Lars Gjesvik
Biographic Data
| ID | 4153346 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lars Gjesvik |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lars |
| FAMILY NAME | Gjesvik |
| SIGNATURE | GJESVIK L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Norwegian Institute of International Affairs |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3199-6301 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Diplomacy in the age of expertise
This article examines the role of expertise in the emergence and evolution of new diplomatic issue areas. Contemporary diplomatic practice increasingly requires coordination across knowledge domains. Nowhere is this more evident than in issues involving fast evolving technology, such as artificial intelligence or cyber issues. Examining the case of cyber diplomacy, we show how diplomats have adapted to these concerns. Contrary to claims that grow…
Digital Governance in a Rubber Band
The United States, the European Union, and China are often portrayed as representing three competing models of digital governance. Their so-called market, democratic, and authoritarian approach supposedly reflects their respective preferences over which actors should control the development and use of digital technologies. We argue that more than representing different preferences, each model differs in how it resolves inherent tensions associate…
Beyond control? The political economy of private interception, intrusion, and surveillance markets
Private intrusion, interception, and surveillance (PIIS) markets represent a key vehicle for the global expansion of digital surveillance regimes. Yet, due to their opacity and notorious secrecy, these markets have received relatively little scholarly attention. Triangulating between a unique dataset comprising 5973 industry presentations, interviews, and industry reports, this article provides novel insights into the evolution of market structur…
Private infrastructure in weaponized interdependence
The ability of states to exploit private resources at an international level is an increasingly salient political issue. In explaining the mechanisms of this shift, the framework of Weaponized Interdependence has quickly risen to prominence, arguing that those states that are centrally placed in global networks can exploit their centrality given the appropriate domestic institutions. Building on this framework, I suggest that the relationship bet…
Avskrekke hvem? Betydningen av strategisk kultur for cybersikkerhet
Det er en pågående debatt i akademia om hvorvidt og hvordan man kan benytte avskrekkingsteori i cyberdomenet. Avskrekking var originalt en teori utviklet for å unngå konvensjonell eller nukleær krig. I diskusjonen om cybersikkerhet har det blitt påpekt en rekke tekniske problemer med å overføre en teori fra den fysiske verden til cyberdomenet. Vi anerkjenner disse tekniske utfordringene ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet, men i denne artikkelen ønske…
Private infrastructure in weaponized interdependence
The ability of states to exploit private resources at an international level is an increasingly salient political issue. In explaining the mechanisms of this shift, the framework of Weaponized Interdependence has quickly risen to prominence, arguing that those states that are centrally placed in global networks can exploit their centrality given the appropriate domestic institutions. Building on this framework, I suggest that the relationship bet…
Digital Governance in a Rubber Band
The United States, the European Union, and China are often portrayed as representing three competing models of digital governance. Their so-called market, democratic, and authoritarian approach supposedly reflects their respective preferences over which actors should control the development and use of digital technologies. We argue that more than representing different preferences, each model differs in how it resolves inherent tensions associate…
Avskrekke hvem? Betydningen av strategisk kultur for cybersikkerhet
Det er en pågående debatt i akademia om hvorvidt og hvordan man kan benytte avskrekkingsteori i cyberdomenet. Avskrekking var originalt en teori utviklet for å unngå konvensjonell eller nukleær krig. I diskusjonen om cybersikkerhet har det blitt påpekt en rekke tekniske problemer med å overføre en teori fra den fysiske verden til cyberdomenet. Vi anerkjenner disse tekniske utfordringene ved avskrekking i cyberdomenet, men i denne artikkelen ønske…
Private infrastructure in weaponized interdependence
The ability of states to exploit private resources at an international level is an increasingly salient political issue. In explaining the mechanisms of this shift, the framework of Weaponized Interdependence has quickly risen to prominence, arguing that those states that are centrally placed in global networks can exploit their centrality given the appropriate domestic institutions. Building on this framework, I suggest that the relationship bet…
Beyond control? The political economy of private interception, intrusion, and surveillance markets
Private intrusion, interception, and surveillance (PIIS) markets represent a key vehicle for the global expansion of digital surveillance regimes. Yet, due to their opacity and notorious secrecy, these markets have received relatively little scholarly attention. Triangulating between a unique dataset comprising 5973 industry presentations, interviews, and industry reports, this article provides novel insights into the evolution of market structur…
Digital Governance in a Rubber Band
The United States, the European Union, and China are often portrayed as representing three competing models of digital governance. Their so-called market, democratic, and authoritarian approach supposedly reflects their respective preferences over which actors should control the development and use of digital technologies. We argue that more than representing different preferences, each model differs in how it resolves inherent tensions associate…
Diplomacy in the age of expertise
This article examines the role of expertise in the emergence and evolution of new diplomatic issue areas. Contemporary diplomatic practice increasingly requires coordination across knowledge domains. Nowhere is this more evident than in issues involving fast evolving technology, such as artificial intelligence or cyber issues. Examining the case of cyber diplomacy, we show how diplomats have adapted to these concerns. Contrary to claims that grow…
Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (2 works) · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (2 works) · Economic system (2 works) · Law (2 works)