Andrea Galeotti
Biographic Data
| ID | 4163817 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrea Galeotti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrea |
| FAMILY NAME | Galeotti |
| SIGNATURE | GALEOTTI A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Essex |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3071-9767 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 8 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Learning in Social Networks
This survey covers models of how agents update behaviors and beliefs using information conveyed through social connections. The chapter begins with sequential social learning models, in which each agent makes a decision once and for all after observing a subset of prior decisions; the discussion is organized around the concepts of diffusion and aggregation of information. Next, the chapter presents the DeGroot framework of average-based repeated …
Diffusion in Networks
This chapter examines models of diffusion in networks, and specifically how the topology of the network impacts the spreading process. The chapter begins by discussing epidemiological models and how stochastic dominance relations can be used to understand the effect of the degree distribution of the network. The chapter then turns to more sophisticated models of social influence, including threshold models and models of social learning. A key ins…
Networks in Economics
The study of networks is a dynamic and exciting field of research in contemporary economics. This chapter traces its origins and illustrates its reach. Social and economic life occurs at the intersection of the global (large firms, international markets) and the local (small overlapping neighborhoods). Game theory is well suited for the study of behavior in small exclusive groups; general equilibrium theory helps to understand large anonymous sys…
Games Played on Networks
This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings, including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. The chapter establishes a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. The authors review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. The chapter discusses the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including…
Networks
Networks in economics can be conceived as a useful adjunct to standard theory that helps incorporate the externalities generated by the interaction between individuals. Alternatively, the economy can be considered as a network where aggregate activity emerges from direct interaction between simple individuals often with only local knowledge. This constitutes a paradigm shift which, this chapter argues, is needed in economics. Rather than consider…
Introduction to the Handbook
This handbook represents the frontier of research into the economics of networks: how and why they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the handbook devotes attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network forma…
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks
This handbook represents the frontier of research into the economics of networks: how and why they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the authors devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formati…
Economic Journal 125th Anniversary Special Issue
Information Aggregation and Optimal Structure of the Executive
We model two aspects of executives in parliamentary democracies: Decision-making authority is assigned to individuals, and private information is aggregated through communication. When information is relevant to all policies and communication is private, all decisions should be centralized to a single politician. A government that holds cabinet meetings, where information is made available to all decision makers, outperforms one where communicati…
Diffusion and protection across a random graph
We study the interplay between the diffusion of a harmful state in a network of contacts and the possibility of individual agents to undertake costly investment to protect themselves against infection. We characterize how equilibrium diffusion outcomes, such as the immunization rate, total prevalence and welfare, respond to changes in the architecture of the network, and show that these responses depend on the details of the diffusion process
Information Aggregation and Optimal Structure of the Executive
We model two aspects of executives in parliamentary democracies: Decision-making authority is assigned to individuals, and private information is aggregated through communication. When information is relevant to all policies and communication is private, all decisions should be centralized to a single politician. A government that holds cabinet meetings, where information is made available to all decision makers, outperforms one where communicati…
Economic Journal 125th Anniversary Special Issue
Information Aggregation and Optimal Structure of the Executive
We model two aspects of executives in parliamentary democracies: Decision-making authority is assigned to individuals, and private information is aggregated through communication. When information is relevant to all policies and communication is private, all decisions should be centralized to a single politician. A government that holds cabinet meetings, where information is made available to all decision makers, outperforms one where communicati…
Diffusion and protection across a random graph
We study the interplay between the diffusion of a harmful state in a network of contacts and the possibility of individual agents to undertake costly investment to protect themselves against infection. We characterize how equilibrium diffusion outcomes, such as the immunization rate, total prevalence and welfare, respond to changes in the architecture of the network, and show that these responses depend on the details of the diffusion process
Learning in Social Networks
This survey covers models of how agents update behaviors and beliefs using information conveyed through social connections. The chapter begins with sequential social learning models, in which each agent makes a decision once and for all after observing a subset of prior decisions; the discussion is organized around the concepts of diffusion and aggregation of information. Next, the chapter presents the DeGroot framework of average-based repeated …
Diffusion in Networks
This chapter examines models of diffusion in networks, and specifically how the topology of the network impacts the spreading process. The chapter begins by discussing epidemiological models and how stochastic dominance relations can be used to understand the effect of the degree distribution of the network. The chapter then turns to more sophisticated models of social influence, including threshold models and models of social learning. A key ins…
Networks in Economics
The study of networks is a dynamic and exciting field of research in contemporary economics. This chapter traces its origins and illustrates its reach. Social and economic life occurs at the intersection of the global (large firms, international markets) and the local (small overlapping neighborhoods). Game theory is well suited for the study of behavior in small exclusive groups; general equilibrium theory helps to understand large anonymous sys…
Games Played on Networks
This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings, including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. The chapter establishes a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. The authors review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. The chapter discusses the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including…
Networks
Networks in economics can be conceived as a useful adjunct to standard theory that helps incorporate the externalities generated by the interaction between individuals. Alternatively, the economy can be considered as a network where aggregate activity emerges from direct interaction between simple individuals often with only local knowledge. This constitutes a paradigm shift which, this chapter argues, is needed in economics. Rather than consider…
Introduction to the Handbook
This handbook represents the frontier of research into the economics of networks: how and why they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the handbook devotes attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network forma…
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks
This handbook represents the frontier of research into the economics of networks: how and why they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the authors devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formati…
Computer Science (8 works) · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence (7 works) · Game Theory and Applications (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Complex Network Analysis Techniques (4 works) · Data science (4 works) · Computer security (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works)