Erica D Lonergan
Biographic Data
| ID | 4134626 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erica D Lonergan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erica D |
| FAMILY NAME | Lonergan |
| SIGNATURE | LONERGAN E D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Columbia University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2599-1069 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The paradox of intelligence failures in the age of artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the speed and scale at which intelligence organizations collect, analyze, and disseminate information. In turn, some are optimistic that AI will reduce the risks of intelligence failures. To evaluate this claim, this article puts AI debates in conversation with the literature on intelligence failures and strategic surprise. The article makes two core arguments. First, AI technologies are not likely to …
Minding the gap? The strategic logic of cyber coercion in theory and practice
Why civilians don’t defer to military preferences about cyber strategy like they do for other domains
Do civilians defer to military preferences about U.S. cyber strategy? The civil-military relations literature has only cursorily addressed this question. This article aims to fill this gap. I argue that three factors affect the prospects of civilian deference: secrecy, the relative bureaucratic power of U.S. Cyber Command, and the influence of civilian industry. Taken together, these factors make civilians less likely to excessively defer to the …
Cyber Sovereignty
Emerging technology and the cult of the offensive
Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy in Cyberspace
Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace
Cyber Operations and Signaling
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalat…
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalat…
Emerging technology and the cult of the offensive
Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy in Cyberspace
Cyber Operations and Signaling
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalat…
Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace
Emerging technology and the cult of the offensive
Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy in Cyberspace
Why civilians don’t defer to military preferences about cyber strategy like they do for other domains
Do civilians defer to military preferences about U.S. cyber strategy? The civil-military relations literature has only cursorily addressed this question. This article aims to fill this gap. I argue that three factors affect the prospects of civilian deference: secrecy, the relative bureaucratic power of U.S. Cyber Command, and the influence of civilian industry. Taken together, these factors make civilians less likely to excessively defer to the …
Cyber Sovereignty
The paradox of intelligence failures in the age of artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming the speed and scale at which intelligence organizations collect, analyze, and disseminate information. In turn, some are optimistic that AI will reduce the risks of intelligence failures. To evaluate this claim, this article puts AI debates in conversation with the literature on intelligence failures and strategic surprise. The article makes two core arguments. First, AI technologies are not likely to …
Minding the gap? The strategic logic of cyber coercion in theory and practice
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Cyberspace (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Computer security (3 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (3 works) · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · The Internet (3 works) · Cyber threats (2 works)