Dawid Sześciło
Biographic Data
| ID | 4275993 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dawid Sześciło |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dawid |
| FAMILY NAME | Sześciło |
| SIGNATURE | SZEŚCIŁO D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warsaw |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1333-7991 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Multi‐level party favoritism
Party favoritism in the distribution of grants is a well‐known mechanism fueling pork‐barrel politics and clientelism. In this paper, we analyze partisan bias in the distribution of the Polish Government Fund for Local Investments (RFIL) and demonstrate implications of party favoritism for the re‐centralization strategy adopted by the right‐wing populist government. We find robust evidence for a substantial bias that favors municipal authorities …
Agencification revisited
Agencification was one of the main pillars of the New Public Management reforms in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. The strong increase in the number of agencies and the extension of their autonomy (especially with regard to independent regulatory agencies) significantly changed the organizational architecture of governments. However, the review of organizational reforms implemented over the past two decades in European administrative systems demon…
From Paris to Venice
Through the adoption of the Venice Principles on the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution, the Venice Commission strives to set a new, more ambitious standard of independence and a mandate for ombudsman institutions across Europe. This article aims at assessing to what extent the Venice Principles offer added value to standards established primarily by the 1993 Paris Principles on the National Human Rights Institutions. It shows …
The Benefits and Risks of Experimental Co‐production
Building on the literature on co‐production and the (pragmatist) literature on experimentalist policy‐making we introduce and evaluate a novel form of co‐production: experimental co‐production. We propose a model of this specific form including a list of not only potential benefits but also possible risks and costs. We illustrate and examine this model of experimental co‐production by drawing on the case study of a major urban planning initiative…
The Benefits and Risks of Experimental Co‐production
Building on the literature on co‐production and the (pragmatist) literature on experimentalist policy‐making we introduce and evaluate a novel form of co‐production: experimental co‐production. We propose a model of this specific form including a list of not only potential benefits but also possible risks and costs. We illustrate and examine this model of experimental co‐production by drawing on the case study of a major urban planning initiative…
Multi‐level party favoritism
Party favoritism in the distribution of grants is a well‐known mechanism fueling pork‐barrel politics and clientelism. In this paper, we analyze partisan bias in the distribution of the Polish Government Fund for Local Investments (RFIL) and demonstrate implications of party favoritism for the re‐centralization strategy adopted by the right‐wing populist government. We find robust evidence for a substantial bias that favors municipal authorities …
Agencification revisited
Agencification was one of the main pillars of the New Public Management reforms in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. The strong increase in the number of agencies and the extension of their autonomy (especially with regard to independent regulatory agencies) significantly changed the organizational architecture of governments. However, the review of organizational reforms implemented over the past two decades in European administrative systems demon…
The Benefits and Risks of Experimental Co‐production
Building on the literature on co‐production and the (pragmatist) literature on experimentalist policy‐making we introduce and evaluate a novel form of co‐production: experimental co‐production. We propose a model of this specific form including a list of not only potential benefits but also possible risks and costs. We illustrate and examine this model of experimental co‐production by drawing on the case study of a major urban planning initiative…
From Paris to Venice
Through the adoption of the Venice Principles on the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution, the Venice Commission strives to set a new, more ambitious standard of independence and a mandate for ombudsman institutions across Europe. This article aims at assessing to what extent the Venice Principles offer added value to standards established primarily by the 1993 Paris Principles on the National Human Rights Institutions. It shows …
Agencification revisited
Agencification was one of the main pillars of the New Public Management reforms in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. The strong increase in the number of agencies and the extension of their autonomy (especially with regard to independent regulatory agencies) significantly changed the organizational architecture of governments. However, the review of organizational reforms implemented over the past two decades in European administrative systems demon…
Multi‐level party favoritism
Party favoritism in the distribution of grants is a well‐known mechanism fueling pork‐barrel politics and clientelism. In this paper, we analyze partisan bias in the distribution of the Polish Government Fund for Local Investments (RFIL) and demonstrate implications of party favoritism for the re‐centralization strategy adopted by the right‐wing populist government. We find robust evidence for a substantial bias that favors municipal authorities …
Business (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Public Administration (2 works) · Public Administration (2 works) · Public Policy and Administration Research (2 works) · Accounting (1 work) · Accounting (1 work)