Corey Cusimano
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4236235 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Corey Cusimano |
| NOMBRES | Corey |
| APELLIDO | Cusimano |
| FIRMA | CUSIMANO C |
| AFILIACIONES | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4980-7839 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
People's judgments of humans and robots in a classic moral dilemma
People recognize and condone their own morally motivated reasoning
People often engage in biased reasoning, favoring some beliefs over others even when the result is a departure from impartial or evidence-based reasoning. Psychologists have long assumed that people are unaware of these biases and operate under an "illusion of objectivity." We identify an important domain of life in which people harbor little illusion about their biases - when they are biased for moral reasons. For instance, people endorse and fe…
Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief
When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one's friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday si…
People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do
People think other individuals have considerable control over what they believe. However, no work to date has investigated how people judge their own belief control, nor whether such judgments diverge from their judgments of others. We addressed this gap in 7 studies and found that people judge others to be more able to voluntarily change what they believe than they themselves are. This occurs when people judge others who disagree with them (Stud…
People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do
People think other individuals have considerable control over what they believe. However, no work to date has investigated how people judge their own belief control, nor whether such judgments diverge from their judgments of others. We addressed this gap in 7 studies and found that people judge others to be more able to voluntarily change what they believe than they themselves are. This occurs when people judge others who disagree with them (Stud…
People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do
People think other individuals have considerable control over what they believe. However, no work to date has investigated how people judge their own belief control, nor whether such judgments diverge from their judgments of others. We addressed this gap in 7 studies and found that people judge others to be more able to voluntarily change what they believe than they themselves are. This occurs when people judge others who disagree with them (Stud…
Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief
When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one's friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday si…
People recognize and condone their own morally motivated reasoning
People often engage in biased reasoning, favoring some beliefs over others even when the result is a departure from impartial or evidence-based reasoning. Psychologists have long assumed that people are unaware of these biases and operate under an "illusion of objectivity." We identify an important domain of life in which people harbor little illusion about their biases - when they are biased for moral reasons. For instance, people endorse and fe…
People's judgments of humans and robots in a classic moral dilemma
Psychology (4 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Epistemology (3 obras) · Moral reasoning (3 obras) · Social and Intergroup Psychology (3 obras) · Cognitive psychology (2 obras) · Dilemma (2 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 obras) · Moral disengagement (2 obras)