Daniel B Magleby
Biographic Data
| ID | 4180214 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel B Magleby |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel B |
| FAMILY NAME | Magleby |
| SIGNATURE | MAGLEBY D B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Binghamton University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The New York Congressional Gerrymander: A Social Science and Policy Lesson
Do Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders
As attempts to combat partisan gerrymandering transition from proposals to the Supreme Court to state-based districting commissions, it is time to ask two questions. First, how well did commissions in the 2010 round of redistricting perform as neutral decision makers? We answer that question with applications to each of the three independent commissions (AZ, CA, and WA) and four other commission forms (IA, NJ, NY, and VA) in place for post-2010. …
Detecting Florida's Gerrymander: A Lesson in Putting First Things First
Objective We show that Florida's post‐2010 congressional districts were an ex ante knowable gerrymander, which, if diagnosed as a factual matter before enactment, would have avoided both the 2012 and 2014 harm and the state's unnecessarily burdensome reliance on a showing of intent. Method We recount the legal focus on intent, apply the McDonald‐Best equal vote weight effects test standard to the Florida facts, and use more than 25,000 simulated …
Can Gerrymanders Be Detected? An Examination of Wisconsin’s State Assembly
In October 2017, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of a November 2016 ruling striking down Wisconsin’s State Assembly districts as a Republican gerrymander that illegally dilutes the weight of Democratic votes. We take the opportunity to revisit this litigation to evaluate three proposed methods of detecting gerrymanders: the “efficiency gap,” a count of Assembly districts carried by statewide candidates, and the difference between the district-l…
A New Approach for Developing Neutral Redistricting Plans
Computers hold the potential to draw legislative districts in a neutral way. Existing approaches to automated redistricting may introduce bias and encounter difficulties when drawing districts of large and even medium-sized jurisdictions. We present a new algorithm that can neutrally generate legislative districts without indications of bias that are contiguous, balanced and relatively compact. The algorithm does not show the kinds of bias found …
Putting the Brakes on Greased Wheels: The Politics of Weak Obstruction in the United States Senate
Obstruction is a fundamental aspect of legislative politics. In the United States Congress, senators exercise procedural prerogatives to defeat a bill with which they disagree on policy grounds. We argue that senators also utilize obstructive tactics in order to do more than block legislation with which they disagree. We claim that legislators engage in “weak” (as opposed to strong) obstruction in an effort to accrue political benefits to themsel…
Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles
A New Approach for Developing Neutral Redistricting Plans
Computers hold the potential to draw legislative districts in a neutral way. Existing approaches to automated redistricting may introduce bias and encounter difficulties when drawing districts of large and even medium-sized jurisdictions. We present a new algorithm that can neutrally generate legislative districts without indications of bias that are contiguous, balanced and relatively compact. The algorithm does not show the kinds of bias found …
Can Gerrymanders Be Detected? An Examination of Wisconsin’s State Assembly
In October 2017, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of a November 2016 ruling striking down Wisconsin’s State Assembly districts as a Republican gerrymander that illegally dilutes the weight of Democratic votes. We take the opportunity to revisit this litigation to evaluate three proposed methods of detecting gerrymanders: the “efficiency gap,” a count of Assembly districts carried by statewide candidates, and the difference between the district-l…
Putting the Brakes on Greased Wheels: The Politics of Weak Obstruction in the United States Senate
Obstruction is a fundamental aspect of legislative politics. In the United States Congress, senators exercise procedural prerogatives to defeat a bill with which they disagree on policy grounds. We argue that senators also utilize obstructive tactics in order to do more than block legislation with which they disagree. We claim that legislators engage in “weak” (as opposed to strong) obstruction in an effort to accrue political benefits to themsel…
Do Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders
As attempts to combat partisan gerrymandering transition from proposals to the Supreme Court to state-based districting commissions, it is time to ask two questions. First, how well did commissions in the 2010 round of redistricting perform as neutral decision makers? We answer that question with applications to each of the three independent commissions (AZ, CA, and WA) and four other commission forms (IA, NJ, NY, and VA) in place for post-2010. …
Detecting Florida's Gerrymander: A Lesson in Putting First Things First
Objective We show that Florida's post‐2010 congressional districts were an ex ante knowable gerrymander, which, if diagnosed as a factual matter before enactment, would have avoided both the 2012 and 2014 harm and the state's unnecessarily burdensome reliance on a showing of intent. Method We recount the legal focus on intent, apply the McDonald‐Best equal vote weight effects test standard to the Florida facts, and use more than 25,000 simulated …
Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles
Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles
Putting the Brakes on Greased Wheels: The Politics of Weak Obstruction in the United States Senate
Obstruction is a fundamental aspect of legislative politics. In the United States Congress, senators exercise procedural prerogatives to defeat a bill with which they disagree on policy grounds. We argue that senators also utilize obstructive tactics in order to do more than block legislation with which they disagree. We claim that legislators engage in “weak” (as opposed to strong) obstruction in an effort to accrue political benefits to themsel…
A New Approach for Developing Neutral Redistricting Plans
Computers hold the potential to draw legislative districts in a neutral way. Existing approaches to automated redistricting may introduce bias and encounter difficulties when drawing districts of large and even medium-sized jurisdictions. We present a new algorithm that can neutrally generate legislative districts without indications of bias that are contiguous, balanced and relatively compact. The algorithm does not show the kinds of bias found …
Can Gerrymanders Be Detected? An Examination of Wisconsin’s State Assembly
In October 2017, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of a November 2016 ruling striking down Wisconsin’s State Assembly districts as a Republican gerrymander that illegally dilutes the weight of Democratic votes. We take the opportunity to revisit this litigation to evaluate three proposed methods of detecting gerrymanders: the “efficiency gap,” a count of Assembly districts carried by statewide candidates, and the difference between the district-l…
Detecting Florida's Gerrymander: A Lesson in Putting First Things First
Objective We show that Florida's post‐2010 congressional districts were an ex ante knowable gerrymander, which, if diagnosed as a factual matter before enactment, would have avoided both the 2012 and 2014 harm and the state's unnecessarily burdensome reliance on a showing of intent. Method We recount the legal focus on intent, apply the McDonald‐Best equal vote weight effects test standard to the Florida facts, and use more than 25,000 simulated …
Do Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders
As attempts to combat partisan gerrymandering transition from proposals to the Supreme Court to state-based districting commissions, it is time to ask two questions. First, how well did commissions in the 2010 round of redistricting perform as neutral decision makers? We answer that question with applications to each of the three independent commissions (AZ, CA, and WA) and four other commission forms (IA, NJ, NY, and VA) in place for post-2010. …
The New York Congressional Gerrymander: A Social Science and Policy Lesson
Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Legislature (4 works) · Public Administration (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Gerrymandering (3 works)