Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4277900 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu |
| PRENOMES | Peter Shiu-Hwa |
| SOBRENOME | Tsu |
| ASSINATURA | TSU P S |
| AFILIAÇÕES | National Chung Cheng University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0430-1460 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2017 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Embeddedness and the psychological nature of default reason
Particularism is widely conceived to endorse the view that moral reason is context-dependent. This being so, it is often accused of flattening the moral landscape—treating the feature of promise-keeping as constituting no more of a (moral) reason for action than the feature of wearing a yellow shoelace in advance of the considerations of the contexts. In reply, Dancy maintains that his particularism allows some features such as promise-keeping to…
What Doesn’t Kill Primary Reason Atomism Will Only Make It Stronger
Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism
Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a l…
Of Primary Features in Aesthetics
Contemporary analytic aesthetics has seen a heated debate about whether there are general critical principles that determine the merits/demerits of an artwork. The so-called generalists say ‘yes’, whereas the so-called particularists say ‘no’. On the particularists’ view, a feature that is a merit in one artwork might well turn out to be a defect in another, so critical principles purporting to define merits and defects are pretty much in vain. A…
Can Virtue Be Codified
This chapter distinguishes and advances four conceptions of virtue according to how moral rules and virtue interact in a virtuous person's moral reasoning processes: absolute conception, pro tanto conception, prima facie conception, and particularist conception. It argues that this uncodifiability conclusion only obtains under McDowell's specific conception of virtues. The chapter also argues that McDowell's rule-following attack as well as two o…
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Can Virtue Be Codified
This chapter distinguishes and advances four conceptions of virtue according to how moral rules and virtue interact in a virtuous person's moral reasoning processes: absolute conception, pro tanto conception, prima facie conception, and particularist conception. It argues that this uncodifiability conclusion only obtains under McDowell's specific conception of virtues. The chapter also argues that McDowell's rule-following attack as well as two o…
Of Primary Features in Aesthetics
Contemporary analytic aesthetics has seen a heated debate about whether there are general critical principles that determine the merits/demerits of an artwork. The so-called generalists say ‘yes’, whereas the so-called particularists say ‘no’. On the particularists’ view, a feature that is a merit in one artwork might well turn out to be a defect in another, so critical principles purporting to define merits and defects are pretty much in vain. A…
Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism
Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a l…
What Doesn’t Kill Primary Reason Atomism Will Only Make It Stronger
Embeddedness and the psychological nature of default reason
Particularism is widely conceived to endorse the view that moral reason is context-dependent. This being so, it is often accused of flattening the moral landscape—treating the feature of promise-keeping as constituting no more of a (moral) reason for action than the feature of wearing a yellow shoelace in advance of the considerations of the contexts. In reply, Dancy maintains that his particularism allows some features such as promise-keeping to…
Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 obras) · Sociology (3 obras) · Generalist and specialist species (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Virtue (2 obras)