Alexis Delamare
Biographic Data
| ID | 4188966 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alexis Delamare |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alexis |
| FAMILY NAME | Delamare |
| SIGNATURE | DELAMARE A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College Dublin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9737-4540 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Edmund Husserl on Position-Taking (Stellungnahme) as the Essence of Human Life
In “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” Edmund Husserl states that “all life is position-taking [ Stellungnehmen ]” and “all position-taking is subject to an ought” (1987: 56). The aim of this paper is to examine Husserl’s multifaceted concept of Stellungnahme and show how it informs his understanding of human life. I start by studying this notion as initially developed by Reinach – where position-taking is a stance towards an object or state …
Feelings as Episodes
The paper offers a renewed interpretation of Husserl’s approach to moods (Stimmungen), in light of the second volume of the Studien. There, Husserl defines moods as feelings that persist after their axiological source is no longer present to consciousness. But how can such an affective experience endure after it has been detached from its intentional origin? To address this issue, I first present an innovative account of Husserl’s conception of f…
Ultimate Rationality. Husserl on Critical Position-Taking (Stellungnahme) in the Theoretical and Axiological Spheres
As a fervent rationalist, Husserl placed considerable emphasis on the delineation of the different levels of reason. Its highest form, he contends, is position-taking ( Stellungnahme ) understood as a critical stance towards a positional act P . In the literature, the role of position-taking in the formation of persons has been aptly emphasized, but insufficient attention has been paid to its intrinsic structure and concrete functioning; furtherm…
The Paradox of Axiological Coldness
This paper explores the nature of our experiences of values – our valueceptions . In the recent literature, two main standpoints have emerged. On the one hand, the ‘Meinongian’ side claims that axiological properties are experienced exclusively in emotions. On the other hand, the ‘Hildebrandian’ side contends that since valueceptions can be ‘cold’, they are not accomplished in emotions but rather reside in ‘value-feelings’ – emotions, in this fra…
The Rationalization of Consciousness
Before engaging with intentionality, the philosopher of mind must consider the intrinsic nature of psychological elements. Conscious states, contrary to ordinary and scientific objects, seem to penetrate each another in such a way that it becomes impossible to enumerate, class or organize through laws the various experiences at stake. In this context, how is a science of consciousness conceivable? How is it possible to apply the epistemological r…
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The Rationalization of Consciousness
Before engaging with intentionality, the philosopher of mind must consider the intrinsic nature of psychological elements. Conscious states, contrary to ordinary and scientific objects, seem to penetrate each another in such a way that it becomes impossible to enumerate, class or organize through laws the various experiences at stake. In this context, how is a science of consciousness conceivable? How is it possible to apply the epistemological r…
The Paradox of Axiological Coldness
This paper explores the nature of our experiences of values – our valueceptions . In the recent literature, two main standpoints have emerged. On the one hand, the ‘Meinongian’ side claims that axiological properties are experienced exclusively in emotions. On the other hand, the ‘Hildebrandian’ side contends that since valueceptions can be ‘cold’, they are not accomplished in emotions but rather reside in ‘value-feelings’ – emotions, in this fra…
Feelings as Episodes
The paper offers a renewed interpretation of Husserl’s approach to moods (Stimmungen), in light of the second volume of the Studien. There, Husserl defines moods as feelings that persist after their axiological source is no longer present to consciousness. But how can such an affective experience endure after it has been detached from its intentional origin? To address this issue, I first present an innovative account of Husserl’s conception of f…
Ultimate Rationality. Husserl on Critical Position-Taking (Stellungnahme) in the Theoretical and Axiological Spheres
As a fervent rationalist, Husserl placed considerable emphasis on the delineation of the different levels of reason. Its highest form, he contends, is position-taking ( Stellungnahme ) understood as a critical stance towards a positional act P . In the literature, the role of position-taking in the formation of persons has been aptly emphasized, but insufficient attention has been paid to its intrinsic structure and concrete functioning; furtherm…
Edmund Husserl on Position-Taking (Stellungnahme) as the Essence of Human Life
In “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” Edmund Husserl states that “all life is position-taking [ Stellungnehmen ]” and “all position-taking is subject to an ought” (1987: 56). The aim of this paper is to examine Husserl’s multifaceted concept of Stellungnahme and show how it informs his understanding of human life. I start by studying this notion as initially developed by Reinach – where position-taking is a stance towards an object or state …
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Feeling (2 works) · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Philosophy and Historical Thought (2 works) · Psychoanalysis (2 works) · Psychoanalysis and Social Critique (2 works) · Psychology (2 works)