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María Gabriela Almaraz

Biographic Data

ID4160415
NAMEMaría Gabriela Almaraz
GIVEN NAMESMaría Gabriela
FAMILY NAMEAlmaraz
SIGNATUREALMARAZ M G
AFFILIATIONSUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS7
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
H-INDEX1
  • With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017

    Open Access•Adrián Lucardi, María Gabriela Almaraz•ARTICLE•Journal of Politics in Latin…•2017•Cited by: 7•References: 39

    How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second …

  • With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017

    Open Access•Adrián Lucardi, María Gabriela Almaraz•ARTICLE•Journal of Politics in Latin…•2017•Cited by: 7•References: 39

    How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second …

  • With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017

    Open Access•Adrián Lucardi, María Gabriela Almaraz•ARTICLE•Journal of Politics in Latin…•2017•Cited by: 7•References: 39

    How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second …

Constitution (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 work) · Executive power (1 work) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Opposition (politics (1 work) · Political economy (1 work) · Political science (1 work)

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