Shawn Tinghao Wang
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281698 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Shawn Tinghao Wang |
| GIVEN NAMES | Shawn Tinghao |
| FAMILY NAME | Wang |
| SIGNATURE | WANG S T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7329-6808 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Embarrassment and the Social Dimensions of Moral Agency
Unlike guilt and shame, embarrassment is rarely considered by philosophers to be a morally relevant emotion.This downplaying of embarrassment is well justified, given traditional views on moral agency. However, recent theorists have argued that the traditional views are too individualistic and overlook the external social conditions that they believe are part and parcel of our moral agency. Their alternative approach is often referred to as the “…
Deserved guilt? A challenge from small wrongdoings
According to a prominent view, all blameworthy wrongdoers deserve to feel guilt at some point in time and to some degree. In this paper, I pose a challenge against this view by examining cases involving extremely small wrongdoings. I contend that, granted that defenders of the above view have provided strong intuitive support and reasons for their thesis when it comes to the morally severe wrongdoings, similar considerations do not extend to the …
Intellectual Humility: Beyond the Learner Paradigm
Rethinking Functionalist Accounts of Blame
Beyond killing one to save five: Sensitivity to ratio and probability in moral judgment
A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral d…
The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge
Various theorists have endorsed the “communication argument”: communicative capacities are necessary for morally responsible agency because blame aims at a distinctive kind of moral communication. I contend that existing versions of the argument, including those defended by Gary Watson and Coleen Macnamara, face a pluralist challenge: they do not seem to sit well with the plausible view that blame has multiple aims. I then examine three possible …
Sensitivity to shifts in probability of harm and benefit in moral dilemmas
Shame and the Scope of Moral Accountability
It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments …
Shame and the Scope of Moral Accountability
It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments …
The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge
Various theorists have endorsed the “communication argument”: communicative capacities are necessary for morally responsible agency because blame aims at a distinctive kind of moral communication. I contend that existing versions of the argument, including those defended by Gary Watson and Coleen Macnamara, face a pluralist challenge: they do not seem to sit well with the plausible view that blame has multiple aims. I then examine three possible …
Sensitivity to shifts in probability of harm and benefit in moral dilemmas
Shame and the Scope of Moral Accountability
It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments …
Beyond killing one to save five: Sensitivity to ratio and probability in moral judgment
A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral d…
Rethinking Functionalist Accounts of Blame
Intellectual Humility: Beyond the Learner Paradigm
Embarrassment and the Social Dimensions of Moral Agency
Unlike guilt and shame, embarrassment is rarely considered by philosophers to be a morally relevant emotion.This downplaying of embarrassment is well justified, given traditional views on moral agency. However, recent theorists have argued that the traditional views are too individualistic and overlook the external social conditions that they believe are part and parcel of our moral agency. Their alternative approach is often referred to as the “…
Deserved guilt? A challenge from small wrongdoings
According to a prominent view, all blameworthy wrongdoers deserve to feel guilt at some point in time and to some degree. In this paper, I pose a challenge against this view by examining cases involving extremely small wrongdoings. I contend that, granted that defenders of the above view have provided strong intuitive support and reasons for their thesis when it comes to the morally severe wrongdoings, similar considerations do not extend to the …
Epistemology (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 works)