Brian M Harward
Biographic Data
| ID | 4180157 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brian M Harward |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brian M |
| FAMILY NAME | Harward |
| SIGNATURE | HARWARD B M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Southern Illinois University Edwardsville |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 49 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Public Response to Trump’s Unilateral Policy Making: The Case of Daca
Are Stealth Democrats Really Committed to Democracy? Process Preferences Revisited
Scholarship on “stealth democracy” finds that many citizens want to avoid the debate and conflict that often come with democratic governance. This scholarship has argued that citizens adopt this posture because they are uncomfortable with disagreement and desire a more expedient political process that enables leaders to make decisions without discussion or compromise. We revisit this argument in light of recent political developments that suggest…
Congressional Response to Statements of Administration Policy and Presidential Signing Statements
We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007.…
Congressional Response to Presidential Signing Statements
Popular and scholarly accounts argue that signing statements are important tools for presidents to shape the implementation of policy. Although signing statements might be important presidential tools, the legislative branch stands in the most immediate and direct competition with the executive for ultimate control of the bureaucracy. In this article, we assess whether congressional committees react to presidential signing statements with increas…
The Calculus of Cosponsorship in the U.S. Senate
We investigated why a legislator would be willing to vote “yea” on final passage of a bill but would choose not to cosponsor that bill. We tested a series of hypotheses regarding the cosponsorship decisions of individual senators, using a dataset that includes every major initiative that was introduced and received a floor vote in the Senate between 1975 and 2000. We found that senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when their preferences di…
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government—and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency’s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White …
Pre-Devolutionary Funding for Poverty Law in the United States
This paper examines the funding of civil legal services for the poor in the U.S. from 1985 to 1990, prior to a fundamental change in legal services regulations and appropriations that occurred in 1996. While federal funding for legal services was a rather uniform distribution to states by poverty population, states varied in terms of their financial support for legal services. This paper explores the sources of that variation. Using a pooled cros…
Funding Poverty Law in an Era of Decentralization
This article explores intergovernmental relations, discretionary authority and the effect of state political ideology on the nature of civil legal representation in the United States. I examine support for legal services from 1996 to 1999 using data gathered by the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC). A CitationHeckman (1976) selection model is employed to test several hypotheses regarding states' decisions to supplement the federal funding …
The Calculus of Cosponsorship in the U.S. Senate
We investigated why a legislator would be willing to vote “yea” on final passage of a bill but would choose not to cosponsor that bill. We tested a series of hypotheses regarding the cosponsorship decisions of individual senators, using a dataset that includes every major initiative that was introduced and received a floor vote in the Senate between 1975 and 2000. We found that senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when their preferences di…
Are Stealth Democrats Really Committed to Democracy? Process Preferences Revisited
Scholarship on “stealth democracy” finds that many citizens want to avoid the debate and conflict that often come with democratic governance. This scholarship has argued that citizens adopt this posture because they are uncomfortable with disagreement and desire a more expedient political process that enables leaders to make decisions without discussion or compromise. We revisit this argument in light of recent political developments that suggest…
Congressional Response to Presidential Signing Statements
Popular and scholarly accounts argue that signing statements are important tools for presidents to shape the implementation of policy. Although signing statements might be important presidential tools, the legislative branch stands in the most immediate and direct competition with the executive for ultimate control of the bureaucracy. In this article, we assess whether congressional committees react to presidential signing statements with increas…
Congressional Response to Statements of Administration Policy and Presidential Signing Statements
We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007.…
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government—and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency’s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White …
Pre-Devolutionary Funding for Poverty Law in the United States
This paper examines the funding of civil legal services for the poor in the U.S. from 1985 to 1990, prior to a fundamental change in legal services regulations and appropriations that occurred in 1996. While federal funding for legal services was a rather uniform distribution to states by poverty population, states varied in terms of their financial support for legal services. This paper explores the sources of that variation. Using a pooled cros…
Pre-Devolutionary Funding for Poverty Law in the United States
This paper examines the funding of civil legal services for the poor in the U.S. from 1985 to 1990, prior to a fundamental change in legal services regulations and appropriations that occurred in 1996. While federal funding for legal services was a rather uniform distribution to states by poverty population, states varied in terms of their financial support for legal services. This paper explores the sources of that variation. Using a pooled cros…
Funding Poverty Law in an Era of Decentralization
This article explores intergovernmental relations, discretionary authority and the effect of state political ideology on the nature of civil legal representation in the United States. I examine support for legal services from 1996 to 1999 using data gathered by the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC). A CitationHeckman (1976) selection model is employed to test several hypotheses regarding states' decisions to supplement the federal funding …
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government—and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency’s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White …
The Calculus of Cosponsorship in the U.S. Senate
We investigated why a legislator would be willing to vote “yea” on final passage of a bill but would choose not to cosponsor that bill. We tested a series of hypotheses regarding the cosponsorship decisions of individual senators, using a dataset that includes every major initiative that was introduced and received a floor vote in the Senate between 1975 and 2000. We found that senators are more likely to cosponsor bills when their preferences di…
Congressional Response to Presidential Signing Statements
Popular and scholarly accounts argue that signing statements are important tools for presidents to shape the implementation of policy. Although signing statements might be important presidential tools, the legislative branch stands in the most immediate and direct competition with the executive for ultimate control of the bureaucracy. In this article, we assess whether congressional committees react to presidential signing statements with increas…
Congressional Response to Statements of Administration Policy and Presidential Signing Statements
We explore the sensitivity of Congress to statements of administration policy (SAPs) and signing statements in the struggle with the executive over policy. We hypothesize that the nature and use of objections contained in these presidential communications generates additional congressional oversight. To test whether this happens, we developed a dataset with all SAPs, signing statements, and congressional oversight hearings from 1997 through 2007.…
Public Response to Trump’s Unilateral Policy Making: The Case of Daca
Are Stealth Democrats Really Committed to Democracy? Process Preferences Revisited
Scholarship on “stealth democracy” finds that many citizens want to avoid the debate and conflict that often come with democratic governance. This scholarship has argued that citizens adopt this posture because they are uncomfortable with disagreement and desire a more expedient political process that enables leaders to make decisions without discussion or compromise. We revisit this argument in light of recent political developments that suggest…
Law (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Public Administration (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Public Administration (5 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (3 works) · Legislature (3 works)