Philip Swenson
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281589 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philip Swenson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philip |
| FAMILY NAME | Swenson |
| SIGNATURE | SWENSON P |
| AFFILIATIONS | William & Mary |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The fine-tuning argument against the multiverse
It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of…
Causation and Responsibility for Omissions
There is a persistently troublesome puzzle concerning the transmission of moral responsibility from actions and omissions to outcomes. On the one hand there are cases of action in which responsibility appears to transmit to an outcome despite the fact that the agent could not have prevented the outcome. On the other hand there are similar cases of omission in which responsibility does not appear to transmit to an outcome. One seemingly plausible …
Risky Thoughts
Equal Moral Opportunity
Many of our common-sense moral judgments seemingly imply the existence of moral luck. I attempt to avoid moral luck while retaining most of these judgments. I defend a view on which agents have moral equality of opportunity. This allows us to account for our anti-moral-luck intuitions at less cost than has been previously recognized
Moral Responsibility Without General Ability
It is widely thought that, to be morally responsible for some action or omission, an agent must have had, at the very least, the general ability to do otherwise. As we argue, however, there are counterexamples to the claim that moral responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise. We present several cases in which agents lack the general ability to do otherwise and yet are intuitively morally responsible for what they do, and we argu…
The Frankfurt Cases and Responsibility for Omissions
In previous work, I presented a challenge for philosophers who appeal to the Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) in order to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). My challenge relied on the claim that there are cases of omitting to act in which the agent is not responsible for her behavior (or lack thereof) and which should yield the same verdict regarding responsibility as the Frankfurt-style cases. In this paper I take a closer l…
Scepticism about the argument from divine hiddenness
Some philosophers have argued that the paucity of evidence for theism – along with basic assumptions about God's nature – is ipso facto evidence for atheism. The resulting argument has come to be known as the argument from divine hiddenness. Theists have challenged both the major and minor premises of the argument by offering defences. However, all of the major, contemporary defences are failures. What unites these failures is instructive: each i…
The Frankfurt Cases and Responsibility for Omissions
In previous work, I presented a challenge for philosophers who appeal to the Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) in order to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). My challenge relied on the claim that there are cases of omitting to act in which the agent is not responsible for her behavior (or lack thereof) and which should yield the same verdict regarding responsibility as the Frankfurt-style cases. In this paper I take a closer l…
Moral Responsibility Without General Ability
It is widely thought that, to be morally responsible for some action or omission, an agent must have had, at the very least, the general ability to do otherwise. As we argue, however, there are counterexamples to the claim that moral responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise. We present several cases in which agents lack the general ability to do otherwise and yet are intuitively morally responsible for what they do, and we argu…
Scepticism about the argument from divine hiddenness
Some philosophers have argued that the paucity of evidence for theism – along with basic assumptions about God's nature – is ipso facto evidence for atheism. The resulting argument has come to be known as the argument from divine hiddenness. Theists have challenged both the major and minor premises of the argument by offering defences. However, all of the major, contemporary defences are failures. What unites these failures is instructive: each i…
The Frankfurt Cases and Responsibility for Omissions
In previous work, I presented a challenge for philosophers who appeal to the Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) in order to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). My challenge relied on the claim that there are cases of omitting to act in which the agent is not responsible for her behavior (or lack thereof) and which should yield the same verdict regarding responsibility as the Frankfurt-style cases. In this paper I take a closer l…
Moral Responsibility Without General Ability
It is widely thought that, to be morally responsible for some action or omission, an agent must have had, at the very least, the general ability to do otherwise. As we argue, however, there are counterexamples to the claim that moral responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise. We present several cases in which agents lack the general ability to do otherwise and yet are intuitively morally responsible for what they do, and we argu…
Equal Moral Opportunity
Many of our common-sense moral judgments seemingly imply the existence of moral luck. I attempt to avoid moral luck while retaining most of these judgments. I defend a view on which agents have moral equality of opportunity. This allows us to account for our anti-moral-luck intuitions at less cost than has been previously recognized
Risky Thoughts
Causation and Responsibility for Omissions
There is a persistently troublesome puzzle concerning the transmission of moral responsibility from actions and omissions to outcomes. On the one hand there are cases of action in which responsibility appears to transmit to an outcome despite the fact that the agent could not have prevented the outcome. On the other hand there are similar cases of omission in which responsibility does not appear to transmit to an outcome. One seemingly plausible …
The fine-tuning argument against the multiverse
It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Moral responsibility (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works)