Oliver Schulte
Biographic Data
| ID | 4139771 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oliver Schulte |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oliver |
| FAMILY NAME | Schulte |
| SIGNATURE | SCHULTE O |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Alberta |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2805-4313 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Persistent Poverty in Rural Vietnam
The co-discovery of conservation laws and particle families
What to Believe and What To Take Seriously
ts the fact that depending on the space of alternative hypotheses, means-ends analysis may select a different hypothesis on the same evidence: "all emeralds are green" in my Goodmanian Riddle, and "all emeralds are grue" in his. To my mind, his example proves that means-ends epistemology is not biased towards green-blue rather than grue-bleen. (A formal demonstration that means-ends analysis is language-invariant for all inductive problems appear…
Inferring Conservation Laws in Particle Physics
This paper develops a means–end analysis of an inductive problem that arises in particle physics: how to infer from observed reactions conservation principles that govern all reactions among elementary particles. I show that there is a reliable inference procedure that is guaranteed to arrive at an empirically adequate set of conservation principles as more and more evidence is obtained. An interesting feature of reliable procedures for finding c…
Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle
Means-Ends Epistemology
This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Ri…
Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on ind…
Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on ind…
Means-Ends Epistemology
This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Ri…
Inferring Conservation Laws in Particle Physics
This paper develops a means–end analysis of an inductive problem that arises in particle physics: how to infer from observed reactions conservation principles that govern all reactions among elementary particles. I show that there is a reliable inference procedure that is guaranteed to arrive at an empirically adequate set of conservation principles as more and more evidence is obtained. An interesting feature of reliable procedures for finding c…
Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on ind…
Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle
Means-Ends Epistemology
This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Ri…
What to Believe and What To Take Seriously
ts the fact that depending on the space of alternative hypotheses, means-ends analysis may select a different hypothesis on the same evidence: "all emeralds are green" in my Goodmanian Riddle, and "all emeralds are grue" in his. To my mind, his example proves that means-ends epistemology is not biased towards green-blue rather than grue-bleen. (A formal demonstration that means-ends analysis is language-invariant for all inductive problems appear…
Inferring Conservation Laws in Particle Physics
This paper develops a means–end analysis of an inductive problem that arises in particle physics: how to infer from observed reactions conservation principles that govern all reactions among elementary particles. I show that there is a reliable inference procedure that is guaranteed to arrive at an empirically adequate set of conservation principles as more and more evidence is obtained. An interesting feature of reliable procedures for finding c…
The co-discovery of conservation laws and particle families
Persistent Poverty in Rural Vietnam
Computer Science (6 works) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Conservation law (2 works) · Convergence (economics) (2 works)