Michael Rochlitz
Biographic Data
| ID | 4191519 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Rochlitz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Rochlitz |
| SIGNATURE | ROCHLITZ M |
| AFFILIATIONS | National Research University Higher School of Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8652-8874 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 82 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Can Authoritarian Electoral Propaganda Compete with the Opposition? Experimental Evidence from Russia
We examine the effectiveness of electoral propaganda in an autocracy, using Russia as a unique setting. Exploiting the unexpected release of a pro-regime propaganda video about Vladimir Putin shortly before the presidential election, we conducted a field experiment by randomly promoting the video to voters via a telephone survey and measuring self-reported voting behaviour after the election. Our results show that the pro-regime treatment success…
Authority endorsements backfire and social norms fail to increase vaccination intent in post-Covid Kazakhstan
parents) in Kazakhstan - a post-Soviet setting where institutional trust is characterized by Soviet legacies and post-pandemic coercion - that varied messenger endorsement (Grand Mufti, President, Chief Sanitary Doctor, control) and social norm framing (Muslim, national, local, control), supplemented by qualitative analysis of 829 open-ended responses. All three endorsements reduced vaccination intent by 6-7 percentage points relative to the 76% …
Authoritarian Surveillance and Public Support for Digital Governance Solutions
This study investigates factors influencing support for digital governance solutions and compares this support between autocracies and democracies. We conduct survey experiments in Russia, Germany, Turkey, the United States, and Estonia, and find that awareness of potential misuse of digital governance tools by the government reduces support. Importantly, while this effect has previously been documented for China, we find it irrespective of regim…
Assessing Socialist Past and Sociodemographic Present
Since the mid-2000s, there has been no study of characteristics of political elites at large in East Central European countries. Accordingly, an assessment of long-term trends is not possible beyond narrow case studies of elite sub-segments. This research note introduces a new dataset covering officeholders for 3,277 position/years in six countries (the Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine) for seven reference years …
Rollentausch
China is a giant, Russia a dwarf by comparison. This is true economically, demographically and now militarily as well. In just a few decades, the ratios between the two states have been reversed. As recently as the 1950s, the Soviet Union played a significant role in the economic development of the nascent People’s Republic of China. Several failed attempts at reform have turned Russia into an autocratic commodity state with institutions antithet…
Verspielte Zukunft
Russia’s economy has been stagnant since 2008. Under the interim presidency of Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2011, there were attempts to modernise the economy. Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in March 2012, economic growth has ceased to be a priority. Instead, a small group of intelligence officers around President Putin has relied on repression to control society and manage confrontation with the West. With the war in Ukraine, th…
Staying Out of Trouble
Although repression against elites is a common occurrence in authoritarian regimes, we know little about which elites are targeted. This paper uses an original dataset on the prosecution of mayors in large Russian cities to examine the factors that make elites more likely to be arrested. We argue that in electoral authoritarian regimes like Russia, regime leaders are reluctant to arrest popular officials. Such officials command political capital …
Bureaucratic discrimination in electoral authoritarian regimes
Are investors in electoral authoritarian regimes discriminated against for political activism? In this paper, we implement a simple experiment to test whether affiliation with the ruling party or the political opposition affects the probability that investors receive advice from investment promotion agencies in Russian regions. Between December 2016 and June 2017, we sent 1504 emails with a short question and a number of randomized treatments to …
Property rights in Russia after 2009
Since about 2009, increasing budgetary constraints forced the Russian state to become notably less tolerant of lower-level corruption and predatory behavior by state agencies. In this paper, we argue that after a first stage of decentralized corruption and state capture during the 1990s, and a second period of decentralized corruption and business capture during the 2000s, Russia has entered a third stage of more centralized corruption since 2009…
The Return of the Siloviki
After a period of relative political liberalization under president Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s security services have again started to play a central role in Russian politics with Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. In this issue of Russian Politics , we analyze three different aspects of this return of the siloviki : the way they think and see the world, how the relationship between governors and siloviki affects economic developme…
Control Over the Security Services in Periods of Political Uncertainty
Control over the security services is a key ingredient of political survival in authoritarian regimes. This is particularly true during periods of leadership succession and high political uncertainty. In this paper, we compare the strategy used by Vladimir Putin towards the siloviki – the Russian security services – with that employed by Xi Jinping towards the Chinese security services. We find that in both countries, the security services have b…
Performance incentives and economic growth
How does the degree of centralization and decentralization of political control affect economic performance? To investigate this question, we gather and analyze a comprehensive original data-set measuring the performance, career paths, and incentives of regional officials in China and Russia during the last 15 years. Both China and Russia combine centralized personnel selection with substantial administrative autonomy for regional officials, but …
Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950
At the Crossroads
In 2013, Russia's economy entered a phase of stagnation, with a rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth much lower than that of other emerging economies. This article argues that economic stagnation is linked to the dysfunctional system of informal institutions that permeates every level of political decision making in the country. By discussing four recent books on the topic, the article shows the negative effect of Russia's informal institu…
Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance
The Political Economy of the Chinese Coal Industry
If you drive through some parts of the coal producing provinces of Northern China, everything is black. The industry dominates the countryside to the point that no shirt remains white for long, wit
Corporate raiding and the role of the state in Russia
To what extent are Russian state agencies involved in predatory behavior, and what are the determinants of their activities? Analyzing a novel data-set comprising 312 cases of illegal corporate raiding (reyderstvo) between 1999 and 2010, this article identifies a shift both in the regional and sectoral distribution of raids over time, as well as an increasing participation of state agencies in criminal raiding attacks. Using panel regression anal…
Tankograd. The Formation of a Soviet Company Town
Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China
Asked about the most influential leader of the twentieth century, probably only a few people would think of Deng Xiaoping. However, as argued by Ezra Vogel in his new biography, this tough, small m
Networks in the Russian Market Economy
Corporate raiding and the role of the state in Russia
To what extent are Russian state agencies involved in predatory behavior, and what are the determinants of their activities? Analyzing a novel data-set comprising 312 cases of illegal corporate raiding (reyderstvo) between 1999 and 2010, this article identifies a shift both in the regional and sectoral distribution of raids over time, as well as an increasing participation of state agencies in criminal raiding attacks. Using panel regression anal…
Performance incentives and economic growth
How does the degree of centralization and decentralization of political control affect economic performance? To investigate this question, we gather and analyze a comprehensive original data-set measuring the performance, career paths, and incentives of regional officials in China and Russia during the last 15 years. Both China and Russia combine centralized personnel selection with substantial administrative autonomy for regional officials, but …
Staying Out of Trouble
Although repression against elites is a common occurrence in authoritarian regimes, we know little about which elites are targeted. This paper uses an original dataset on the prosecution of mayors in large Russian cities to examine the factors that make elites more likely to be arrested. We argue that in electoral authoritarian regimes like Russia, regime leaders are reluctant to arrest popular officials. Such officials command political capital …
Property rights in Russia after 2009
Since about 2009, increasing budgetary constraints forced the Russian state to become notably less tolerant of lower-level corruption and predatory behavior by state agencies. In this paper, we argue that after a first stage of decentralized corruption and state capture during the 1990s, and a second period of decentralized corruption and business capture during the 2000s, Russia has entered a third stage of more centralized corruption since 2009…
Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance
Authoritarian Surveillance and Public Support for Digital Governance Solutions
This study investigates factors influencing support for digital governance solutions and compares this support between autocracies and democracies. We conduct survey experiments in Russia, Germany, Turkey, the United States, and Estonia, and find that awareness of potential misuse of digital governance tools by the government reduces support. Importantly, while this effect has previously been documented for China, we find it irrespective of regim…
Control Over the Security Services in Periods of Political Uncertainty
Control over the security services is a key ingredient of political survival in authoritarian regimes. This is particularly true during periods of leadership succession and high political uncertainty. In this paper, we compare the strategy used by Vladimir Putin towards the siloviki – the Russian security services – with that employed by Xi Jinping towards the Chinese security services. We find that in both countries, the security services have b…
The Return of the Siloviki
After a period of relative political liberalization under president Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s security services have again started to play a central role in Russian politics with Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. In this issue of Russian Politics , we analyze three different aspects of this return of the siloviki : the way they think and see the world, how the relationship between governors and siloviki affects economic developme…
At the Crossroads
In 2013, Russia's economy entered a phase of stagnation, with a rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth much lower than that of other emerging economies. This article argues that economic stagnation is linked to the dysfunctional system of informal institutions that permeates every level of political decision making in the country. By discussing four recent books on the topic, the article shows the negative effect of Russia's informal institu…
Networks in the Russian Market Economy
Tankograd. The Formation of a Soviet Company Town
Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China
Asked about the most influential leader of the twentieth century, probably only a few people would think of Deng Xiaoping. However, as argued by Ezra Vogel in his new biography, this tough, small m
Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance
The Political Economy of the Chinese Coal Industry
If you drive through some parts of the coal producing provinces of Northern China, everything is black. The industry dominates the countryside to the point that no shirt remains white for long, wit
Corporate raiding and the role of the state in Russia
To what extent are Russian state agencies involved in predatory behavior, and what are the determinants of their activities? Analyzing a novel data-set comprising 312 cases of illegal corporate raiding (reyderstvo) between 1999 and 2010, this article identifies a shift both in the regional and sectoral distribution of raids over time, as well as an increasing participation of state agencies in criminal raiding attacks. Using panel regression anal…
Performance incentives and economic growth
How does the degree of centralization and decentralization of political control affect economic performance? To investigate this question, we gather and analyze a comprehensive original data-set measuring the performance, career paths, and incentives of regional officials in China and Russia during the last 15 years. Both China and Russia combine centralized personnel selection with substantial administrative autonomy for regional officials, but …
Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950
At the Crossroads
In 2013, Russia's economy entered a phase of stagnation, with a rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth much lower than that of other emerging economies. This article argues that economic stagnation is linked to the dysfunctional system of informal institutions that permeates every level of political decision making in the country. By discussing four recent books on the topic, the article shows the negative effect of Russia's informal institu…
The Return of the Siloviki
After a period of relative political liberalization under president Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s security services have again started to play a central role in Russian politics with Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. In this issue of Russian Politics , we analyze three different aspects of this return of the siloviki : the way they think and see the world, how the relationship between governors and siloviki affects economic developme…
Control Over the Security Services in Periods of Political Uncertainty
Control over the security services is a key ingredient of political survival in authoritarian regimes. This is particularly true during periods of leadership succession and high political uncertainty. In this paper, we compare the strategy used by Vladimir Putin towards the siloviki – the Russian security services – with that employed by Xi Jinping towards the Chinese security services. We find that in both countries, the security services have b…
Property rights in Russia after 2009
Since about 2009, increasing budgetary constraints forced the Russian state to become notably less tolerant of lower-level corruption and predatory behavior by state agencies. In this paper, we argue that after a first stage of decentralized corruption and state capture during the 1990s, and a second period of decentralized corruption and business capture during the 2000s, Russia has entered a third stage of more centralized corruption since 2009…
Bureaucratic discrimination in electoral authoritarian regimes
Are investors in electoral authoritarian regimes discriminated against for political activism? In this paper, we implement a simple experiment to test whether affiliation with the ruling party or the political opposition affects the probability that investors receive advice from investment promotion agencies in Russian regions. Between December 2016 and June 2017, we sent 1504 emails with a short question and a number of randomized treatments to …
Verspielte Zukunft
Russia’s economy has been stagnant since 2008. Under the interim presidency of Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2011, there were attempts to modernise the economy. Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in March 2012, economic growth has ceased to be a priority. Instead, a small group of intelligence officers around President Putin has relied on repression to control society and manage confrontation with the West. With the war in Ukraine, th…
Staying Out of Trouble
Although repression against elites is a common occurrence in authoritarian regimes, we know little about which elites are targeted. This paper uses an original dataset on the prosecution of mayors in large Russian cities to examine the factors that make elites more likely to be arrested. We argue that in electoral authoritarian regimes like Russia, regime leaders are reluctant to arrest popular officials. Such officials command political capital …
Rollentausch
China is a giant, Russia a dwarf by comparison. This is true economically, demographically and now militarily as well. In just a few decades, the ratios between the two states have been reversed. As recently as the 1950s, the Soviet Union played a significant role in the economic development of the nascent People’s Republic of China. Several failed attempts at reform have turned Russia into an autocratic commodity state with institutions antithet…
Assessing Socialist Past and Sociodemographic Present
Since the mid-2000s, there has been no study of characteristics of political elites at large in East Central European countries. Accordingly, an assessment of long-term trends is not possible beyond narrow case studies of elite sub-segments. This research note introduces a new dataset covering officeholders for 3,277 position/years in six countries (the Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine) for seven reference years …
Authoritarian Surveillance and Public Support for Digital Governance Solutions
This study investigates factors influencing support for digital governance solutions and compares this support between autocracies and democracies. We conduct survey experiments in Russia, Germany, Turkey, the United States, and Estonia, and find that awareness of potential misuse of digital governance tools by the government reduces support. Importantly, while this effect has previously been documented for China, we find it irrespective of regim…
Can Authoritarian Electoral Propaganda Compete with the Opposition? Experimental Evidence from Russia
We examine the effectiveness of electoral propaganda in an autocracy, using Russia as a unique setting. Exploiting the unexpected release of a pro-regime propaganda video about Vladimir Putin shortly before the presidential election, we conducted a field experiment by randomly promoting the video to voters via a telephone survey and measuring self-reported voting behaviour after the election. Our results show that the pro-regime treatment success…
Authority endorsements backfire and social norms fail to increase vaccination intent in post-Covid Kazakhstan
parents) in Kazakhstan - a post-Soviet setting where institutional trust is characterized by Soviet legacies and post-pandemic coercion - that varied messenger endorsement (Grand Mufti, President, Chief Sanitary Doctor, control) and social norm framing (Muslim, national, local, control), supplemented by qualitative analysis of 829 open-ended responses. All three endorsements reduced vaccination intent by 6-7 percentage points relative to the 76% …
Political science (15 works) · Economics (12 works) · Law (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Political economy (9 works) · Politics (9 works) · Business (7 works) · Economic system (7 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (6 works) · Authoritarianism (5 works)