Lauren L Ferry
Biographic Data
| ID | 4153385 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lauren L Ferry |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lauren L |
| FAMILY NAME | Ferry |
| SIGNATURE | FERRY L L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Mississippi |
| ORCID | 0009-0000-9775-2839 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Crises and Consequences: The Role of U.S. Support in International Bond Markets
Sovereign default should theoretically lead to creditor punishment through higher borrowing costs or market exclusion. However, empirical evidence shows that punishment is inconsistent across defaulters. We argue that this disconnect can be explained by examining the role of geopolitical relationships, particularly with the United States. US support conditions expectations of both borrowers and creditors by providing a fiscal cushion and subsidiz…
Affinity or effectiveness? Donors’ preferences for bypass aid
Western donors have progressively increased the amount of foreign aid allocated through bypass channels, particularly for recipients with weak domestic institutions. Rather than giving money directly to recipient governments, aid is given to non-governmental organizations working on the ground in those countries. Explanations for this shift range from increased donor attention to effectiveness, a desire to deliver assistance directly to those in …
China, the IMF, and Sovereign Debt Crises
The rise of China as a major bilateral lender has transformed the financial landscape for developing countries and, consequently, the process of resolving debt crises. We examine how China’s loans impact the response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to countries in debt distress. We argue that China’s lending approach and its absence from creditor forums, notably the Paris Club, can complicate the IMF’s efforts in managing debt crises. Wh…
Getting to yes: The role of creditor coordination in debt restructuring negotiations
How do indebted governments restructure their debts with private creditors? What explains variation in indebted states’ negotiating behavior? Existing explanations of debt restructuring have largely treated creditors as a profit-maximizing monolith; Yet creditors have different exposures, ties to borrowers, and roles in the international banking system. Inter-creditor disputes are common. In this paper, I argue that because institutional norms di…
Defaulting Differently: The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt Restructuring Negotiations
Negotiations to restructure sovereign debt are protracted affairs, and their outcomes, known as “haircuts,” range from 0 to 80 percent creditor losses. Haircuts impact states’ ability to borrow, cost of borrowing, and economic recovery; they also redistribute income—between states and creditors and between domestic interest groups. I conceptualize the interaction between governments and private creditors as a bargaining game where the government’…
Bypassing the Incumbent: Leadership Tenure and Foreign Aid Channels
The traditional perception is that foreign aid provides leaders in recipient states access to nontax revenue, which incumbents may be able to manipulate in order to provide public or private goods as is required to maintain office. Recognizing this possibility, donors have been shifting away from direct government-to-government aid and toward bypass aid, administered by NGOs and civil society groups rather than the regime directly. Receiving aid …
China, the IMF, and Sovereign Debt Crises
The rise of China as a major bilateral lender has transformed the financial landscape for developing countries and, consequently, the process of resolving debt crises. We examine how China’s loans impact the response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to countries in debt distress. We argue that China’s lending approach and its absence from creditor forums, notably the Paris Club, can complicate the IMF’s efforts in managing debt crises. Wh…
Bypassing the Incumbent: Leadership Tenure and Foreign Aid Channels
The traditional perception is that foreign aid provides leaders in recipient states access to nontax revenue, which incumbents may be able to manipulate in order to provide public or private goods as is required to maintain office. Recognizing this possibility, donors have been shifting away from direct government-to-government aid and toward bypass aid, administered by NGOs and civil society groups rather than the regime directly. Receiving aid …
Getting to yes: The role of creditor coordination in debt restructuring negotiations
How do indebted governments restructure their debts with private creditors? What explains variation in indebted states’ negotiating behavior? Existing explanations of debt restructuring have largely treated creditors as a profit-maximizing monolith; Yet creditors have different exposures, ties to borrowers, and roles in the international banking system. Inter-creditor disputes are common. In this paper, I argue that because institutional norms di…
Defaulting Differently: The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt Restructuring Negotiations
Negotiations to restructure sovereign debt are protracted affairs, and their outcomes, known as “haircuts,” range from 0 to 80 percent creditor losses. Haircuts impact states’ ability to borrow, cost of borrowing, and economic recovery; they also redistribute income—between states and creditors and between domestic interest groups. I conceptualize the interaction between governments and private creditors as a bargaining game where the government’…
Affinity or effectiveness? Donors’ preferences for bypass aid
Western donors have progressively increased the amount of foreign aid allocated through bypass channels, particularly for recipients with weak domestic institutions. Rather than giving money directly to recipient governments, aid is given to non-governmental organizations working on the ground in those countries. Explanations for this shift range from increased donor attention to effectiveness, a desire to deliver assistance directly to those in …
Getting to yes: The role of creditor coordination in debt restructuring negotiations
How do indebted governments restructure their debts with private creditors? What explains variation in indebted states’ negotiating behavior? Existing explanations of debt restructuring have largely treated creditors as a profit-maximizing monolith; Yet creditors have different exposures, ties to borrowers, and roles in the international banking system. Inter-creditor disputes are common. In this paper, I argue that because institutional norms di…
Defaulting Differently: The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt Restructuring Negotiations
Negotiations to restructure sovereign debt are protracted affairs, and their outcomes, known as “haircuts,” range from 0 to 80 percent creditor losses. Haircuts impact states’ ability to borrow, cost of borrowing, and economic recovery; they also redistribute income—between states and creditors and between domestic interest groups. I conceptualize the interaction between governments and private creditors as a bargaining game where the government’…
Bypassing the Incumbent: Leadership Tenure and Foreign Aid Channels
The traditional perception is that foreign aid provides leaders in recipient states access to nontax revenue, which incumbents may be able to manipulate in order to provide public or private goods as is required to maintain office. Recognizing this possibility, donors have been shifting away from direct government-to-government aid and toward bypass aid, administered by NGOs and civil society groups rather than the regime directly. Receiving aid …
Affinity or effectiveness? Donors’ preferences for bypass aid
Western donors have progressively increased the amount of foreign aid allocated through bypass channels, particularly for recipients with weak domestic institutions. Rather than giving money directly to recipient governments, aid is given to non-governmental organizations working on the ground in those countries. Explanations for this shift range from increased donor attention to effectiveness, a desire to deliver assistance directly to those in …
China, the IMF, and Sovereign Debt Crises
The rise of China as a major bilateral lender has transformed the financial landscape for developing countries and, consequently, the process of resolving debt crises. We examine how China’s loans impact the response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to countries in debt distress. We argue that China’s lending approach and its absence from creditor forums, notably the Paris Club, can complicate the IMF’s efforts in managing debt crises. Wh…
Crises and Consequences: The Role of U.S. Support in International Bond Markets
Sovereign default should theoretically lead to creditor punishment through higher borrowing costs or market exclusion. However, empirical evidence shows that punishment is inconsistent across defaulters. We argue that this disconnect can be explained by examining the role of geopolitical relationships, particularly with the United States. US support conditions expectations of both borrowers and creditors by providing a fiscal cushion and subsidiz…
Economics (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Finance (5 works) · International Development and Aid (5 works) · Creditor (3 works) · Debt (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Financial system (3 works) · Negotiation (3 works)