Noemí Navarro
Biographic Data
| ID | 4270839 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Noemí Navarro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Noemí |
| FAMILY NAME | Navarro |
| SIGNATURE | NAVARRO N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1795-5976 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Negotiating Upstream-Downstream Environmental Agreements
Nous examinons les résultats de deux versions du protocole « Négocier avec ses voisins » pour deux jeux de type amont-aval : le jeu de la digue (Delille et Pereau [2014]) et le jeu des Grands Lacs (Becker et Easter [1999]). Dans ce protocole, des négociations bilatérales ont lieu avec les joueurs situés immédiatement en amont ou en aval (les proches voisins). Alors que dans la première version, les joueurs négocient simultanément les actions et l…
Cooperative Games with Externalities, Marginalism and the Average approach
On welfarism and scale invariance
International audience
Nash solutions for bargaining problems with a reference point
How robust is the equal split? Transferable utility and three-person bargaining in the laboratory
This paper investigates the robustness of equal-split outcomes in unstructured bargaining environments, expanding on classic two-person settings to include payoff transfers and multi-party bargaining. Drawing from experimental data, we find that equal splits persist as a focal solution in two-person bargaining with payoff transfers, even when some potential efficiency gains are left unexploited, likely due to limitations in participants’ cognitiv…
Proficiency, Attitude, and Conventions in Minority Languages
In this article, we study a simple mathematical model of a bilingual community in which all agents are fluent in the majority language but only a fraction of the population has some degree of proficiency in the minority language. We investigate how different distributions of proficiency, combined with the speakers' attitudes toward or against the minority language, may influence its use in pair conversations
Demonstration of power
Demonstration of power
Proficiency, Attitude, and Conventions in Minority Languages
In this article, we study a simple mathematical model of a bilingual community in which all agents are fluent in the majority language but only a fraction of the population has some degree of proficiency in the minority language. We investigate how different distributions of proficiency, combined with the speakers' attitudes toward or against the minority language, may influence its use in pair conversations
Cooperative Games with Externalities, Marginalism and the Average approach
On welfarism and scale invariance
International audience
Nash solutions for bargaining problems with a reference point
How robust is the equal split? Transferable utility and three-person bargaining in the laboratory
This paper investigates the robustness of equal-split outcomes in unstructured bargaining environments, expanding on classic two-person settings to include payoff transfers and multi-party bargaining. Drawing from experimental data, we find that equal splits persist as a focal solution in two-person bargaining with payoff transfers, even when some potential efficiency gains are left unexploited, likely due to limitations in participants’ cognitiv…
Negotiating Upstream-Downstream Environmental Agreements
Nous examinons les résultats de deux versions du protocole « Négocier avec ses voisins » pour deux jeux de type amont-aval : le jeu de la digue (Delille et Pereau [2014]) et le jeu des Grands Lacs (Becker et Easter [1999]). Dans ce protocole, des négociations bilatérales ont lieu avec les joueurs situés immédiatement en amont ou en aval (les proches voisins). Alors que dans la première version, les joueurs négocient simultanément les actions et l…
Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works)