Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Biographic Data
| ID | 4163815 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yevgeniy Vorobeychik |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yevgeniy |
| FAMILY NAME | Vorobeychik |
| SIGNATURE | VOROBEYCHIK Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | Washington University in St. Louis |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2471-5345 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Calling the police as an interdependent security game
Calling to report crime represents public cooperation with the police. When rational individuals are predicted to report (and when not) is still poorly understood. We study an interdependent security game under threat of a costly event that can only occur once or is perceived as so costly that the threat of the event occurring more than once is (in foresight) perceived as no more costly than the event occurring only once. Our analysis suggests ho…
Robust coordination in adversarial social networks
Decentralized coordination is one of the fundamental challenges for societies and organizations. While extensively explored from a variety of perspectives, one issue that has received limited attention is human coordination in the presence of adversarial agents. We study this problem by situating human subjects as nodes on a network, and endowing each with a role, either regular (with the goal of achieving consensus among all regular players), or…
Robust coordination in adversarial social networks
Decentralized coordination is one of the fundamental challenges for societies and organizations. While extensively explored from a variety of perspectives, one issue that has received limited attention is human coordination in the presence of adversarial agents. We study this problem by situating human subjects as nodes on a network, and endowing each with a role, either regular (with the goal of achieving consensus among all regular players), or…
Robust coordination in adversarial social networks
Decentralized coordination is one of the fundamental challenges for societies and organizations. While extensively explored from a variety of perspectives, one issue that has received limited attention is human coordination in the presence of adversarial agents. We study this problem by situating human subjects as nodes on a network, and endowing each with a role, either regular (with the goal of achieving consensus among all regular players), or…
Calling the police as an interdependent security game
Calling to report crime represents public cooperation with the police. When rational individuals are predicted to report (and when not) is still poorly understood. We study an interdependent security game under threat of a costly event that can only occur once or is perceived as so costly that the threat of the event occurring more than once is (in foresight) perceived as no more costly than the event occurring only once. Our analysis suggests ho…
Computer Science (2 works) · Computer security (2 works) · Adversarial system (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Complex Network Analysis Techniques (1 work) · Computer network (1 work) · Crime Patterns and Interventions (1 work) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (1 work) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (1 work)