Elizabeth A Stein
Biographic Data
| ID | 4160395 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elizabeth A Stein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elizabeth A |
| FAMILY NAME | Stein |
| SIGNATURE | STEIN E A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 109 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Are ICTs Democratizing Dictatorships? New Media and Mass Mobilization
Objective This article evaluates the relationship between the degree of access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the extent of anti‐government protests and riots, accounting for the effects of past protest on subsequent ICT access, and examines direct and indirect effects of ICT diffusion on political change. Method Using a cross‐national time‐series data set from 1995 through 2014, the article employs simultaneous equation…
Countering Coups
Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators. Specifically, they protect dictators from coup attempts because they reduce elites’ incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. By assuaging…
Silencing Critics
The media hold democratically elected leaders accountable by exposing corruption and policy failures. Although many politicians accept media criticism as intrinsic to liberal democracy, some politicians rein in freedom of the press or intimidate media outlets to silence their critics. We identify circumstances that motivate and enable presidents to curb media freedom in presidential democracies. We argue that (a) presidents who hold ideological p…
Censoring the Press
This paper proposes that dissident leaders aiming to build mass opposition movements follow the mainstream press to help them gauge government tolerance for anti-government mass actions in repressive authoritarian regimes. Under conditions of censorship, media–state interactions serve as a barometer of the government's disposition toward and capacity to impede public displays of dissent. Observing trends in coverage and the government's reaction …
Programming Presidential Agendas
This article examines how media and partisan mechanisms of accountability influence presidential agendas in Latin America. The authors argue that responsiveness increases in powerful presidential systems when opposition parties and free media help citizens hold presidents accountable between elections. Where presidents must contend with a cohesive, ideological opposition and effective constraints to their power, they turn to valence issues with b…
The media in transitional democracies
The Unraveling of Support for Authoritarianism
This work examines the dynamic relationship among elites, media, and the public during authoritarian rule. Using Brazil’s military regime (1964–85), it investigates whether changing press censorship influenced public support for military rule during the period of political liberalization. This paper uses the exposure-resistance model of opinion formation, in which a person’s probability of supporting a position depends first on her probability of…
Countering Coups
Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators. Specifically, they protect dictators from coup attempts because they reduce elites’ incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. By assuaging…
Silencing Critics
The media hold democratically elected leaders accountable by exposing corruption and policy failures. Although many politicians accept media criticism as intrinsic to liberal democracy, some politicians rein in freedom of the press or intimidate media outlets to silence their critics. We identify circumstances that motivate and enable presidents to curb media freedom in presidential democracies. We argue that (a) presidents who hold ideological p…
The Unraveling of Support for Authoritarianism
This work examines the dynamic relationship among elites, media, and the public during authoritarian rule. Using Brazil’s military regime (1964–85), it investigates whether changing press censorship influenced public support for military rule during the period of political liberalization. This paper uses the exposure-resistance model of opinion formation, in which a person’s probability of supporting a position depends first on her probability of…
Programming Presidential Agendas
This article examines how media and partisan mechanisms of accountability influence presidential agendas in Latin America. The authors argue that responsiveness increases in powerful presidential systems when opposition parties and free media help citizens hold presidents accountable between elections. Where presidents must contend with a cohesive, ideological opposition and effective constraints to their power, they turn to valence issues with b…
Are ICTs Democratizing Dictatorships? New Media and Mass Mobilization
Objective This article evaluates the relationship between the degree of access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the extent of anti‐government protests and riots, accounting for the effects of past protest on subsequent ICT access, and examines direct and indirect effects of ICT diffusion on political change. Method Using a cross‐national time‐series data set from 1995 through 2014, the article employs simultaneous equation…
Censoring the Press
This paper proposes that dissident leaders aiming to build mass opposition movements follow the mainstream press to help them gauge government tolerance for anti-government mass actions in repressive authoritarian regimes. Under conditions of censorship, media–state interactions serve as a barometer of the government's disposition toward and capacity to impede public displays of dissent. Observing trends in coverage and the government's reaction …
The media in transitional democracies
The Unraveling of Support for Authoritarianism
This work examines the dynamic relationship among elites, media, and the public during authoritarian rule. Using Brazil’s military regime (1964–85), it investigates whether changing press censorship influenced public support for military rule during the period of political liberalization. This paper uses the exposure-resistance model of opinion formation, in which a person’s probability of supporting a position depends first on her probability of…
Programming Presidential Agendas
This article examines how media and partisan mechanisms of accountability influence presidential agendas in Latin America. The authors argue that responsiveness increases in powerful presidential systems when opposition parties and free media help citizens hold presidents accountable between elections. Where presidents must contend with a cohesive, ideological opposition and effective constraints to their power, they turn to valence issues with b…
The media in transitional democracies
Silencing Critics
The media hold democratically elected leaders accountable by exposing corruption and policy failures. Although many politicians accept media criticism as intrinsic to liberal democracy, some politicians rein in freedom of the press or intimidate media outlets to silence their critics. We identify circumstances that motivate and enable presidents to curb media freedom in presidential democracies. We argue that (a) presidents who hold ideological p…
Censoring the Press
This paper proposes that dissident leaders aiming to build mass opposition movements follow the mainstream press to help them gauge government tolerance for anti-government mass actions in repressive authoritarian regimes. Under conditions of censorship, media–state interactions serve as a barometer of the government's disposition toward and capacity to impede public displays of dissent. Observing trends in coverage and the government's reaction …
Are ICTs Democratizing Dictatorships? New Media and Mass Mobilization
Objective This article evaluates the relationship between the degree of access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the extent of anti‐government protests and riots, accounting for the effects of past protest on subsequent ICT access, and examines direct and indirect effects of ICT diffusion on political change. Method Using a cross‐national time‐series data set from 1995 through 2014, the article employs simultaneous equation…
Countering Coups
Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators. Specifically, they protect dictators from coup attempts because they reduce elites’ incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. By assuaging…
Law (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Democracy (5 works) · Media Influence and Politics (5 works) · Ideology (4 works) · Authoritarianism (3 works)