Fabian Burkhardt
Biographic Data
| ID | 4191591 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fabian Burkhardt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fabian |
| FAMILY NAME | Burkhardt |
| SIGNATURE | BURKHARDT F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0789-9410 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 27 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Can Germany learn from Ukraine? Resilience in a time of polycrisis
Digital ballots, partisan bias
Vladimir Putin
Russia’s political system is highly personalised. All relevant decisions, including the war against Ukraine, are made by autocrat Vladimir Putin. Despite defeats on the battlefield, his regime appears stable. But the war reveals the paradox of personalised rule: Putin claims that the “special military operation” was necessary to forestall a larger war that the United States had planned against Russia. He admits weaknesses, but claims Russia will …
Lukashenka’s Constitutional Plebiscite and the Polarization of Belarusian Society
Aliaksandr Lukashenka pushed through an overhaul of Belarus’s constitution as a response to the protests against the official results of the 2020 presidential election. The goal was to address the desire for change among the population without reacting to the demand for snap elections. With the February 2022 constitutional plebiscite on the most far-ranging changes to Belarus’s constitution since 1994, Lukashenka further entrenched himself in pow…
Institutionalizing Personalism
The 2020 constitutional changes considerably increase presidential powers while sending mixed signals about presidential transition. The main driver of the amendments were term limits. The “zeroing” of Putin’s presidential terms enhances certainty for himself by fostering uncertainty for others. But there is more to the amendments: Numerous changes are not new, they simply align the constitutional text with subconstitutional powers the presidency…
Diktatur ist unser Markenzeichen“
For a long time, Belarus was considered an exemplary case of a stable authoritarian regime. For 26 years, the country has been ruled by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The central organisational principle of the ruling elite is a single-pyramid network, with Lukashenka at the top. From this position, he was able to prevent rival factions from gaining access to power resources. Despite a major political crisis in the country and ongoing protests after the …
Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies
This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders re…
The Tail Wagging the Dog? Top-down and Bottom-up Explanations for Bureaucratic Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes
The paper investigates the link between the sub-national variation of political regimes in a (at the federal level) non-democratic country and the appointments of federal officials in the sub-national provinces. In particular, we look at the appointment of the chief federal inspectors to the regions in Putin’s Russia in 2000–2012. Our main research question is whether appointment patterns can be explained by top-down concerns of the central gover…
The institutionalization of relative advantage
What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far flung patron-client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presiden…
The institutionalization of relative advantage
What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far flung patron-client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presiden…
Institutionalizing Personalism
The 2020 constitutional changes considerably increase presidential powers while sending mixed signals about presidential transition. The main driver of the amendments were term limits. The “zeroing” of Putin’s presidential terms enhances certainty for himself by fostering uncertainty for others. But there is more to the amendments: Numerous changes are not new, they simply align the constitutional text with subconstitutional powers the presidency…
Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies
This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders re…
Digital ballots, partisan bias
Lukashenka’s Constitutional Plebiscite and the Polarization of Belarusian Society
Aliaksandr Lukashenka pushed through an overhaul of Belarus’s constitution as a response to the protests against the official results of the 2020 presidential election. The goal was to address the desire for change among the population without reacting to the demand for snap elections. With the February 2022 constitutional plebiscite on the most far-ranging changes to Belarus’s constitution since 1994, Lukashenka further entrenched himself in pow…
The Tail Wagging the Dog? Top-down and Bottom-up Explanations for Bureaucratic Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes
The paper investigates the link between the sub-national variation of political regimes in a (at the federal level) non-democratic country and the appointments of federal officials in the sub-national provinces. In particular, we look at the appointment of the chief federal inspectors to the regions in Putin’s Russia in 2000–2012. Our main research question is whether appointment patterns can be explained by top-down concerns of the central gover…
The institutionalization of relative advantage
What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far flung patron-client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presiden…
The Tail Wagging the Dog? Top-down and Bottom-up Explanations for Bureaucratic Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes
The paper investigates the link between the sub-national variation of political regimes in a (at the federal level) non-democratic country and the appointments of federal officials in the sub-national provinces. In particular, we look at the appointment of the chief federal inspectors to the regions in Putin’s Russia in 2000–2012. Our main research question is whether appointment patterns can be explained by top-down concerns of the central gover…
Diktatur ist unser Markenzeichen“
For a long time, Belarus was considered an exemplary case of a stable authoritarian regime. For 26 years, the country has been ruled by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The central organisational principle of the ruling elite is a single-pyramid network, with Lukashenka at the top. From this position, he was able to prevent rival factions from gaining access to power resources. Despite a major political crisis in the country and ongoing protests after the …
Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies
This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders re…
Institutionalizing Personalism
The 2020 constitutional changes considerably increase presidential powers while sending mixed signals about presidential transition. The main driver of the amendments were term limits. The “zeroing” of Putin’s presidential terms enhances certainty for himself by fostering uncertainty for others. But there is more to the amendments: Numerous changes are not new, they simply align the constitutional text with subconstitutional powers the presidency…
Vladimir Putin
Russia’s political system is highly personalised. All relevant decisions, including the war against Ukraine, are made by autocrat Vladimir Putin. Despite defeats on the battlefield, his regime appears stable. But the war reveals the paradox of personalised rule: Putin claims that the “special military operation” was necessary to forestall a larger war that the United States had planned against Russia. He admits weaknesses, but claims Russia will …
Lukashenka’s Constitutional Plebiscite and the Polarization of Belarusian Society
Aliaksandr Lukashenka pushed through an overhaul of Belarus’s constitution as a response to the protests against the official results of the 2020 presidential election. The goal was to address the desire for change among the population without reacting to the demand for snap elections. With the February 2022 constitutional plebiscite on the most far-ranging changes to Belarus’s constitution since 1994, Lukashenka further entrenched himself in pow…
Digital ballots, partisan bias
Can Germany learn from Ukraine? Resilience in a time of polycrisis
Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Democracy (6 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Authoritarianism (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Presidential system (4 works)