Bumba Mukherjee
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4180213 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Bumba Mukherjee |
| NOMBRES | Bumba |
| APELLIDO | Mukherjee |
| FIRMA | MUKHERJEE B |
| AFILIACIONES | Pennsylvania State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3453-601X |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 39 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 429 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 39 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1929 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 11 |
Contested Governance and Civilian Prosocial Behavior
How does contested governance by states and competing armed actors affect the behavior of the governed? During civil conflicts, rebel organizations frequently provide public goods, judicial arbitration, and security, but these forms of governance often operate alongside local state institutions. Beyond avoiding violence, therefore, noncombatants must navigate the daily uncertainty of local governance by states and armed groups vying for territori…
Right-Wing Populist Leaders, Nationalist Rhetoric, and Dispute Initiation in International Politics
The global rise of right-wing populist (RWP) leaders has raised concerns about the threat they pose to a cooperative international order, but there is little systematic evidence linking RWP leaders to military aggression. Are RWP leaders more prone to initiating international disputes? If so, when and why? We argue that a RWP leader’s hyper-nationalist rhetoric can galvanize popular support for militant internationalism, but this only leads to pr…
The IMF, Financial Crisis, and Repression of Human Rights
Top-Category Inflation in Ordered International Relations Outcomes
Ordered dependent variables are widely employed in international relations (IR). These ordered dependent variables often suffer from inflated observations in their highest outcome category due to distinct processes. The application of standard ordered probit and ordered logit models to such ordinal measures will fail to capture these distinct processes, often producing biased inferences as a result. Yet IR researchers have thus far ignored the po…
Domestic Financial Intermediaries, Dictatorship, and Social Spending
Economic crises, civilian mobilization, and repression in developing states
Research on the causes of repression has had limited success in connecting economic crises to state-led violence. We develop an explanation for violent government repression in urban areas, which links the importance of urban infrastructure in enabling civilians to wage an effective opposition campaign with the stress caused by economic crisis, empirically validating the underlying mechanisms using disaggregated geospatial data. We then confirm t…
Security Consolidation in the Aftermath of Civil War
Policymakers and peacebuilding research often focus on rebel groups when studying demobilization and integration processes, but post-war governments must also manage the non-state militias that helped them gain or maintain power. Why do some post-war governments disintegrate their militia allies, while others integrate them into the military? We argue that when a salient ethnic difference exists between the (new) ruling elite and an allied militi…
Civil Dissent and Repression
Do governments make a strategic choice in deciding what type of security agent to use for repression? Research acknowledges the role of auxiliary groups such as militias in repression, yet surprisingly little attention is given to the state's formal domestic security agents, such as the police. We show that formal security organizations and auxiliary groups enhance the government's ability to repress by acting as strategic complements. As the bet…
Rebel command and control, time, and rebel group splits
Fractious splits of rebel groups debilitate the military capacity of these organizations which increases their vulnerability to anti-rebel operations. Despite the risks of disunity and the battlefield advantages of remaining cohesive, our new global sample of rebel groups (1980–2014) reveals that two-fifths of these (but not the remaining) groups have split into distinct, competing factions. Why and when do some rebel groups split, while other gr…
Response to Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen’s review of Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries
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A Bayesian Split Population Survival Model for Duration Data With Misclassified Failure Events
We develop a new Bayesian split population survival model for the analysis of survival data with misclassified event failures. Within political science survival data, right-censored survival cases are often erroneously misclassified as failure cases due to measurement error. Treating these cases as failure events within survival analyses will underestimate the duration of some events. This will bias coefficient estimates, especially in situations…
Droughts, Land Appropriation, and Rebel Violence in the Developing World
Scholars note that rebel atrocities against civilians often arise within rural areas in the developing world. This characterization is not far-fetched, and recent data show that rebel atrocities do predominately occur within rural agricultural regions. Yet the frequency of such incidents also varies substantially across different agricultural regions and years. What accounts for this observed variation in rebel-perpetrated atrocities against civi…
The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships
The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships studies how institutional and social factors influence corruption in dictatorships. Dictatorships are often synonymous with high levels of corruption, yet Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue otherwise. The authors ask why corruption has declined in some but not other authoritarian regimes. What are the main political factors that drive some autocrats to curb corruption? The book explores the role th…
Modeling Two Types of Peace
A growing body of applied research on political violence employs split-population models to address problems of zero inflation in conflict event counts and related binary dependent variables. Nevertheless, conflict researchers typically use standard ordered probit models to study discrete ordered dependent variables characterized by excessive zeros (e.g., levels of conflict). This study familiarizes conflict scholars with a recently proposed spli…
Regional International Organizations and Individual Immigration Attitudes
When are individuals more likely to support immigration? We suggest here that regional international organizations (IOs; for example, the European Union) publicly release reports about the scale and benefits of immigration to member states in the region in which these IOs operate. We argue that unlike individuals who are uninformed about immigration, informed individuals who have more knowledge of the main regional IO in which their country parti…
Introduction
Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims…
State Capacity and the Environmental Investment Gap in Authoritarian States
We construct an n-period, constrained optimization model where the authoritarian ruler maximizes expected rents subject to budget constraint of available surplus. We show that the larger state capacity is in the previous period, the worse environmental quality will be in the next period: while infrastructural investment and environmental protection increase with state capacity, the former increases at a faster rate which enlarges the gap between …
Electoral Particularism, Bank Concentration, and Capital Account Liberalization in Developing Democracies
Extant research suggests that democracy fosters capital account liberalization in developing countries. Yet the data reveal that there exists substantial variation in the extent of capital account openness across democracies in the developing world. When do democratic governments in developing states liberalize their capital account policies? We hypothesize that the market concentration of domestic private banks has a positive effect on capital a…
Candidate-centred systems, public banks and equity market restrictions in developing democracies
The pace of financial globalization across the developing world grew rapidly after developing country governments started reducing restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic equities. Studies suggest that the emergence of democracy in developing states played a critical role in facilitating the reduction of controls on foreign investment in domestic equities. Yet, the data reveals that although some developing country democracies have curtaile…
Information Politics Versus Organizational Incentives
Information politics" INGOs such as Amnesty International have incentives to maintain their credibility by carefully vetting information about rights abuses committed by governments. But they are also strategic actors that may inflate allegations of abuse to fulfill organizational imperatives. This raises an intriguing question: When are INGOs more likely to exaggerate their allegations? In answer to this question, we argue that news media report…
The IMF, Domestic Public Sector Banks, and Currency Crises in Developing States
The stabilization programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—which are often designed to prevent currency crashes and promote exchange rate stability—frequently fail to prevent currency crises in program-recipient developing countries. This leads to the following puzzle: when do IMF programs fail to prevent currency crises in developing states that turn to the Fund for assistance? We suggest that the likelihood that a currency crisis may o…
A Mixture Model for Middle Category Inflation in Ordered Survey Responses
Recent research finds that, for social desirability reasons, uninformed individuals disproportionately give “neither agree nor disagree” type responses to survey attitude questions, even when a “do not know” option is available. Such “face-saving” responses inflate the indifference (i.e., middle) categories of ordered attitude variables with nonordered responses. When such inflation occurs within the middle category of one's ordered dependent var…
Electoral institutions and growth volatility
What accounts for the substantial variation in the temporal volatility of economic growth rates in democratic regimes? We claim that institutional differences between the majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems explain why growth volatility is high in some democracies, but not others. Specifically, we suggest that unlike PR democracies, the pronounced career concerns of policymakers in majoritarian systems give them in…
Revue des revues
utilisation du site ou, le cas chant, des conditions gnrales de la licence souscrite par votre tablissement
International Institutions and Domestic Compensation
Certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross‐border movement of capital. How can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s? We argue that IMF stabilization programs provide a window of opportunity for governments to initiate financial reforms, but that policy makers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high. Large…
Democratization and Economic Globalization
We address two questions that are central to the literature on the emergence of democracy and economic globalization. First, does democratization foster higher levels of trade and capital account openness? Second, do trade and capital account openness increase the likelihood of democratization? We review the literature in international political economy and comparative politics that has theoretically and empirically addressed these questions. We …
Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others
This paper develops a bargaining model that explains why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars between governments and insurgents in some cases, but not others. The model predicts that if the civil war ends in a military stalemate, the government uses its offer of a political power-sharing agreement to the insurgents as a tool to misrepresent private information about its military capacity and defeat the ins…
Information Politics Versus Organizational Incentives
Information politics" INGOs such as Amnesty International have incentives to maintain their credibility by carefully vetting information about rights abuses committed by governments. But they are also strategic actors that may inflate allegations of abuse to fulfill organizational imperatives. This raises an intriguing question: When are INGOs more likely to exaggerate their allegations? In answer to this question, we argue that news media report…
Government Partisanship, Elections, and the Stock Market
We construct a model of speculative trading to examine how the mean and volatility of stock prices is affected both by government partisanship and by traders' expectations of electoral victory by the right‐wing or left‐wing party. Our model predicts that rational expectations of higher inflation under left‐wing administrations lowers the volume of stocks traded in the stock market. The decline in trading volume leads to a decrease in the mean and…
Political Parties and the Size of Government in Multiparty Legislatures
This article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government—proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP—in multiparty legislatures. The author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure. Conversely, as the size of the majority party grows from a bare-minimum majority to …
International Institutions and Domestic Compensation
Certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross‐border movement of capital. How can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s? We argue that IMF stabilization programs provide a window of opportunity for governments to initiate financial reforms, but that policy makers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high. Large…
Droughts, Land Appropriation, and Rebel Violence in the Developing World
Scholars note that rebel atrocities against civilians often arise within rural areas in the developing world. This characterization is not far-fetched, and recent data show that rebel atrocities do predominately occur within rural agricultural regions. Yet the frequency of such incidents also varies substantially across different agricultural regions and years. What accounts for this observed variation in rebel-perpetrated atrocities against civi…
Modeling Two Types of Peace
A growing body of applied research on political violence employs split-population models to address problems of zero inflation in conflict event counts and related binary dependent variables. Nevertheless, conflict researchers typically use standard ordered probit models to study discrete ordered dependent variables characterized by excessive zeros (e.g., levels of conflict). This study familiarizes conflict scholars with a recently proposed spli…
Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation Targeting
Since 1989, twenty-five countries have adopted a monetary policy rule known as inflation targeting (IT), in which the central bank commits to using monetary policy solely for the purpose of meeting a publicly announced numerical inflation target within a particular time frame. In contrast, many other countries continue to conduct monetary policy without a transparent nominal anchor. The emergence of IT has been almost completely ignored by politi…
State Capacity and the Environmental Investment Gap in Authoritarian States
We construct an n-period, constrained optimization model where the authoritarian ruler maximizes expected rents subject to budget constraint of available surplus. We show that the larger state capacity is in the previous period, the worse environmental quality will be in the next period: while infrastructural investment and environmental protection increase with state capacity, the former increases at a faster rate which enlarges the gap between …
Presidential Elections and the Stock Market
Existing research on electoral politics and financial markets predicts that when investors expect left parties—Democrats (US), Labor (UK)—to win elections, market volatility increases. In addition, current econometric research on stock market volatility suggests that Markov-switching models provide more accurate volatility forecasts and fit stock price volatility data better than linear or nonlinear GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional h…
A Mixture Model for Middle Category Inflation in Ordered Survey Responses
Recent research finds that, for social desirability reasons, uninformed individuals disproportionately give “neither agree nor disagree” type responses to survey attitude questions, even when a “do not know” option is available. Such “face-saving” responses inflate the indifference (i.e., middle) categories of ordered attitude variables with nonordered responses. When such inflation occurs within the middle category of one's ordered dependent var…
Introduction
Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims…
Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises
Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric informati…
Labor (Im)mobility and the Politics of Trade Protection in Majoritarian Democracies
The two workhorse models of trade, Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner, provide leverage in explaining how societal groups divide over trade protection. Tension between the two trade models has significantly influenced the scholarship of trade politics, with explanations of trade politics adopting either the factor-based approach or the industry-based framework. No study has investigated how changes in factor mobility as a continuous variable influ…
Electoral Particularism, Bank Concentration, and Capital Account Liberalization in Developing Democracies
Extant research suggests that democracy fosters capital account liberalization in developing countries. Yet the data reveal that there exists substantial variation in the extent of capital account openness across democracies in the developing world. When do democratic governments in developing states liberalize their capital account policies? We hypothesize that the market concentration of domestic private banks has a positive effect on capital a…
Coalition Government Formation and Foreign Exchange Markets
This study examines how the politics of coalition government formation affect foreign exchange markets in Western European parliamentary democracies. Existing studies suggest that ex ante uncertainty associated with the formation of coalition governments increases exchange rate volatility. We develop a formal model that places currency traders at the center and examines how traders respond to the uncertainty produced by coalition bargaining in pa…
Electoral Institutions and the Evolution of Partisan Conventions, 1880-1940
This article examines variation in partisanship levels across the United States between 1880 and 1940 and suggests that the introduction of three electoral laws in this time period—party registration, primaries and secret ballots—can explain the geographic variation in partisanship levels across the United States during this era. Specifically, the article argues that the introduction of party registration increased the observability of partisan b…
Rebel command and control, time, and rebel group splits
Fractious splits of rebel groups debilitate the military capacity of these organizations which increases their vulnerability to anti-rebel operations. Despite the risks of disunity and the battlefield advantages of remaining cohesive, our new global sample of rebel groups (1980–2014) reveals that two-fifths of these (but not the remaining) groups have split into distinct, competing factions. Why and when do some rebel groups split, while other gr…
Does Third-Party Enforcement or Domestic Institutions Promote Enduring Peace After Civil Wars? Policy Lessons From an Empirical Test
What causes peaceful resolution of civil wars to endure rather than to collapse into renewed fighting? Existing studies predict that third-party peace enforcement by the United Nations (UN) or domestic institutions such as democracy, parliamentary, and presidential institutions and the proportional representation (PR) electoral system promotes enduring peace in societies that have emerged from a civil war. However, extant empirical works test the…
Security Consolidation in the Aftermath of Civil War
Policymakers and peacebuilding research often focus on rebel groups when studying demobilization and integration processes, but post-war governments must also manage the non-state militias that helped them gain or maintain power. Why do some post-war governments disintegrate their militia allies, while others integrate them into the military? We argue that when a salient ethnic difference exists between the (new) ruling elite and an allied militi…
Regional International Organizations and Individual Immigration Attitudes
When are individuals more likely to support immigration? We suggest here that regional international organizations (IOs; for example, the European Union) publicly release reports about the scale and benefits of immigration to member states in the region in which these IOs operate. We argue that unlike individuals who are uninformed about immigration, informed individuals who have more knowledge of the main regional IO in which their country parti…
Candidate-centred systems, public banks and equity market restrictions in developing democracies
The pace of financial globalization across the developing world grew rapidly after developing country governments started reducing restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic equities. Studies suggest that the emergence of democracy in developing states played a critical role in facilitating the reduction of controls on foreign investment in domestic equities. Yet, the data reveals that although some developing country democracies have curtaile…
Minority Governments and Exchange Rate Regimes
We examine the impact of minority governments on the choice of exchange rate regime in advanced OECD democracies after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We demonstrate that leaders of minority governments had a lower political discount factor in office than majority governments across advanced OECD democracies and use that finding to motivate a model. The model predicts that leaders of minority governments had strong incentives to switch …
Right-Wing Populist Leaders, Nationalist Rhetoric, and Dispute Initiation in International Politics
The global rise of right-wing populist (RWP) leaders has raised concerns about the threat they pose to a cooperative international order, but there is little systematic evidence linking RWP leaders to military aggression. Are RWP leaders more prone to initiating international disputes? If so, when and why? We argue that a RWP leader’s hyper-nationalist rhetoric can galvanize popular support for militant internationalism, but this only leads to pr…
Rural Welfare in India
Journal Article Rural Welfare in India Get access B. B. Mukherjee B. B. Mukherjee Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Social Forces, Volume 8, Issue 2, December 1929, Pages 253–254, https://doi.org/10.2307/2569587 Published: 01 December 1929
Political Parties and the Size of Government in Multiparty Legislatures
This article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government—proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP—in multiparty legislatures. The author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure. Conversely, as the size of the majority party grows from a bare-minimum majority to …
Presidential Elections and the Stock Market
Existing research on electoral politics and financial markets predicts that when investors expect left parties—Democrats (US), Labor (UK)—to win elections, market volatility increases. In addition, current econometric research on stock market volatility suggests that Markov-switching models provide more accurate volatility forecasts and fit stock price volatility data better than linear or nonlinear GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional h…
Government Partisanship, Elections, and the Stock Market
We construct a model of speculative trading to examine how the mean and volatility of stock prices is affected both by government partisanship and by traders' expectations of electoral victory by the right‐wing or left‐wing party. Our model predicts that rational expectations of higher inflation under left‐wing administrations lowers the volume of stocks traded in the stock market. The decline in trading volume leads to a decrease in the mean and…
Government Partisanship, Elections, and the Stock Market
We construct a model of speculative trading to examine how the mean and volatility of stock prices is affected both by government partisanship and by traders' expectations of electoral victory by the right-wing or left-wing party. Our model predicts that rational expectations of higher inflation under left-wing administrations lowers the volume of stocks traded in the stock market. The decline in trading volume leads to a decrease in the mean and…
Does Third-Party Enforcement or Domestic Institutions Promote Enduring Peace After Civil Wars? Policy Lessons From an Empirical Test
What causes peaceful resolution of civil wars to endure rather than to collapse into renewed fighting? Existing studies predict that third-party peace enforcement by the United Nations (UN) or domestic institutions such as democracy, parliamentary, and presidential institutions and the proportional representation (PR) electoral system promotes enduring peace in societies that have emerged from a civil war. However, extant empirical works test the…
Coalition Government Formation and Foreign Exchange Markets
This study examines how the politics of coalition government formation affect foreign exchange markets in Western European parliamentary democracies. Existing studies suggest that ex ante uncertainty associated with the formation of coalition governments increases exchange rate volatility. We develop a formal model that places currency traders at the center and examines how traders respond to the uncertainty produced by coalition bargaining in pa…
Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others
This paper develops a bargaining model that explains why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars between governments and insurgents in some cases, but not others. The model predicts that if the civil war ends in a military stalemate, the government uses its offer of a political power-sharing agreement to the insurgents as a tool to misrepresent private information about its military capacity and defeat the ins…
Minority Governments and Exchange Rate Regimes
We examine the impact of minority governments on the choice of exchange rate regime in advanced OECD democracies after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We demonstrate that leaders of minority governments had a lower political discount factor in office than majority governments across advanced OECD democracies and use that finding to motivate a model. The model predicts that leaders of minority governments had strong incentives to switch …
Electoral Institutions and the Evolution of Partisan Conventions, 1880-1940
This article examines variation in partisanship levels across the United States between 1880 and 1940 and suggests that the introduction of three electoral laws in this time period—party registration, primaries and secret ballots—can explain the geographic variation in partisanship levels across the United States during this era. Specifically, the article argues that the introduction of party registration increased the observability of partisan b…
Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises
Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric informati…
Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation Targeting
Since 1989, twenty-five countries have adopted a monetary policy rule known as inflation targeting (IT), in which the central bank commits to using monetary policy solely for the purpose of meeting a publicly announced numerical inflation target within a particular time frame. In contrast, many other countries continue to conduct monetary policy without a transparent nominal anchor. The emergence of IT has been almost completely ignored by politi…
Labor (Im)mobility and the Politics of Trade Protection in Majoritarian Democracies
The two workhorse models of trade, Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner, provide leverage in explaining how societal groups divide over trade protection. Tension between the two trade models has significantly influenced the scholarship of trade politics, with explanations of trade politics adopting either the factor-based approach or the industry-based framework. No study has investigated how changes in factor mobility as a continuous variable influ…
Democratization and Economic Globalization
We address two questions that are central to the literature on the emergence of democracy and economic globalization. First, does democratization foster higher levels of trade and capital account openness? Second, do trade and capital account openness increase the likelihood of democratization? We review the literature in international political economy and comparative politics that has theoretically and empirically addressed these questions. We …
Revue des revues
utilisation du site ou, le cas chant, des conditions gnrales de la licence souscrite par votre tablissement
International Institutions and Domestic Compensation
Certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross‐border movement of capital. How can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s? We argue that IMF stabilization programs provide a window of opportunity for governments to initiate financial reforms, but that policy makers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high. Large…
Electoral institutions and growth volatility
What accounts for the substantial variation in the temporal volatility of economic growth rates in democratic regimes? We claim that institutional differences between the majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems explain why growth volatility is high in some democracies, but not others. Specifically, we suggest that unlike PR democracies, the pronounced career concerns of policymakers in majoritarian systems give them in…
The IMF, Domestic Public Sector Banks, and Currency Crises in Developing States
The stabilization programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—which are often designed to prevent currency crashes and promote exchange rate stability—frequently fail to prevent currency crises in program-recipient developing countries. This leads to the following puzzle: when do IMF programs fail to prevent currency crises in developing states that turn to the Fund for assistance? We suggest that the likelihood that a currency crisis may o…
A Mixture Model for Middle Category Inflation in Ordered Survey Responses
Recent research finds that, for social desirability reasons, uninformed individuals disproportionately give “neither agree nor disagree” type responses to survey attitude questions, even when a “do not know” option is available. Such “face-saving” responses inflate the indifference (i.e., middle) categories of ordered attitude variables with nonordered responses. When such inflation occurs within the middle category of one's ordered dependent var…
Candidate-centred systems, public banks and equity market restrictions in developing democracies
The pace of financial globalization across the developing world grew rapidly after developing country governments started reducing restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic equities. Studies suggest that the emergence of democracy in developing states played a critical role in facilitating the reduction of controls on foreign investment in domestic equities. Yet, the data reveals that although some developing country democracies have curtaile…
Information Politics Versus Organizational Incentives
Information politics" INGOs such as Amnesty International have incentives to maintain their credibility by carefully vetting information about rights abuses committed by governments. But they are also strategic actors that may inflate allegations of abuse to fulfill organizational imperatives. This raises an intriguing question: When are INGOs more likely to exaggerate their allegations? In answer to this question, we argue that news media report…
Regional International Organizations and Individual Immigration Attitudes
When are individuals more likely to support immigration? We suggest here that regional international organizations (IOs; for example, the European Union) publicly release reports about the scale and benefits of immigration to member states in the region in which these IOs operate. We argue that unlike individuals who are uninformed about immigration, informed individuals who have more knowledge of the main regional IO in which their country parti…
Introduction
Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims…
State Capacity and the Environmental Investment Gap in Authoritarian States
We construct an n-period, constrained optimization model where the authoritarian ruler maximizes expected rents subject to budget constraint of available surplus. We show that the larger state capacity is in the previous period, the worse environmental quality will be in the next period: while infrastructural investment and environmental protection increase with state capacity, the former increases at a faster rate which enlarges the gap between …
Electoral Particularism, Bank Concentration, and Capital Account Liberalization in Developing Democracies
Extant research suggests that democracy fosters capital account liberalization in developing countries. Yet the data reveal that there exists substantial variation in the extent of capital account openness across democracies in the developing world. When do democratic governments in developing states liberalize their capital account policies? We hypothesize that the market concentration of domestic private banks has a positive effect on capital a…
Economics (33 obras) · Political science (29 obras) · Politics (24 obras) · Law (14 obras) · Political Conflict and Governance (14 obras) · Law (13 obras) · International Development and Aid (12 obras) · Political economy (12 obras) · Econometrics (10 obras) · Market economy (9 obras)