Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Brian Mcelwee

Biographic Data

ID4281569
NAMEBrian Mcelwee
GIVEN NAMESBrian
FAMILY NAMEMcelwee
SIGNATUREMCELWEE B
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Southampton
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS9
TOTAL CITATIONS6
AUTHOR COUNT9
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2010
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX1
  • Right and Wrong

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2024

    Demoralising ethical theory involves eschewing the deontic categories of moral obligation, moral permissibility, and moral impermissibility from our ethical thought. In this paper, I evaluate the case made in Alastair Norcross’s recent book, Morality By Degrees (2020), for a consequentialist version of such demoralisation. Norcross defends scalar consequentialism, a radical variant of consequentialism which restricts fundamental normative verdict…

  • Cost and Psychological Difficulty

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2023

    The demandingness of a moral prescription is generally understood exclusively in terms of the welfare costs involved in complying with that prescription. I argue that psychological difficulty is a second aspect of demandingness, whose relevance cannot be reduced to that of welfare costs. Appeal to psychological difficulty explains intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of favouring oneself over others, favouring loved ones over strangers, an…

  • The Ambitions of Consequentialism

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2020

    Consequentialism is most famously a theory of right action. But many consequentialists assume, and some have explicitly argued, that consequentialism is equally plausible as a direct theory of the right rules, motives, character traits, institutions, and even such things as climates and eye colors. In this paper, I call into question this "Global Consequentialist" extension of consequentialist evaluation beyond the domain of action. Consequential…

  • Demandingness Objections in Ethics

    Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2017•Cited by: 6•References: 14

    It is common for moral philosophers to reject a moral theory on the basis that its verdicts are unreasonably demanding—it requires too much of us to be a correct account of our moral obligations. Even though such objections frequently strike us as convincing, they give rise to two challenges: Are demandingness objections really independent of other objections to moral theories? Do standard demandingness objections not presuppose that costs borne …

  • What Is Demandingness

    Brian Mcelwee•CHAPTER•The limits of moral obligation•2015

    Moral theories are often rejected on the basis of being too demanding. But what is meant by demandingness is generally left unarticulated. Moral philosophy has the potential to uplift us, to inspire us to live better by portraying ideals of virtue or excellence. In much of the philosophical literature, the notion of demandingness is left at an intuitive level. Singer's arguments have been subjected to intense scrutiny, and have given rise to some…

  • The Value of the Virtues

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2014•References: 7

    I argue that debates about virtue are best settled by clearly distinguishing two questions: (a) What sort of character trait is there reason to cultivate? (b) What sort of character trait is there reason (morally) to admire? With this distinction in mind, I focus on recent accounts of what consequentialists ought to say about virtue, arguing that: (1) The instrumentalist view of virtue accepted by many prominent consequentialists should not be ac…

  • Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2011

  • The Appeal of Self-Ownership

    Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Social Theory and Practice•2010

  • Consequentialism and Permissibility

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2010•References: 2

    Scalar consequentialism, recently championed by Alastair Norcross, holds that the value of an action varies according to the goodness of its consequences, but eschews all judgements of moral permissibility and impermissibility. I show that the strongest version of scalar consequentialism is not vulnerable to the objection that it is insufficiently action-guiding. Instead, the principle objection to the scalar view is simply that it leaves out imp…

  • Demandingness Objections in Ethics

    Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2017•Cited by: 6•References: 14

    It is common for moral philosophers to reject a moral theory on the basis that its verdicts are unreasonably demanding—it requires too much of us to be a correct account of our moral obligations. Even though such objections frequently strike us as convincing, they give rise to two challenges: Are demandingness objections really independent of other objections to moral theories? Do standard demandingness objections not presuppose that costs borne …

  • The Appeal of Self-Ownership

    Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Social Theory and Practice•2010

  • Consequentialism and Permissibility

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2010•References: 2

    Scalar consequentialism, recently championed by Alastair Norcross, holds that the value of an action varies according to the goodness of its consequences, but eschews all judgements of moral permissibility and impermissibility. I show that the strongest version of scalar consequentialism is not vulnerable to the objection that it is insufficiently action-guiding. Instead, the principle objection to the scalar view is simply that it leaves out imp…

  • Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2011

  • The Value of the Virtues

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2014•References: 7

    I argue that debates about virtue are best settled by clearly distinguishing two questions: (a) What sort of character trait is there reason to cultivate? (b) What sort of character trait is there reason (morally) to admire? With this distinction in mind, I focus on recent accounts of what consequentialists ought to say about virtue, arguing that: (1) The instrumentalist view of virtue accepted by many prominent consequentialists should not be ac…

  • What Is Demandingness

    Brian Mcelwee•CHAPTER•The limits of moral obligation•2015

    Moral theories are often rejected on the basis of being too demanding. But what is meant by demandingness is generally left unarticulated. Moral philosophy has the potential to uplift us, to inspire us to live better by portraying ideals of virtue or excellence. In much of the philosophical literature, the notion of demandingness is left at an intuitive level. Singer's arguments have been subjected to intense scrutiny, and have given rise to some…

  • Demandingness Objections in Ethics

    Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2017•Cited by: 6•References: 14

    It is common for moral philosophers to reject a moral theory on the basis that its verdicts are unreasonably demanding—it requires too much of us to be a correct account of our moral obligations. Even though such objections frequently strike us as convincing, they give rise to two challenges: Are demandingness objections really independent of other objections to moral theories? Do standard demandingness objections not presuppose that costs borne …

  • The Ambitions of Consequentialism

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2020

    Consequentialism is most famously a theory of right action. But many consequentialists assume, and some have explicitly argued, that consequentialism is equally plausible as a direct theory of the right rules, motives, character traits, institutions, and even such things as climates and eye colors. In this paper, I call into question this "Global Consequentialist" extension of consequentialist evaluation beyond the domain of action. Consequential…

  • Cost and Psychological Difficulty

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Australasian Journal of Philosophy•2023

    The demandingness of a moral prescription is generally understood exclusively in terms of the welfare costs involved in complying with that prescription. I argue that psychological difficulty is a second aspect of demandingness, whose relevance cannot be reduced to that of welfare costs. Appeal to psychological difficulty explains intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of favouring oneself over others, favouring loved ones over strangers, an…

  • Right and Wrong

    Open Access•Brian Mcelwee•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2024

    Demoralising ethical theory involves eschewing the deontic categories of moral obligation, moral permissibility, and moral impermissibility from our ethical thought. In this paper, I evaluate the case made in Alastair Norcross’s recent book, Morality By Degrees (2020), for a consequentialist version of such demoralisation. Norcross defends scalar consequentialism, a radical variant of consequentialism which restricts fundamental normative verdict…

Philosophy (8 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works) · Ethics in medical practice (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Appeal (3 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae