Andrew Lister
Biographic Data
| ID | 4163704 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Lister |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Lister |
| SIGNATURE | LISTER A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Queen's University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5834-5971 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 22 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Practicing community-based research in GIScience and geography – a case study with an Indigenous community, best practices, challenges, and lessons learned
Community-based research (CBR) in geography is increasingly emphasizing participatory approaches that center the voices of local communities in the research process. This shift seeks to move away from extractive research practices by fostering collaborations built on reciprocity and respect - particularly with Indigenous and marginalized groups. At the core of this approach is co-produced knowledge, wherein communities actively shape research pri…
Non-ideal justice in holdings, or rectification revisited
Justice and Reciprocity
Contractualist alternatives to the veil of ignorance
Some of the strongest criticisms of the original position have come from contractualists sympathetic to egalitarianism. In “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” Thomas Scanlon objected that, without special assumptions, choice under uncertainty justifies maximizing the average rather than the minimum, and is thus compatible with the least advantaged suffering serious avoidable hardship. Yet Scanlon also argued that the difference principle is unre…
Theology, Desert, and Egalitarianism
This article assesses Eric Nelson’s claims that the young Rawls’s endorsement of an illiberal doctrine of original sin led to his later denial that desert is relevant to social justice and that the mature Rawls’s egalitarianism still depends on the theologically contestable assumption that the distribution of natural talents is morally arbitrary. The article defends Rawlsian egalitarianism without endorsing Rawls’s more general skepticism about d…
Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income
This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection were that unconditionality invites people to neglect contributory obligations arising from a duty of reciprocity, people could ask to opt out of eligibility for the benefit so as to avoid liability to contribution. While market failure provides a reason fo…
The Coherence of Public Reason
Theories of public reason face a dilemma. If their standard of reasonableness is low, the view will be unacceptably anarchic and self-refuting, while if it is high, the exclusion of unreasonable views will manifest unequal treatment. This paper shows how to avoid this dilemma by distinguishing two models of public reason. The coercion model is vulnerable to the worry about anarchy but not self-defeat, while the reasons model is vulnerable to self…
The Difference Principle, Capitalism, and Property-Owning Democracy
Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace cont…
Public Reason and Reciprocity
Markets, desert, and reciprocity
This article traces John Rawls’s debt to Frank Knight’s critique of the ‘just deserts’ rationale for laissez-faire in order to defend justice as fairness against some prominent contemporary criticisms, but also to argue that desert can find a place within a Rawlsian theory of justice when desert is grounded in reciprocity. The first lesson Rawls took from Knight was that inheritance of talent and wealth are on a moral par. Knight highlighted the …
Fact-Sensitivity and the ‘Defining-Down’ Objection
Screening for post-traumatic stress symptoms in looked after children
Purpose – Many children who are looked after by the state have experienced adverse and traumatic life circumstances prior to being removed from their biological parents. Previous research has highlighted that many of them experience barriers to accessing psychological therapies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the feasibility of assessing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)-like symptoms using a screening tool, and through this to d…
Public reason and perfectionism
Liberalism Without Perfection elaborates a generally Rawlsian conception of public justification in order to defend antiperfectionist liberalism. This critical response raises questions about the link between the two parts of the project. On the hand, it is possible to reject that demand that reasons for political decisions pass a qualified acceptability requirement even if one is strictly opposed to paternalism. On the other hand, the commitment…
Reciprocity, Relationships, and Distributive Justice
This paper argues that the concern for distributive justice might be universal rather than contingent on a morally optional relationship, but limited in the demands it places upon us where a reasonable assurance of reciprocity is lacking. Principles of dis tributive justice apply wherever people are interacting, even if they have no choice but to interact, but are grounded in the goal of constituting relationships of mutual recognition as equals,…
The classical tilt of justificatory liberalism
The Order of Public Reason is Gerald Gaus's important new statement of justificatory liberalism. However, the book is much more than a refinement of Gaus's political philosophy, as it also attempts to explain and justify social morality. The initial purpose of this essay is to explain how the overall argument is meant to hang together. The paper also identifies four points at which the argument might be challenged, primarily as it relates to just…
The “Mirage” of Social Justice
There is an odd proximity between Hayek, hero of the libertarian right, and Rawls, theorist of social justice, because, at the level of principle, Hayek was in some important respects a Rawlsian. Although Hayek said that the idea of social justice was nonsense, he argued against only a particular principle of social justice, one that Rawls too rejected, namely distribution according to individual merit. Any attempt to make reward and merit coinci…
Democracy and Moral Conflict
Justice as Fairness and Reciprocity
This paper tries to reconcile reciprocity with a fundamentally ‘subject- Centred’ ethic by interpreting the reciprocity condition as a consequence of the fact that justice is in part a relational value. Duties of egalitarian distributive justice are not grounded on the duty to reciprocate benefits already received, but limited by a reasonable assurance of compliance on the part of those able to reciprocate, because their point is to constitute a …
Public justification and the limits of state action
One objection to the principle of public reason is that since there is room for reasonable disagreement about distributive justice as well as about human flourishing, the requirement of reasonable acceptability rules out redistribution as well as perfectionism. In response, some justificatory liberals have invoked the argument from higher-order unanimity, or nested inclusiveness. If it is not reasonable to reject having some system of property ri…
Liberal Foundations of Democratic Authority
Estlund argues that decision‐procedures are to be judged solely by their tendency to generate morally superior decisions, but that because any relationship of authority must be acceptable to all qualified moral points of view, the epistemic benefits of less equal procedures must be evident beyond qualified objection. If all doctrines involved in political justification must be qualifiedly acceptable, however, the qualified acceptability requireme…
Public reason and democracy
Public reasoning is widely thought to be essential to democracy, but there is much disagreement about whether such deliberation should be constrained by a principle of public reason, which may seem to conflict with important democratic values. This paper denies that there is such a conflict, and argues that the distinctive contribution of public reason is to constitute a relationship of civic friendship in a diverse society. Acceptance of public …
Public Reason and Moral Compromise
One source of controversy surrounding John Rawls's later work — a source of both criticism and praise — has been the impression that he abandoned the philosophical project of figuring out what is truly just, in favour of the political project of working out a feasible consensus for people from a particular political tradition. One aspect of this controversy is the question of whether Rawls could advance his theory as being worthy of endorsement o…
Public justification and the limits of state action
One objection to the principle of public reason is that since there is room for reasonable disagreement about distributive justice as well as about human flourishing, the requirement of reasonable acceptability rules out redistribution as well as perfectionism. In response, some justificatory liberals have invoked the argument from higher-order unanimity, or nested inclusiveness. If it is not reasonable to reject having some system of property ri…
The “Mirage” of Social Justice
There is an odd proximity between Hayek, hero of the libertarian right, and Rawls, theorist of social justice, because, at the level of principle, Hayek was in some important respects a Rawlsian. Although Hayek said that the idea of social justice was nonsense, he argued against only a particular principle of social justice, one that Rawls too rejected, namely distribution according to individual merit. Any attempt to make reward and merit coinci…
Public Reason and Reciprocity
Markets, desert, and reciprocity
This article traces John Rawls’s debt to Frank Knight’s critique of the ‘just deserts’ rationale for laissez-faire in order to defend justice as fairness against some prominent contemporary criticisms, but also to argue that desert can find a place within a Rawlsian theory of justice when desert is grounded in reciprocity. The first lesson Rawls took from Knight was that inheritance of talent and wealth are on a moral par. Knight highlighted the …
Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income
This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection were that unconditionality invites people to neglect contributory obligations arising from a duty of reciprocity, people could ask to opt out of eligibility for the benefit so as to avoid liability to contribution. While market failure provides a reason fo…
Public reason and perfectionism
Liberalism Without Perfection elaborates a generally Rawlsian conception of public justification in order to defend antiperfectionist liberalism. This critical response raises questions about the link between the two parts of the project. On the hand, it is possible to reject that demand that reasons for political decisions pass a qualified acceptability requirement even if one is strictly opposed to paternalism. On the other hand, the commitment…
The classical tilt of justificatory liberalism
The Order of Public Reason is Gerald Gaus's important new statement of justificatory liberalism. However, the book is much more than a refinement of Gaus's political philosophy, as it also attempts to explain and justify social morality. The initial purpose of this essay is to explain how the overall argument is meant to hang together. The paper also identifies four points at which the argument might be challenged, primarily as it relates to just…
Liberal Foundations of Democratic Authority
Estlund argues that decision‐procedures are to be judged solely by their tendency to generate morally superior decisions, but that because any relationship of authority must be acceptable to all qualified moral points of view, the epistemic benefits of less equal procedures must be evident beyond qualified objection. If all doctrines involved in political justification must be qualifiedly acceptable, however, the qualified acceptability requireme…
Public reason and democracy
Public reasoning is widely thought to be essential to democracy, but there is much disagreement about whether such deliberation should be constrained by a principle of public reason, which may seem to conflict with important democratic values. This paper denies that there is such a conflict, and argues that the distinctive contribution of public reason is to constitute a relationship of civic friendship in a diverse society. Acceptance of public …
Public Reason and Moral Compromise
One source of controversy surrounding John Rawls's later work — a source of both criticism and praise — has been the impression that he abandoned the philosophical project of figuring out what is truly just, in favour of the political project of working out a feasible consensus for people from a particular political tradition. One aspect of this controversy is the question of whether Rawls could advance his theory as being worthy of endorsement o…
Public reason and democracy
Public reasoning is widely thought to be essential to democracy, but there is much disagreement about whether such deliberation should be constrained by a principle of public reason, which may seem to conflict with important democratic values. This paper denies that there is such a conflict, and argues that the distinctive contribution of public reason is to constitute a relationship of civic friendship in a diverse society. Acceptance of public …
Public justification and the limits of state action
One objection to the principle of public reason is that since there is room for reasonable disagreement about distributive justice as well as about human flourishing, the requirement of reasonable acceptability rules out redistribution as well as perfectionism. In response, some justificatory liberals have invoked the argument from higher-order unanimity, or nested inclusiveness. If it is not reasonable to reject having some system of property ri…
Liberal Foundations of Democratic Authority
Estlund argues that decision‐procedures are to be judged solely by their tendency to generate morally superior decisions, but that because any relationship of authority must be acceptable to all qualified moral points of view, the epistemic benefits of less equal procedures must be evident beyond qualified objection. If all doctrines involved in political justification must be qualifiedly acceptable, however, the qualified acceptability requireme…
Democracy and Moral Conflict
Justice as Fairness and Reciprocity
This paper tries to reconcile reciprocity with a fundamentally ‘subject- Centred’ ethic by interpreting the reciprocity condition as a consequence of the fact that justice is in part a relational value. Duties of egalitarian distributive justice are not grounded on the duty to reciprocate benefits already received, but limited by a reasonable assurance of compliance on the part of those able to reciprocate, because their point is to constitute a …
Reciprocity, Relationships, and Distributive Justice
This paper argues that the concern for distributive justice might be universal rather than contingent on a morally optional relationship, but limited in the demands it places upon us where a reasonable assurance of reciprocity is lacking. Principles of dis tributive justice apply wherever people are interacting, even if they have no choice but to interact, but are grounded in the goal of constituting relationships of mutual recognition as equals,…
The classical tilt of justificatory liberalism
The Order of Public Reason is Gerald Gaus's important new statement of justificatory liberalism. However, the book is much more than a refinement of Gaus's political philosophy, as it also attempts to explain and justify social morality. The initial purpose of this essay is to explain how the overall argument is meant to hang together. The paper also identifies four points at which the argument might be challenged, primarily as it relates to just…
The “Mirage” of Social Justice
There is an odd proximity between Hayek, hero of the libertarian right, and Rawls, theorist of social justice, because, at the level of principle, Hayek was in some important respects a Rawlsian. Although Hayek said that the idea of social justice was nonsense, he argued against only a particular principle of social justice, one that Rawls too rejected, namely distribution according to individual merit. Any attempt to make reward and merit coinci…
Public reason and perfectionism
Liberalism Without Perfection elaborates a generally Rawlsian conception of public justification in order to defend antiperfectionist liberalism. This critical response raises questions about the link between the two parts of the project. On the hand, it is possible to reject that demand that reasons for political decisions pass a qualified acceptability requirement even if one is strictly opposed to paternalism. On the other hand, the commitment…
Screening for post-traumatic stress symptoms in looked after children
Purpose – Many children who are looked after by the state have experienced adverse and traumatic life circumstances prior to being removed from their biological parents. Previous research has highlighted that many of them experience barriers to accessing psychological therapies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the feasibility of assessing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)-like symptoms using a screening tool, and through this to d…
Fact-Sensitivity and the ‘Defining-Down’ Objection
Public Reason and Reciprocity
Markets, desert, and reciprocity
This article traces John Rawls’s debt to Frank Knight’s critique of the ‘just deserts’ rationale for laissez-faire in order to defend justice as fairness against some prominent contemporary criticisms, but also to argue that desert can find a place within a Rawlsian theory of justice when desert is grounded in reciprocity. The first lesson Rawls took from Knight was that inheritance of talent and wealth are on a moral par. Knight highlighted the …
The Coherence of Public Reason
Theories of public reason face a dilemma. If their standard of reasonableness is low, the view will be unacceptably anarchic and self-refuting, while if it is high, the exclusion of unreasonable views will manifest unequal treatment. This paper shows how to avoid this dilemma by distinguishing two models of public reason. The coercion model is vulnerable to the worry about anarchy but not self-defeat, while the reasons model is vulnerable to self…
The Difference Principle, Capitalism, and Property-Owning Democracy
Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace cont…
Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income
This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection were that unconditionality invites people to neglect contributory obligations arising from a duty of reciprocity, people could ask to opt out of eligibility for the benefit so as to avoid liability to contribution. While market failure provides a reason fo…
Theology, Desert, and Egalitarianism
This article assesses Eric Nelson’s claims that the young Rawls’s endorsement of an illiberal doctrine of original sin led to his later denial that desert is relevant to social justice and that the mature Rawls’s egalitarianism still depends on the theologically contestable assumption that the distribution of natural talents is morally arbitrary. The article defends Rawlsian egalitarianism without endorsing Rawls’s more general skepticism about d…
Contractualist alternatives to the veil of ignorance
Some of the strongest criticisms of the original position have come from contractualists sympathetic to egalitarianism. In “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” Thomas Scanlon objected that, without special assumptions, choice under uncertainty justifies maximizing the average rather than the minimum, and is thus compatible with the least advantaged suffering serious avoidable hardship. Yet Scanlon also argued that the difference principle is unre…
Justice and Reciprocity
Practicing community-based research in GIScience and geography – a case study with an Indigenous community, best practices, challenges, and lessons learned
Community-based research (CBR) in geography is increasingly emphasizing participatory approaches that center the voices of local communities in the research process. This shift seeks to move away from extractive research practices by fostering collaborations built on reciprocity and respect - particularly with Indigenous and marginalized groups. At the core of this approach is co-produced knowledge, wherein communities actively shape research pri…
Non-ideal justice in holdings, or rectification revisited
Political science (20 works) · Law (19 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (18 works) · Sociology (16 works) · Law and economics (14 works) · Law (13 works) · Politics (13 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Economic Justice (10 works)