Darren L Linvill
Biographic Data
| ID | 4266977 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Darren L Linvill |
| GIVEN NAMES | Darren L |
| FAMILY NAME | Linvill |
| SIGNATURE | LINVILL D L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Clemson University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 58 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Content camouflage
Social media trolls as faux third-party agents of image repair
This study examines trolls affiliated with the People's Republic of China (PRC) that targeted conversations around former Houston Rockets' General Manager Daryl Morey, who tweeted support for Hong Kong protests and apologized in October 2019.Researchers coded 5,800 tweets to inform a machine-learning approach examining a corpus of over 163,000 tweets.Findings suggested that a PRC disinformation campaign was organized as a faux third-party image r…
Mapping the messenger
We analyzed message board content originating with the online persona “Q,” leader of the right-wing conspiracy community known as QAnon. We qualitatively placed all of Q’s messages into one of five qualitatively derived categories: allusion to hidden knowledge, undermining institutions and individuals, inspirational, administration and security, and call to action. Further analysis of how these categories are used by Q over time illustrates how t…
Talking to Trolls—How Users Respond to a Coordinated Information Operation and Why They’re So Supportive
This research explored how users interacted with inauthentic social media accounts with the goal of gaining insight into tactics employed by state-backed disinformation efforts. We combine hand coding with natural-language processing to measure the ways in which users talked with and about the accounts employed by the Russian-affiliated Internet Research Agency in the month before the 2016 U.S. Election. We find that user mentions were overwhelmi…
Inauthentic Newsfeeds and Agenda Setting in a Coordinated Inauthentic Information Operation
The 2015–2017 Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA)’s coordinated information operation is one of the earliest and most studied of the social media age. A set of 38 city-specific inauthentic “newsfeeds” made up a large, underanalyzed part of its English-language output. We label 1,000 tweets from the IRA newsfeeds and a matched set of real news sources from those same cities with up to five labels indicating the tweet represents a world in unres…
Troll Factories
We document methods employed by Russia’s Internet Research Agency to influence the political agenda of the United States from September 9, 2009 to June 21, 2018. We qualitatively and quantitatively analyze Twitter accounts with known IRA affiliation to better understand the form and function of Russian efforts. We identified five handle categories: Right Troll, Left Troll, News Feed, Hashtag Gamer, and Fearmonger. Within each type, accounts were …
College Students and Yik Yak
This study, employing an exploratory mixed-methods approach, explores college students’ use of Yik Yak, a pseudo-anonymous social media platform that allows users to post short messages and engage primarily with other nearby users. Study 1 qualitatively examined student uses and perceptions of the app through 12 in-depth interviews with Yik Yak users. Study 2 conducted a content analysis of yaks ( N = 3,905) from 24 colleges and universities to g…
Troll Factories
We document methods employed by Russia’s Internet Research Agency to influence the political agenda of the United States from September 9, 2009 to June 21, 2018. We qualitatively and quantitatively analyze Twitter accounts with known IRA affiliation to better understand the form and function of Russian efforts. We identified five handle categories: Right Troll, Left Troll, News Feed, Hashtag Gamer, and Fearmonger. Within each type, accounts were …
Inauthentic Newsfeeds and Agenda Setting in a Coordinated Inauthentic Information Operation
The 2015–2017 Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA)’s coordinated information operation is one of the earliest and most studied of the social media age. A set of 38 city-specific inauthentic “newsfeeds” made up a large, underanalyzed part of its English-language output. We label 1,000 tweets from the IRA newsfeeds and a matched set of real news sources from those same cities with up to five labels indicating the tweet represents a world in unres…
College Students and Yik Yak
This study, employing an exploratory mixed-methods approach, explores college students’ use of Yik Yak, a pseudo-anonymous social media platform that allows users to post short messages and engage primarily with other nearby users. Study 1 qualitatively examined student uses and perceptions of the app through 12 in-depth interviews with Yik Yak users. Study 2 conducted a content analysis of yaks ( N = 3,905) from 24 colleges and universities to g…
College Students and Yik Yak
This study, employing an exploratory mixed-methods approach, explores college students’ use of Yik Yak, a pseudo-anonymous social media platform that allows users to post short messages and engage primarily with other nearby users. Study 1 qualitatively examined student uses and perceptions of the app through 12 in-depth interviews with Yik Yak users. Study 2 conducted a content analysis of yaks ( N = 3,905) from 24 colleges and universities to g…
Troll Factories
We document methods employed by Russia’s Internet Research Agency to influence the political agenda of the United States from September 9, 2009 to June 21, 2018. We qualitatively and quantitatively analyze Twitter accounts with known IRA affiliation to better understand the form and function of Russian efforts. We identified five handle categories: Right Troll, Left Troll, News Feed, Hashtag Gamer, and Fearmonger. Within each type, accounts were …
Mapping the messenger
We analyzed message board content originating with the online persona “Q,” leader of the right-wing conspiracy community known as QAnon. We qualitatively placed all of Q’s messages into one of five qualitatively derived categories: allusion to hidden knowledge, undermining institutions and individuals, inspirational, administration and security, and call to action. Further analysis of how these categories are used by Q over time illustrates how t…
Talking to Trolls—How Users Respond to a Coordinated Information Operation and Why They’re So Supportive
This research explored how users interacted with inauthentic social media accounts with the goal of gaining insight into tactics employed by state-backed disinformation efforts. We combine hand coding with natural-language processing to measure the ways in which users talked with and about the accounts employed by the Russian-affiliated Internet Research Agency in the month before the 2016 U.S. Election. We find that user mentions were overwhelmi…
Inauthentic Newsfeeds and Agenda Setting in a Coordinated Inauthentic Information Operation
The 2015–2017 Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA)’s coordinated information operation is one of the earliest and most studied of the social media age. A set of 38 city-specific inauthentic “newsfeeds” made up a large, underanalyzed part of its English-language output. We label 1,000 tweets from the IRA newsfeeds and a matched set of real news sources from those same cities with up to five labels indicating the tweet represents a world in unres…
Social media trolls as faux third-party agents of image repair
This study examines trolls affiliated with the People's Republic of China (PRC) that targeted conversations around former Houston Rockets' General Manager Daryl Morey, who tweeted support for Hong Kong protests and apologized in October 2019.Researchers coded 5,800 tweets to inform a machine-learning approach examining a corpus of over 163,000 tweets.Findings suggested that a PRC disinformation campaign was organized as a faux third-party image r…
Content camouflage
Social media (7 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Misinformation and Its Impacts (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · World Wide Web (5 works) · Disinformation (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Agency (philosophy (3 works)