Joshua Alley
Biographic Data
| ID | 4134787 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joshua Alley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joshua |
| FAMILY NAME | Alley |
| SIGNATURE | ALLEY J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Virginia |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3180-4787 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Selling War at Home and Abroad
This study examines how authoritarian regimes set conflicting domestic and foreign propaganda agenda during wartime to ensure domestic unity and engage international audiences. We posit that authoritarian regimes relying on public support for legitimacy attempt to keep domestic opinion onside by emphasizing the high stakes and low costs of war, thereby ensuring that dissent against the conflict does not threaten the regime. Foreign audiences, on …
When Do Sanctions On Terrorist Groups Work
A substantial amount of literature studies the effects of sanctions against states, but far less is known about sanctions against violent non-state actors. We argue and show that the effectiveness of counterterrorism sanctions hinges on terrorist groups’ financial adaptability. Groups with low financial adaptability are likely to reduce attacks due to sanctions. In contrast, groups with high financial adaptability are likely to adapt to sanctions…
Attitudes Towards Extremist Organizations in the United States
How do Americans view militant right-wing extremist organizations? We address this question using identical survey instruments that combine endorsement experiments and direct questions fielded in 2020 and 2022. Our design builds on established methodologies used to study attitudes toward militant organizations abroad. We find that consumption of right-wing media is strongly associated with less negative views of militant right-wing groups. We als…
Arms and Elections
The United States makes more arms deals with autocracies during election years. US leaders sell arms to autocrats to bolster their electoral prospects by claiming credit for providing jobs and increasing defense contracting. Autocratic arms recipients have the political flexibility to order arms around elections and increase their security by taking arms. Three major pieces of evidence support this argument. First, I detail electoral cycles in ar…
Frenemies
When do states ally against a common threat despite ideological differences? This question presents a puzzle for two prominent theories of international relations. Realists expect that ideology animosity is no barrier to alliance formation, while ideological arguments expect that it is an insuperable obstacle. Mark L. Haas’s answer to this important and relevant puzzle provides new insights for scholars and policymakers to consider. First, Haas a…
Elite Cues and Public Attitudes Towards Military Alliances
Do elite cues exert extensive, conditional or minimal influence on public support for military alliances in the United States? I assess the boundaries of elite leadership on public opinion towards alliances by dividing partisan respondents into wings based on isolationism and militant assertiveness. If co-partisan elite cues change public attitudes across three or four wings within their party, elites exert extensive influence. Elite cues exert c…
Estimating Alliance Costs
Reassessing the public goods theory of alliances
The public goods theory of alliances exerts substantial influence on scholarship and policy, especially through its claim that small alliance participants free-ride on larger partners. Prior statistical tests of free-riding suffer from model specification and generalizability problems, however, so there is little reliable and general evidence about this prediction. In this study, I address those limitations with a new test of the free-riding hypo…
Signaling restraint
Approximately 20% of contemporary rebel groups have expressed commitment to international law and signaled their intention to exercise restraint during wartime. Which rebel groups make these commitments and under what conditions? We argue that international engagement shapes the likelihood of rebel commitment to international law. Rebel groups with transnational non-military support and clear organizational structure are likely to speak the langu…
Alliance Participation, Treaty Depth, and Military Spending
How does alliance participation affect military spending? Some argue that alliance membership increases military expenditures, while others contend that it produces spending cuts. I argue that deep formal defense cooperation modifies the impact of alliance participation on military expenditures and can explain increases and decreases in spending by small alliance members. Security-seeking junior members of deep alliances usually decrease military…
Budget Breaker? The Financial Cost of US Military Alliances
How do alliance commitments affect US military spending? This question is at the heart of debates about the value of alliances and the future of US grand strategy. One perspective, which we call the budget hawk view, asserts that alliances are exorbitantly expensive, as they require military investments to deter third-party adversaries and reassure allies, encourage free riding, and facilitate reckless allied behavior. A competing view, which we …
Elite Cues and Public Attitudes Towards Military Alliances
Do elite cues exert extensive, conditional or minimal influence on public support for military alliances in the United States? I assess the boundaries of elite leadership on public opinion towards alliances by dividing partisan respondents into wings based on isolationism and militant assertiveness. If co-partisan elite cues change public attitudes across three or four wings within their party, elites exert extensive influence. Elite cues exert c…
Alliance Participation, Treaty Depth, and Military Spending
How does alliance participation affect military spending? Some argue that alliance membership increases military expenditures, while others contend that it produces spending cuts. I argue that deep formal defense cooperation modifies the impact of alliance participation on military expenditures and can explain increases and decreases in spending by small alliance members. Security-seeking junior members of deep alliances usually decrease military…
Signaling restraint
Approximately 20% of contemporary rebel groups have expressed commitment to international law and signaled their intention to exercise restraint during wartime. Which rebel groups make these commitments and under what conditions? We argue that international engagement shapes the likelihood of rebel commitment to international law. Rebel groups with transnational non-military support and clear organizational structure are likely to speak the langu…
Budget Breaker? The Financial Cost of US Military Alliances
How do alliance commitments affect US military spending? This question is at the heart of debates about the value of alliances and the future of US grand strategy. One perspective, which we call the budget hawk view, asserts that alliances are exorbitantly expensive, as they require military investments to deter third-party adversaries and reassure allies, encourage free riding, and facilitate reckless allied behavior. A competing view, which we …
Arms and Elections
The United States makes more arms deals with autocracies during election years. US leaders sell arms to autocrats to bolster their electoral prospects by claiming credit for providing jobs and increasing defense contracting. Autocratic arms recipients have the political flexibility to order arms around elections and increase their security by taking arms. Three major pieces of evidence support this argument. First, I detail electoral cycles in ar…
Estimating Alliance Costs
Reassessing the public goods theory of alliances
The public goods theory of alliances exerts substantial influence on scholarship and policy, especially through its claim that small alliance participants free-ride on larger partners. Prior statistical tests of free-riding suffer from model specification and generalizability problems, however, so there is little reliable and general evidence about this prediction. In this study, I address those limitations with a new test of the free-riding hypo…
Reassessing the public goods theory of alliances
The public goods theory of alliances exerts substantial influence on scholarship and policy, especially through its claim that small alliance participants free-ride on larger partners. Prior statistical tests of free-riding suffer from model specification and generalizability problems, however, so there is little reliable and general evidence about this prediction. In this study, I address those limitations with a new test of the free-riding hypo…
Signaling restraint
Approximately 20% of contemporary rebel groups have expressed commitment to international law and signaled their intention to exercise restraint during wartime. Which rebel groups make these commitments and under what conditions? We argue that international engagement shapes the likelihood of rebel commitment to international law. Rebel groups with transnational non-military support and clear organizational structure are likely to speak the langu…
Alliance Participation, Treaty Depth, and Military Spending
How does alliance participation affect military spending? Some argue that alliance membership increases military expenditures, while others contend that it produces spending cuts. I argue that deep formal defense cooperation modifies the impact of alliance participation on military expenditures and can explain increases and decreases in spending by small alliance members. Security-seeking junior members of deep alliances usually decrease military…
Budget Breaker? The Financial Cost of US Military Alliances
How do alliance commitments affect US military spending? This question is at the heart of debates about the value of alliances and the future of US grand strategy. One perspective, which we call the budget hawk view, asserts that alliances are exorbitantly expensive, as they require military investments to deter third-party adversaries and reassure allies, encourage free riding, and facilitate reckless allied behavior. A competing view, which we …
Estimating Alliance Costs
Frenemies
When do states ally against a common threat despite ideological differences? This question presents a puzzle for two prominent theories of international relations. Realists expect that ideology animosity is no barrier to alliance formation, while ideological arguments expect that it is an insuperable obstacle. Mark L. Haas’s answer to this important and relevant puzzle provides new insights for scholars and policymakers to consider. First, Haas a…
Elite Cues and Public Attitudes Towards Military Alliances
Do elite cues exert extensive, conditional or minimal influence on public support for military alliances in the United States? I assess the boundaries of elite leadership on public opinion towards alliances by dividing partisan respondents into wings based on isolationism and militant assertiveness. If co-partisan elite cues change public attitudes across three or four wings within their party, elites exert extensive influence. Elite cues exert c…
Arms and Elections
The United States makes more arms deals with autocracies during election years. US leaders sell arms to autocrats to bolster their electoral prospects by claiming credit for providing jobs and increasing defense contracting. Autocratic arms recipients have the political flexibility to order arms around elections and increase their security by taking arms. Three major pieces of evidence support this argument. First, I detail electoral cycles in ar…
Selling War at Home and Abroad
This study examines how authoritarian regimes set conflicting domestic and foreign propaganda agenda during wartime to ensure domestic unity and engage international audiences. We posit that authoritarian regimes relying on public support for legitimacy attempt to keep domestic opinion onside by emphasizing the high stakes and low costs of war, thereby ensuring that dissent against the conflict does not threaten the regime. Foreign audiences, on …
When Do Sanctions On Terrorist Groups Work
A substantial amount of literature studies the effects of sanctions against states, but far less is known about sanctions against violent non-state actors. We argue and show that the effectiveness of counterterrorism sanctions hinges on terrorist groups’ financial adaptability. Groups with low financial adaptability are likely to reduce attacks due to sanctions. In contrast, groups with high financial adaptability are likely to adapt to sanctions…
Attitudes Towards Extremist Organizations in the United States
How do Americans view militant right-wing extremist organizations? We address this question using identical survey instruments that combine endorsement experiments and direct questions fielded in 2020 and 2022. Our design builds on established methodologies used to study attitudes toward militant organizations abroad. We find that consumption of right-wing media is strongly associated with less negative views of militant right-wing groups. We als…
Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Alliance (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies (3 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (3 works) · Psychology (3 works)