Daniele Bruno
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281636 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniele Bruno |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniele |
| FAMILY NAME | Bruno |
| SIGNATURE | BRUNO D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8860-9096 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism
One classic objection to Objectivism about ought is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so‐called Three‐Option‐Cases, the most famous of which is Jackson's case featuring a doctor called Jill. Some philosophers deny this orthodoxy and claim that Objectivism can yet account for our intuitions in such cases. In this paper, I critically evaluate such attempts and draw some more general lessons about Objectivism's ability to deal with …
Must we worry about epistemic shirkers
It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epist…
Perspectivism and Rights
Perspectivism is the view that what an agent ought to do always needs to be determined relative to this agent’s epistemic position. Despite its many virtues, this theory appears crucially flawed in its inability to properly account for the existence of universal claim rights. This article draws out this incompatibility through a set of plausible and widely accepted conceptual claims. It then discusses options available to the perspectivist in rea…
Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing
On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to dis…
Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection
Normative powers like promising allow agents to effect changes to their reasons, permissions and rights by the means of communicative actions whose function is to effect just those changes. An attractive view of the normativity of such powers combines a non-reductive account of their bindingness with a value-based grounding story of why we have them. This value-based view of normative powers however invites a charge of wishful thinking: Is it not…
Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection
One of the most formidable challenges to the Error Theory is the Normative Objection, according to which the Error Theory ought to be rejected because of its deeply implausible first-order normative implications. Recently, Bart Streumer has offered a novel and powerful defense of the Error Theory against this objection. Streumer argues that the Error Theory’s plausibility deficit when viewed against the background of our normative beliefs does no…
Trust-Based Theories of Promising
This paper discusses the prospects of a comprehensive philosophical account of promising that relies centrally on the notion of trust. I lay out the core idea behind the Trust View, showing how it convincingly explains the normative contours and the unique value of our promissory practice. I then sketch three distinct options of how the Trust View can explain the normativity of promises. First, an effect based-view, second, a view drawing on a wi…
Trust-Based Theories of Promising
This paper discusses the prospects of a comprehensive philosophical account of promising that relies centrally on the notion of trust. I lay out the core idea behind the Trust View, showing how it convincingly explains the normative contours and the unique value of our promissory practice. I then sketch three distinct options of how the Trust View can explain the normativity of promises. First, an effect based-view, second, a view drawing on a wi…
Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection
One of the most formidable challenges to the Error Theory is the Normative Objection, according to which the Error Theory ought to be rejected because of its deeply implausible first-order normative implications. Recently, Bart Streumer has offered a novel and powerful defense of the Error Theory against this objection. Streumer argues that the Error Theory’s plausibility deficit when viewed against the background of our normative beliefs does no…
Trust-Based Theories of Promising
This paper discusses the prospects of a comprehensive philosophical account of promising that relies centrally on the notion of trust. I lay out the core idea behind the Trust View, showing how it convincingly explains the normative contours and the unique value of our promissory practice. I then sketch three distinct options of how the Trust View can explain the normativity of promises. First, an effect based-view, second, a view drawing on a wi…
Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection
Normative powers like promising allow agents to effect changes to their reasons, permissions and rights by the means of communicative actions whose function is to effect just those changes. An attractive view of the normativity of such powers combines a non-reductive account of their bindingness with a value-based grounding story of why we have them. This value-based view of normative powers however invites a charge of wishful thinking: Is it not…
Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing
On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to dis…
Must we worry about epistemic shirkers
It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epist…
Perspectivism and Rights
Perspectivism is the view that what an agent ought to do always needs to be determined relative to this agent’s epistemic position. Despite its many virtues, this theory appears crucially flawed in its inability to properly account for the existence of universal claim rights. This article draws out this incompatibility through a set of plausible and widely accepted conceptual claims. It then discusses options available to the perspectivist in rea…
Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism
One classic objection to Objectivism about ought is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so‐called Three‐Option‐Cases, the most famous of which is Jackson's case featuring a doctor called Jill. Some philosophers deny this orthodoxy and claim that Objectivism can yet account for our intuitions in such cases. In this paper, I critically evaluate such attempts and draw some more general lessons about Objectivism's ability to deal with …
Epistemology (6 works) · Free Will and Agency (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Political science (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Normative (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works)