Licia Bobzien
Biographic Data
| ID | 4207319 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Licia Bobzien |
| GIVEN NAMES | Licia |
| FAMILY NAME | Bobzien |
| SIGNATURE | BOBZIEN L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Potsdam |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2274-509X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 36 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Does the TikTok Feed Lean Right? Exposure to Political Content Among Non-Partisan Users in Germany
We evaluated disparities in exposure to partisan content among new, nonpartisan TikTok users. We performed a sock puppet audit using 118 automated users in Germany ahead of three regional elections in 2024 and the federal election in 2025 (N = 266.161 videos). The design allowed us to account for past individual user behavior, user networks, location, and time. Overall, general political content constitutes 5%–7% of nonpolitical user feeds in our…
Visualizing Age-Specific Digital Platform Usage in Germany
This visualization explores age-specific digital platform use among the German population, aged 18 to 74 years, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Innovation Sample. Focusing on time spent on social media, we show that nearly everyone uses digital platforms on a regular basis, with younger users spending significantly more time online. Moreover, YouTube is quite popular across all age groups, while younger users spend more time on pl…
How much for whom? Explaining preferences for welfare benefits to short-time workers and the unemployed
In response to labour-market crises, governments routinely adopt ‘short-time’ work schemes which supplement the incomes of workers who might otherwise be laid off. Such schemes increase the number of welfare recipients but could also lead to increased competition among different types of welfare claimants. We draw on data from an online panel survey fielded in Austria during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022) to study individual preferences for fi…
Taxed fairly? How differences in perception shape attitudes towards progressive taxation
Empirically, the poor are more likely to support increases in the level of tax progressivity than the rich. Such income-stratified tax preferences can result from differences in preferences of what should be taxed as argued by previous literature. However, it may also result from income-stratified perceptions of what is taxed. This paper argues that the rich perceive higher levels of tax progressivity than the poor and that tax perceptions affect…
Income Inequality and Political Trust
Political trust-in terms of trust in political institutions-is an important precondition for the functioning and stability of democracy. One widely studied determinant of political trust is income inequality. While the empirical finding that societies with lower levels of income inequality have higher levels of trust is well established, the exact ways in which income inequality affects political trust remain unclear. Past research has shown that…
Polarized perceptions, polarized preferences? Understanding the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution
When studying the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution, it is often assumed – either implicitly or explicitly – that individuals are informed about actual levels of inequality. Newer research, however, challenges this assumption and shows that perceived inequality differs from actual inequality. Empirically, these inequality perceptions are rather good predictors for preferences for redistribution. This article argue…
Polarized perceptions, polarized preferences? Understanding the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution
When studying the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution, it is often assumed – either implicitly or explicitly – that individuals are informed about actual levels of inequality. Newer research, however, challenges this assumption and shows that perceived inequality differs from actual inequality. Empirically, these inequality perceptions are rather good predictors for preferences for redistribution. This article argue…
Income Inequality and Political Trust
Political trust-in terms of trust in political institutions-is an important precondition for the functioning and stability of democracy. One widely studied determinant of political trust is income inequality. While the empirical finding that societies with lower levels of income inequality have higher levels of trust is well established, the exact ways in which income inequality affects political trust remain unclear. Past research has shown that…
Taxed fairly? How differences in perception shape attitudes towards progressive taxation
Empirically, the poor are more likely to support increases in the level of tax progressivity than the rich. Such income-stratified tax preferences can result from differences in preferences of what should be taxed as argued by previous literature. However, it may also result from income-stratified perceptions of what is taxed. This paper argues that the rich perceive higher levels of tax progressivity than the poor and that tax perceptions affect…
Polarized perceptions, polarized preferences? Understanding the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution
When studying the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution, it is often assumed – either implicitly or explicitly – that individuals are informed about actual levels of inequality. Newer research, however, challenges this assumption and shows that perceived inequality differs from actual inequality. Empirically, these inequality perceptions are rather good predictors for preferences for redistribution. This article argue…
Income Inequality and Political Trust
Political trust-in terms of trust in political institutions-is an important precondition for the functioning and stability of democracy. One widely studied determinant of political trust is income inequality. While the empirical finding that societies with lower levels of income inequality have higher levels of trust is well established, the exact ways in which income inequality affects political trust remain unclear. Past research has shown that…
How much for whom? Explaining preferences for welfare benefits to short-time workers and the unemployed
In response to labour-market crises, governments routinely adopt ‘short-time’ work schemes which supplement the incomes of workers who might otherwise be laid off. Such schemes increase the number of welfare recipients but could also lead to increased competition among different types of welfare claimants. We draw on data from an online panel survey fielded in Austria during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022) to study individual preferences for fi…
Taxed fairly? How differences in perception shape attitudes towards progressive taxation
Empirically, the poor are more likely to support increases in the level of tax progressivity than the rich. Such income-stratified tax preferences can result from differences in preferences of what should be taxed as argued by previous literature. However, it may also result from income-stratified perceptions of what is taxed. This paper argues that the rich perceive higher levels of tax progressivity than the poor and that tax perceptions affect…
Visualizing Age-Specific Digital Platform Usage in Germany
This visualization explores age-specific digital platform use among the German population, aged 18 to 74 years, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Innovation Sample. Focusing on time spent on social media, we show that nearly everyone uses digital platforms on a regular basis, with younger users spending significantly more time online. Moreover, YouTube is quite popular across all age groups, while younger users spend more time on pl…
Does the TikTok Feed Lean Right? Exposure to Political Content Among Non-Partisan Users in Germany
We evaluated disparities in exposure to partisan content among new, nonpartisan TikTok users. We performed a sock puppet audit using 118 automated users in Germany ahead of three regional elections in 2024 and the federal election in 2025 (N = 266.161 videos). The design allowed us to account for past individual user behavior, user networks, location, and time. Overall, general political content constitutes 5%–7% of nonpolitical user feeds in our…
Demographic economics (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Perception (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Economic inequality (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Inequality (2 works) · Labour economics (2 works) · Politics (2 works)