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Tessa Provins

Biographic Data

ID4247811
NAMETessa Provins
GIVEN NAMESTessa
FAMILY NAMEProvins
SIGNATUREPROVINS T
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Pittsburgh
ORCID0000-0001-9115-8732
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS9
WORKS AS AUTHOR8
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX2
  • The Illusion of Accountability

    Open Access•Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Political Science Quarterly•2025

  • Lights Out

    Open Access•Srinivas C Parinandi, Katherine Sevin et al.•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 21

    In the United States, state governments play an essential role in balancing the interests of consumers and electricity providers. While scholars have explored how regulations are crafted, less attention has been paid to the impact of regulation, particularly on the disadvantaged. By analyzing data on over two decades of disconnections, we find that investor-owned utilities have significantly lower disconnection rates than municipal utilities, des…

  • What Explains Party Unity? Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures

    Open Access•Nicholas O Howard, Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2024•References: 24

    Party unity is central to studying legislative politics and explaining the organization of legislative chambers, passage of policy, and even electoral outcomes. Its effect has been shown at the subnational, national, and international levels. While party unity has been used to explain many phenomena in legislative politics, there is much less known about the determinants of party unity, especially at the subnational level. We leverage a dataset o…

  • The political economy of climate action in Indian Country

    Open Access•Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2024•References: 41

  • Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Nathan W Monroe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2023•References: 28

    The literature on congressional decision-making has largely ignored the influence of the minority party in the legislative process. This follows from the widely held belief that the majority party dominates the agenda-setting process. Though the minority party rarely achieves major policy success in Congress, we argue that the minority has significantly more influence over the legislative agenda than is commonly believed. We posit that, under som…

  • Hurdles to inference

    Open Access•David Fortunato, Matthew V Hibbing et al.•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Objective Various shirking behaviors in survey-taking can inhibit researchers' ability to draw unbiased inferences from the resulting data. We define three types of shirking behavior, identify their demographic correlates among survey respondents, show how shirking may lead to biased or incorrect inferences, and offer suggestions for navigating these threats. Methods We analyze responses from a large (N=3,256), representative survey of Americans,…

  • Allocating Costly Influence in Legislatures

    Tessa Provins, Nathan W Monroe et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 53

    Committee seats endow holders with both policy influence and labor obligation. These benefits and costs present the organizational majority with an interesting choice: how many seats should it allocate to the opposition? We present a theoretical framework for understanding the allocation of committee seats by the majority coalition that incorporates both procedural and electoral concerns in the decision calculus and predict that when the majority…

  • Compensation, Opportunity, and Information

    Open Access•David Fortunato, Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2017•Cited by: 5•References: 33

    We present a parsimonious framework for understanding contextual variation in legislative nonresponse. We argue that legislators’ propensity to vote is a function of their willingness and ability to be physically present in the chamber and determine the best position to take on a given proposal. From this framework, we derive four hypotheses regarding the compensation legislators receive, their opportunity to pursue work outside of the chamber, a…

  • Compensation, Opportunity, and Information

    Open Access•David Fortunato, Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2017•Cited by: 5•References: 33

    We present a parsimonious framework for understanding contextual variation in legislative nonresponse. We argue that legislators’ propensity to vote is a function of their willingness and ability to be physically present in the chamber and determine the best position to take on a given proposal. From this framework, we derive four hypotheses regarding the compensation legislators receive, their opportunity to pursue work outside of the chamber, a…

  • Allocating Costly Influence in Legislatures

    Tessa Provins, Nathan W Monroe et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 53

    Committee seats endow holders with both policy influence and labor obligation. These benefits and costs present the organizational majority with an interesting choice: how many seats should it allocate to the opposition? We present a theoretical framework for understanding the allocation of committee seats by the majority coalition that incorporates both procedural and electoral concerns in the decision calculus and predict that when the majority…

  • Lights Out

    Open Access•Srinivas C Parinandi, Katherine Sevin et al.•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 21

    In the United States, state governments play an essential role in balancing the interests of consumers and electricity providers. While scholars have explored how regulations are crafted, less attention has been paid to the impact of regulation, particularly on the disadvantaged. By analyzing data on over two decades of disconnections, we find that investor-owned utilities have significantly lower disconnection rates than municipal utilities, des…

  • Hurdles to inference

    Open Access•David Fortunato, Matthew V Hibbing et al.•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Objective Various shirking behaviors in survey-taking can inhibit researchers' ability to draw unbiased inferences from the resulting data. We define three types of shirking behavior, identify their demographic correlates among survey respondents, show how shirking may lead to biased or incorrect inferences, and offer suggestions for navigating these threats. Methods We analyze responses from a large (N=3,256), representative survey of Americans,…

  • Compensation, Opportunity, and Information

    Open Access•David Fortunato, Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2017•Cited by: 5•References: 33

    We present a parsimonious framework for understanding contextual variation in legislative nonresponse. We argue that legislators’ propensity to vote is a function of their willingness and ability to be physically present in the chamber and determine the best position to take on a given proposal. From this framework, we derive four hypotheses regarding the compensation legislators receive, their opportunity to pursue work outside of the chamber, a…

  • Hurdles to inference

    Open Access•David Fortunato, Matthew V Hibbing et al.•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Objective Various shirking behaviors in survey-taking can inhibit researchers' ability to draw unbiased inferences from the resulting data. We define three types of shirking behavior, identify their demographic correlates among survey respondents, show how shirking may lead to biased or incorrect inferences, and offer suggestions for navigating these threats. Methods We analyze responses from a large (N=3,256), representative survey of Americans,…

  • Allocating Costly Influence in Legislatures

    Tessa Provins, Nathan W Monroe et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2022•Cited by: 2•References: 53

    Committee seats endow holders with both policy influence and labor obligation. These benefits and costs present the organizational majority with an interesting choice: how many seats should it allocate to the opposition? We present a theoretical framework for understanding the allocation of committee seats by the majority coalition that incorporates both procedural and electoral concerns in the decision calculus and predict that when the majority…

  • Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress

    Open Access•J A Jenkins, Nathan W Monroe et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2023•References: 28

    The literature on congressional decision-making has largely ignored the influence of the minority party in the legislative process. This follows from the widely held belief that the majority party dominates the agenda-setting process. Though the minority party rarely achieves major policy success in Congress, we argue that the minority has significantly more influence over the legislative agenda than is commonly believed. We posit that, under som…

  • What Explains Party Unity? Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures

    Open Access•Nicholas O Howard, Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2024•References: 24

    Party unity is central to studying legislative politics and explaining the organization of legislative chambers, passage of policy, and even electoral outcomes. Its effect has been shown at the subnational, national, and international levels. While party unity has been used to explain many phenomena in legislative politics, there is much less known about the determinants of party unity, especially at the subnational level. We leverage a dataset o…

  • The political economy of climate action in Indian Country

    Open Access•Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2024•References: 41

  • The Illusion of Accountability

    Open Access•Tessa Provins•ARTICLE•Political Science Quarterly•2025

  • Lights Out

    Open Access•Srinivas C Parinandi, Katherine Sevin et al.•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2025•Cited by: 1•References: 21

    In the United States, state governments play an essential role in balancing the interests of consumers and electricity providers. While scholars have explored how regulations are crafted, less attention has been paid to the impact of regulation, particularly on the disadvantaged. By analyzing data on over two decades of disconnections, we find that investor-owned utilities have significantly lower disconnection rates than municipal utilities, des…

Political science (8 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Legislature (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works)

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