Wolfgang Steinel
Biographic Data
| ID | 4231682 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Wolfgang Steinel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Wolfgang |
| FAMILY NAME | Steinel |
| SIGNATURE | STEINEL W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Leiden University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 135 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
(Dis)honesty in the face of uncertain gains or losses
We examine dishonest behavior in the face of potential uncertain gains and losses in three pre-studies (N = 150, N = 225, N = 188) and a main study (N = 240). Ample research has shown that people cheat when presented with the opportunity. We use a die-under-cup paradigm, in which participants could dishonestly report a private die roll and thereby increase the odds to obtain a desired outcome. Results showed that the framing of the uncertain situ…
Effects of power on negotiations: A comparison of collaborative versus competitive approach
Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, the authors state oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. This study further investigates the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e. topics that touch on one’s power positi…
Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement
While organizations strive for ethical conduct, the activity of negotiating offers strong temptations to employ unethical tactics and secure benefits for one’s own party. In four experiments, we examined the role of constituency communication in terms of their attitudes towards (un)ethical and competitive conduct on negotiators’ willingness and actual use of unethical tactics. We find that the mere presence of a constituency already increased rep…
Uncertain lies: How payoff uncertainty affects dishonesty
Too good to be true: Suspicion-based rejections of high offers
It is a common belief that high offers are more readily accepted than low offers. In contrast to this general notion, the current set of studies shows that there is a limit to the beneficial effects of making high offers and that becoming too generous may backfire. This paradoxical finding is observed when offers are made in an ambiguous situation of asymmetric information. In three studies, we found that when bargaining opponents had private inf…
Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining
International audience
How intragroup dynamics affect behavior in intergroup conflict: The role of group norms, prototypicality, and need to belong
This study explores the role of intragroup dynamics in intergroup conflict. In a computer-mediated negotiation experiment (N = 107), we investigated how a group representative’s standing in the group, group norm, and the representative’s need to belong influence behavior in intergroup negotiations. We hypothesized that the extent to which peripheral representatives adhere to group norms is contingent on their need to belong, whereas prototypical …
Disappointed in you, angry about your offer: Distinct negative emotions induce concessions via different mechanisms
A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires
Previous research on the communication of emotions has suggested that bargainers obtain higher outcomes if they communicate anger than if they communicate happiness because anger signals higher limits, which in turn leads opponents to give in. Building on a social functional account of communicated emotions, the authors demonstrate that the behavioral consequences of communicated anger strongly depend on structural characteristics of the bargaini…
Effects of Experience and Advice on Process and Performance in Negotiations
This experiment ( N = 68 dyads) tested the influence of experience and advice on behavior and joint outcomes in integrative two-party negotiations. Dyads in an advice condition received short tactical advice to question fixed-pie assumptions and to exchange information. Afterward, they negotiated once. Dyads in an experience condition negotiated twice in successive rounds. Finally, dyads in an experience-and-advice condition negotiated twice and …
Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation
Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making
In 4 experiments, the authors studied the influence of social motives on deception and strategic misrepresentation. In a newly developed information provision game, individuals faced a decision maker whose decision would affect both own and other's outcomes. By withholding information or by giving (in)accurate information about payoffs, participants could try to influence other's decision making. Less accurate and more inaccurate information was …
Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation
Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountab…
Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation
Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountab…
A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires
Previous research on the communication of emotions has suggested that bargainers obtain higher outcomes if they communicate anger than if they communicate happiness because anger signals higher limits, which in turn leads opponents to give in. Building on a social functional account of communicated emotions, the authors demonstrate that the behavioral consequences of communicated anger strongly depend on structural characteristics of the bargaini…
Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making
In 4 experiments, the authors studied the influence of social motives on deception and strategic misrepresentation. In a newly developed information provision game, individuals faced a decision maker whose decision would affect both own and other's outcomes. By withholding information or by giving (in)accurate information about payoffs, participants could try to influence other's decision making. Less accurate and more inaccurate information was …
How intragroup dynamics affect behavior in intergroup conflict: The role of group norms, prototypicality, and need to belong
This study explores the role of intragroup dynamics in intergroup conflict. In a computer-mediated negotiation experiment (N = 107), we investigated how a group representative’s standing in the group, group norm, and the representative’s need to belong influence behavior in intergroup negotiations. We hypothesized that the extent to which peripheral representatives adhere to group norms is contingent on their need to belong, whereas prototypical …
Disappointed in you, angry about your offer: Distinct negative emotions induce concessions via different mechanisms
Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation
(Dis)honesty in the face of uncertain gains or losses
We examine dishonest behavior in the face of potential uncertain gains and losses in three pre-studies (N = 150, N = 225, N = 188) and a main study (N = 240). Ample research has shown that people cheat when presented with the opportunity. We use a die-under-cup paradigm, in which participants could dishonestly report a private die roll and thereby increase the odds to obtain a desired outcome. Results showed that the framing of the uncertain situ…
Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining
International audience
Uncertain lies: How payoff uncertainty affects dishonesty
Too good to be true: Suspicion-based rejections of high offers
It is a common belief that high offers are more readily accepted than low offers. In contrast to this general notion, the current set of studies shows that there is a limit to the beneficial effects of making high offers and that becoming too generous may backfire. This paradoxical finding is observed when offers are made in an ambiguous situation of asymmetric information. In three studies, we found that when bargaining opponents had private inf…
Effects of Experience and Advice on Process and Performance in Negotiations
This experiment ( N = 68 dyads) tested the influence of experience and advice on behavior and joint outcomes in integrative two-party negotiations. Dyads in an advice condition received short tactical advice to question fixed-pie assumptions and to exchange information. Afterward, they negotiated once. Dyads in an experience condition negotiated twice in successive rounds. Finally, dyads in an experience-and-advice condition negotiated twice and …
Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation
Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountab…
Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making
In 4 experiments, the authors studied the influence of social motives on deception and strategic misrepresentation. In a newly developed information provision game, individuals faced a decision maker whose decision would affect both own and other's outcomes. By withholding information or by giving (in)accurate information about payoffs, participants could try to influence other's decision making. Less accurate and more inaccurate information was …
Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation
Effects of Experience and Advice on Process and Performance in Negotiations
This experiment ( N = 68 dyads) tested the influence of experience and advice on behavior and joint outcomes in integrative two-party negotiations. Dyads in an advice condition received short tactical advice to question fixed-pie assumptions and to exchange information. Afterward, they negotiated once. Dyads in an experience condition negotiated twice in successive rounds. Finally, dyads in an experience-and-advice condition negotiated twice and …
A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires
Previous research on the communication of emotions has suggested that bargainers obtain higher outcomes if they communicate anger than if they communicate happiness because anger signals higher limits, which in turn leads opponents to give in. Building on a social functional account of communicated emotions, the authors demonstrate that the behavioral consequences of communicated anger strongly depend on structural characteristics of the bargaini…
How intragroup dynamics affect behavior in intergroup conflict: The role of group norms, prototypicality, and need to belong
This study explores the role of intragroup dynamics in intergroup conflict. In a computer-mediated negotiation experiment (N = 107), we investigated how a group representative’s standing in the group, group norm, and the representative’s need to belong influence behavior in intergroup negotiations. We hypothesized that the extent to which peripheral representatives adhere to group norms is contingent on their need to belong, whereas prototypical …
Disappointed in you, angry about your offer: Distinct negative emotions induce concessions via different mechanisms
Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining
International audience
Too good to be true: Suspicion-based rejections of high offers
It is a common belief that high offers are more readily accepted than low offers. In contrast to this general notion, the current set of studies shows that there is a limit to the beneficial effects of making high offers and that becoming too generous may backfire. This paradoxical finding is observed when offers are made in an ambiguous situation of asymmetric information. In three studies, we found that when bargaining opponents had private inf…
Uncertain lies: How payoff uncertainty affects dishonesty
Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement
While organizations strive for ethical conduct, the activity of negotiating offers strong temptations to employ unethical tactics and secure benefits for one’s own party. In four experiments, we examined the role of constituency communication in terms of their attitudes towards (un)ethical and competitive conduct on negotiators’ willingness and actual use of unethical tactics. We find that the mere presence of a constituency already increased rep…
Effects of power on negotiations: A comparison of collaborative versus competitive approach
Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, the authors state oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. This study further investigates the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e. topics that touch on one’s power positi…
(Dis)honesty in the face of uncertain gains or losses
We examine dishonest behavior in the face of potential uncertain gains and losses in three pre-studies (N = 150, N = 225, N = 188) and a main study (N = 240). Ample research has shown that people cheat when presented with the opportunity. We use a die-under-cup paradigm, in which participants could dishonestly report a private die roll and thereby increase the odds to obtain a desired outcome. Results showed that the framing of the uncertain situ…
Psychology (12 works) · Social Psychology (12 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (10 works) · Social Psychology (9 works) · Conflict Management and Negotiation (7 works) · Negotiation (7 works) · Economics (5 works) · Social and Intergroup Psychology (5 works) · Political science (4 works) · Sociology (4 works)