Johannes Kleibl
Biographic Data
| ID | 4268481 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Johannes Kleibl |
| GIVEN NAMES | Johannes |
| FAMILY NAME | Kleibl |
| SIGNATURE | KLEIBL J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Essex |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Coercion and the Global Spread of Securities Regulation
Securities laws, overseen by independent regulatory agencies, have spread around the world. This article argues that coercion has played a more critical role in the spread of regulatory models than previously acknowledged. In particular, I argue that globally integrated markets can provide powerful regulators and governments with strong incentives to actively promote the export of their regulatory models. Case study evidence and the analysis of a…
The Politics of Financial Regulatory Agency Replacement
As the global financial crisis has shown, regulatory agencies can at times spectacularly fail to fulfill their regulatory mandates. Yet, the conditions under which governments respond to regulatory failures by terminating and replacing their regulatory agencies have so far remained largely unclear. This article offers an explanation for the significant variation in governments' propensities to dismantle and replace their banking regulatory agenci…
Tertiarization, Industrial Adjustment, and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid1
This paper explains the varying degrees to which commercial interests or recipients' development needs shape donor governments' foreign aid allocation decisions. I argue that domestic interest group politics is a major driver of the heterogeneity in donors' aid allocation policies. As proxy measures of donor governments' dependence on the political support of industrial producer lobbies and their susceptibility to the demands of development inter…
A global risk assessment model for civil wars
The Politics of Financial Regulatory Agency Replacement
As the global financial crisis has shown, regulatory agencies can at times spectacularly fail to fulfill their regulatory mandates. Yet, the conditions under which governments respond to regulatory failures by terminating and replacing their regulatory agencies have so far remained largely unclear. This article offers an explanation for the significant variation in governments' propensities to dismantle and replace their banking regulatory agenci…
A global risk assessment model for civil wars
Tertiarization, Industrial Adjustment, and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid1
This paper explains the varying degrees to which commercial interests or recipients' development needs shape donor governments' foreign aid allocation decisions. I argue that domestic interest group politics is a major driver of the heterogeneity in donors' aid allocation policies. As proxy measures of donor governments' dependence on the political support of industrial producer lobbies and their susceptibility to the demands of development inter…
Coercion and the Global Spread of Securities Regulation
Securities laws, overseen by independent regulatory agencies, have spread around the world. This article argues that coercion has played a more critical role in the spread of regulatory models than previously acknowledged. In particular, I argue that globally integrated markets can provide powerful regulators and governments with strong incentives to actively promote the export of their regulatory models. Case study evidence and the analysis of a…
A global risk assessment model for civil wars
The Politics of Financial Regulatory Agency Replacement
As the global financial crisis has shown, regulatory agencies can at times spectacularly fail to fulfill their regulatory mandates. Yet, the conditions under which governments respond to regulatory failures by terminating and replacing their regulatory agencies have so far remained largely unclear. This article offers an explanation for the significant variation in governments' propensities to dismantle and replace their banking regulatory agenci…
Tertiarization, Industrial Adjustment, and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid1
This paper explains the varying degrees to which commercial interests or recipients' development needs shape donor governments' foreign aid allocation decisions. I argue that domestic interest group politics is a major driver of the heterogeneity in donors' aid allocation policies. As proxy measures of donor governments' dependence on the political support of industrial producer lobbies and their susceptibility to the demands of development inter…
Coercion and the Global Spread of Securities Regulation
Securities laws, overseen by independent regulatory agencies, have spread around the world. This article argues that coercion has played a more critical role in the spread of regulatory models than previously acknowledged. In particular, I argue that globally integrated markets can provide powerful regulators and governments with strong incentives to actively promote the export of their regulatory models. Case study evidence and the analysis of a…
Economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Accounting (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Financial system (2 works) · Global Financial Regulation and Crises (2 works) · Law (2 works)