiding after 1975. However, using new and more comprehensive data on territorial conquest attempts, this study presents a revised history of conquest after 1945. Unlike attempts to conquer entire states, attempts to conquer parts of states remained far more common than previously recognized. More than conquest declined i…
By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion
The Psychology of Coercion Failure
When confronted with coercive threats, targets often stand firm rather than back down. We identify one important yet unrecognized factor that causes actors to resist threats: psychological reactance. Reactance theory explains that when someone perceives a threat to their freedom to make choices, they attempt to restore their autonomy by refusing to capitulate. The result is unwillingness to concede to coercion that extends beyond rational incenti…
Why Territorial Disputes Escalate
Although attempts to conquer entire states became rare after 1945, attempts to conquer small pieces of territory persisted. Why do states so often seize—and even fight wars over—remarkably small areas? We argue that traditional explanations predicated on the material or ethnic value of disputed territories largely cannot explain the escalation of territorial disputes since 1945. Instead, actors more often seize territory to be seen seizing it. We…
Advancing without Attacking
What is the nature of the strategic game that states play during crises? Extensive research examines the leading answer: coercive bargaining. States prevail by signaling resolve, establishing the credibility of their threats, and coercing their adversaries into backing down. However, instead of (or in addition to) traditional coercive bargaining, this article shows that states frequently play out a different game with its own set of rules and tac…
Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve
Sinking costs to signal resolve has become a vital part of how the field of international relations (IR) understands crisis bargaining. The logic of a resolved state “burning money” to distinguish itself from an unresolved state is well established in theory. But do states choose to sink costs and burn money in practice? We address the question on two fronts. First, we collect and analyze the examples of sinking costs in the mainstream IR literat…
Red lines
Using declassified materials to examine the eleven red lines of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this study qualifies and amends two popular beliefs about them: failing to punish violations damages credibility and deterrence requires declaring unambiguous red lines. I argue, first, that violations of red lines create fleeting ‘windows of credibility’ wherein violators fear retaliation. If declarers move quickly, they can convert non-enforcement into a b…
By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion
Advancing without Attacking
What is the nature of the strategic game that states play during crises? Extensive research examines the leading answer: coercive bargaining. States prevail by signaling resolve, establishing the credibility of their threats, and coercing their adversaries into backing down. However, instead of (or in addition to) traditional coercive bargaining, this article shows that states frequently play out a different game with its own set of rules and tac…
The Evolution of Territorial Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm
Past studies conclude that a territorial integrity norm caused territorial conquest to decline sharply after 1945, virtually subsiding after 1975. However, using new and more comprehensive data on territorial conquest attempts, this study presents a revised history of conquest after 1945. Unlike attempts to conquer entire states, attempts to conquer parts of states remained far more common than previously recognized. More than conquest declined i…
Why Territorial Disputes Escalate
Although attempts to conquer entire states became rare after 1945, attempts to conquer small pieces of territory persisted. Why do states so often seize—and even fight wars over—remarkably small areas? We argue that traditional explanations predicated on the material or ethnic value of disputed territories largely cannot explain the escalation of territorial disputes since 1945. Instead, actors more often seize territory to be seen seizing it. We…
Red lines
Using declassified materials to examine the eleven red lines of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this study qualifies and amends two popular beliefs about them: failing to punish violations damages credibility and deterrence requires declaring unambiguous red lines. I argue, first, that violations of red lines create fleeting ‘windows of credibility’ wherein violators fear retaliation. If declarers move quickly, they can convert non-enforcement into a b…
The Psychology of Coercion Failure
When confronted with coercive threats, targets often stand firm rather than back down. We identify one important yet unrecognized factor that causes actors to resist threats: psychological reactance. Reactance theory explains that when someone perceives a threat to their freedom to make choices, they attempt to restore their autonomy by refusing to capitulate. The result is unwillingness to concede to coercion that extends beyond rational incenti…
Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve
Sinking costs to signal resolve has become a vital part of how the field of international relations (IR) understands crisis bargaining. The logic of a resolved state “burning money” to distinguish itself from an unresolved state is well established in theory. But do states choose to sink costs and burn money in practice? We address the question on two fronts. First, we collect and analyze the examples of sinking costs in the mainstream IR literat…
Political science (7 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law and economics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Credibility (3 works) · Global Peace and Security Dynamics (3 works)