Anustubh Agnihotri
Biographic Data
| ID | 4169168 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anustubh Agnihotri |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anustubh |
| FAMILY NAME | Agnihotri |
| SIGNATURE | AGNIHOTRI A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India
This paper investigates how politicians use the assignment of officials to geographical posts—a personnel system found in many countries—as a system of incentives to control, and possibly corrupt, bureaucratic behavior. The argument is developed with a matching model and tested with a nationwide survey of Indian officials who administer land, a lucrative asset and source of rents in fast‐growing countries. With an unobtrusive design, we provide e…
Digital intermediaries, market competition, and citizen‐state interactions
Can market competition between intermediaries improve the quality of citizen‐state interactions? I test this question in the context of a public‐private partnership (PPP) policy that created a network of digital intermediaries ‐ individuals authorized by the state to submit online applications on behalf of citizens. I use the overtime and staggered expansion of the intermediary network to identify the relationship between greater competition amon…
Transfer preferences of bureaucrats and spatial disparities in local state presence
Content Analysis of Digital Text and Its Applications
Using Crowd-Sourced Data to Study Public Services: Lessons from Urban India
Design-based Approach in Social Science Research
Digital intermediaries, market competition, and citizen‐state interactions
Can market competition between intermediaries improve the quality of citizen‐state interactions? I test this question in the context of a public‐private partnership (PPP) policy that created a network of digital intermediaries ‐ individuals authorized by the state to submit online applications on behalf of citizens. I use the overtime and staggered expansion of the intermediary network to identify the relationship between greater competition amon…
Transfer preferences of bureaucrats and spatial disparities in local state presence
Using Crowd-Sourced Data to Study Public Services: Lessons from Urban India
Design-based Approach in Social Science Research
Using Crowd-Sourced Data to Study Public Services: Lessons from Urban India
Content Analysis of Digital Text and Its Applications
Digital intermediaries, market competition, and citizen‐state interactions
Can market competition between intermediaries improve the quality of citizen‐state interactions? I test this question in the context of a public‐private partnership (PPP) policy that created a network of digital intermediaries ‐ individuals authorized by the state to submit online applications on behalf of citizens. I use the overtime and staggered expansion of the intermediary network to identify the relationship between greater competition amon…
Transfer preferences of bureaucrats and spatial disparities in local state presence
Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India
This paper investigates how politicians use the assignment of officials to geographical posts—a personnel system found in many countries—as a system of incentives to control, and possibly corrupt, bureaucratic behavior. The argument is developed with a matching model and tested with a nationwide survey of Indian officials who administer land, a lucrative asset and source of rents in fast‐growing countries. With an unobtrusive design, we provide e…
Computer Science (5 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Bureaucracy (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Land Rights and Reforms (2 works) · Law (2 works)