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Gabrielle Cheung

Biographic Data

ID4269619
NAMEGabrielle Cheung
GIVEN NAMESGabrielle
FAMILY NAMECheung
SIGNATURECHEUNG G
AFFILIATIONSPolitical Science and International Relations, University of Southern California , Los Angeles, CA, USA
ORCID0000-0002-8097-8644
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX1
  • Asymmetric incentives and the new politics of monetary policy

    Open Access•Gene Park, Gabrielle Cheung et al.•ARTICLE•Socio-Economic Review•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 45

    This article develops and tests a theory of asymmetric incentives to explain why politicians might be less motivated to confront deflation than inflation. Leveraging Japan as a least-likely crucial case, we analyze the conditions that lead legislators to take advantage of their power to summon central bankers for questioning. We find that even moderate inflation makes it more likely that legislators will summon central bankers compared to periods…

  • Asymmetric incentives and the new politics of monetary policy

    Open Access•Gene Park, Gabrielle Cheung et al.•ARTICLE•Socio-Economic Review•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 45

    This article develops and tests a theory of asymmetric incentives to explain why politicians might be less motivated to confront deflation than inflation. Leveraging Japan as a least-likely crucial case, we analyze the conditions that lead legislators to take advantage of their power to summon central bankers for questioning. We find that even moderate inflation makes it more likely that legislators will summon central bankers compared to periods…

  • Asymmetric incentives and the new politics of monetary policy

    Open Access•Gene Park, Gabrielle Cheung et al.•ARTICLE•Socio-Economic Review•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 45

    This article develops and tests a theory of asymmetric incentives to explain why politicians might be less motivated to confront deflation than inflation. Leveraging Japan as a least-likely crucial case, we analyze the conditions that lead legislators to take advantage of their power to summon central bankers for questioning. We find that even moderate inflation makes it more likely that legislators will summon central bankers compared to periods…

Central bank (1 work) · Deflation (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (1 work) · Housing Market and Economics (1 work) · Incentive (1 work) · Inflation (cosmology) (1 work) · Inflation targeting (1 work) · Keynesian economics (1 work) · Law (1 work)

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