Shawn W Lonergan
Biographic Data
| ID | 4134658 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Shawn W Lonergan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Shawn W |
| FAMILY NAME | Lonergan |
| SIGNATURE | LONERGAN S W |
| AFFILIATIONS | 75th Innovation Command and PricewaterhouseCoopers |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 38 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Deterrence by denial in cyberspace
Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and conceptual rigor to the proliferation of arguments within the United States about deterrence in cyberspace. Specifically, we argue that cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence …
Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace
Cyber Operations and Signaling
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalat…
The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace
What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly comm…
Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber Proxies
The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace
What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly comm…
Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber Proxies
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalat…
Deterrence by denial in cyberspace
Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and conceptual rigor to the proliferation of arguments within the United States about deterrence in cyberspace. Specifically, we argue that cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence …
Can States Calculate the Risks of Using Cyber Proxies
The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace
What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly comm…
Cyber Operations and Signaling
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalat…
Deterrence by denial in cyberspace
Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and conceptual rigor to the proliferation of arguments within the United States about deterrence in cyberspace. Specifically, we argue that cyber deterrence frameworks that draw from the traditional nuclear deterrence literature and the logic of deterrence …
Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace
Computer Science (5 works) · Computer security (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Cyberspace (3 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · The Internet (3 works) · Business (2 works)